Reasoning from transitive premises: An EEG study

Neuroimaging studies have contributed to a major advance in understanding the neural and cognitive mechanisms underpinning deductive reasoning. However, the dynamics of cognitive events associated with inference making have been largely neglected. Using electroencephalography, the present study aims at describing the rapid sequence of processes involved in performing transitive inference (A B; B C therefore “A C”; with AB meaning “A is to the left of B”). The results indicate that when the second premise can be integrated into the first one (e.g. A B; B C) its processing elicits a P3b component. In contrast, when the second premise cannot be integrated into the first premise (e.g. A B; D C), a P600-like components is elicited. These ERP components are discussed with respect to cognitive expectations.     

Why expectations do or do not change after expectation violation: A comparison of seven models

Individuals are often confronted with events that violate their expectations, but disconfirming evidence does not always lead to expectation change. We review seven theoretical models on how individuals cope with disconfirming expectations: associative learning theories, the ViolEx Model, the model of coping with expectation disconfirmation (Roese & Sherman, 2007), the Meaning Maintenance Model, the Predictive Processing Framework, Expectancy Violations Theory, and the Expectation-Disconfirmation Model of consumer satisfaction. We focus on the proposed processes that relate to persistence or change of expectations. We discuss similarities and differences between the models. Three core coping processes are identified across most of these models – minimization of the importance of expectation-disconfirming evidence, search for/production of future expectation-confirming evidence, and expectation change. Suggestions for refinements and extensions of the models as well as for future empirical work on model testing are drawn.     

Individual differences in the tendency to see the expected

Prior knowledge has been shown to facilitate the incorporation of visual stimuli into awareness. We adopted an individual differences approach to explore whether a tendency to ‘see the expected’ is general or method-specific. We administered a binocular rivalry task and manipulated selective attention, as well as induced expectations via predictive context, self-generated imagery, expectancy cues, and perceptual priming. Most prior manipulations led to a facilitated awareness of the biased percept in binocular rivalry, whereas strong signal primes led to a suppressed awareness, i.e., adaptation. Correlations and factor analysis revealed that the facilitatory effect of priors on visual awareness is closely related to attentional control. We also investigated whether expectation-based biases predict perceptual abilities. Adaptation to strong primes predicted improved naturalistic change detection and the facilitatory effect of weak primes predicted the experience of perceptual anomalies. Taken together, our results indicate that the facilitatory effect of priors may be underpinned by an attentional mechanism but the tendency to ‘see the expected’ is method-specific.