IRB and Research Regulatory Delays Within the Military Health System: Do They Really Matter? And If So,Why and for Whom?

Institutional review board (IRB) delays may hinder the successful completion of federally funded research in the U.S. military. When this happens, time-sensitive, mission-relevant questions go unanswered. Research participants face unnecessary burdens and risks if delays squeeze recruitment timelines, resulting in inadequate sample sizes for definitive analyses. More broadly, military members are exposed to untested or undertested interventions, implemented by well-intentioned leaders who bypass the research process altogether. To illustrate, we offer two case examples. We posit that IRB delays often appear in the service of managing institutional risk, rather than protecting research participants. Regulators may see more risk associated with moving quickly than risk related to delay, choosing to err on the side of bureaucracy. The authors of this article, all of whom are military-funded researchers, government stakeholders, and/or human subject protection experts, offer feasible recommendations to improve the IRB system and, ultimately, research within military, veteran, and civilian populations.     

Not Just “Study Drugs” for the Rich: Stimulants as Moral Tools for Creating Opportunities for Socially Disadvantaged Students

An argument in the cognitive enhancement literature is that using stimulants in populations of healthy but socially disadvantaged individuals mistakenly attributes pathology to nonpathological individuals who experience social inequalities. As the argument goes, using stimulants as cognitive-enhancing drugs to solve the social problem of poorly educated students in inadequate schools misattributes the problem as an individual medical problem, when it is really a collective sociopolitical problem. I challenge this argument on the grounds that not all types of enhancement have to be explained in medical terms, but rather at least one conception of enhancement can be explained in social terms—opportunity maintenance. Therefore, I propose that as a moral requirement we ought to explore whether stimulants could be a means of remedying underprivileged children's experiences of social inequalities that are borne from inadequate schools for the sake of increasing their chances for opportunities and well-being.     

A Broader Understanding of Moral Distress

On the traditional view, moral distress arises only in cases where an individual believes she knows the morally right thing to do but fails to perform that action due to various constraints. We seek to motivate a broader understanding of moral distress. We begin by presenting six types of distress that fall outside the bounds of the traditional definition and explaining why they should be recognized as forms of moral distress. We then propose and defend a new and more expansive definition of moral distress and examine how it can enable the development of a taxonomy of moral distress.     

Fetal Risks,Relative Risks,and Relatives' Risks

Several factors related to fetal risk render it more or less acceptable in justifying constraints on the behavior of pregnant women. Risk is an unavoidable part of pregnancy and childbirth, one that women must balance against other vital personal and family interests. Two particular issues relate to the fairness of claims that pregnant women are never entitled to put their fetuses at risk: relative risks and relatives' risks. The former have been used—often spuriously—to advance arguments against activities, such as home birth, that may incur risk; the latter implicate the nature of relationships in determining the acceptability of coercing or precluding activities. Motivated reasoning by clinicians and judges leads to inaccurate risk assessments, and judgments based on false claims to objectivity. Such judgments undermine the moral and legal standing of pregnant women and do not advance the interests of fetuses, pregnant women, families, or states.     

The Complexity of Justice - A Challenge to the 21st Century

The author discusses two questions, the relation between liberalism and democracy, and the relation between ethics, morality and law. As to the first question, she argues that neither liberalism nor democracy are merely formal. Roughly spoken, it can be said that liberalism stands for negative liberties, whereas democracy stands for positive ones. She observes a non-contingent tension between the ethos of liberalism (personal freedom) and the ethos of democracy (equality; majority rule). It is the task of morality to maintain and restore the balance between these two kinds of ethos. As to the second question, she is worried about the balance between law (legal regulation), ethics, and morality. On the one hand, abolishing legal regulations would amount to abolishing the freedom of the moderns. On the other hand, the substitution of legal regulations for ethical regulations would lead to a similar result: the end of the freedom of the moderns through the homogenisation of life. In the former case, personal support, charity, magnanimity, and caring would get lost, while in the latter there would be no escape from community pressure towards uniformity.     

Argumentational Integrity: A Training Program for Dealing with Unfair Argumentative Contributions

In this article we present a training program based on the empirical research conducted in the project 'argumentational integrity'. After a brief sketch of the problem dimensions concerning unfair argumentation we give an overview of the training concept and the underlying empirical research. Exemplification of the instructional design is given for the second and the fifth training dimension (standards of argumentational integrity and reactions to unfair contributions). Finally we indicate how the training is to be evaluated and present initial results demonstrating that in comparison with an untrained control group participants in the training significantly improve their skills in identifying and naming argumentative rule violations.     

中西方古代“性善论”比较研究

本论文以中国古代儒家思想（以孔子和孟子为代表）和西方古希腊三杰（苏格拉底、柏拉图和亚里士多德）的人性思想中的＂性善论＂为研究对象,说明两者在唯心主义色彩、重义轻利的立场以及在重视人性的后天培养等几个方面的相似性;同时,作者还认识到,由于文化差异,双方在诸多方面又存在不同,主要表现为中西方在历史上占主导地位的人性观不同、在人性培养的方法认识上的差别、人与人之间关系的差异等。     

从对立走向统一——生态伦理学发展趋势研究

在生态伦理学研究中,人类中心主义和非人类中心主义围绕自然存在物有无道德地位等问题展开了激烈争论。这种争论的不可调和性及其观点的不可公度性,意味着生态伦理学自身发生了严重的形而上学危机。如何摆脱这一危机,使生态伦理学研究向纵深发展,成为摆在人们面前的一项重要任务。黑格尔关于人的自由意志是一个否定之否定过程的观点为走出这种争论提供了理论依据,马克思关于人与自然界完成本质统一的思想亦为消解这种对立奠定了理论基础。     

启新、拓新与创新——论生态伦理学对伦理学的贡献

构建和谐社会,必须弘扬生态伦理,繁荣生态伦理学。生态伦理学对伦理学的贡献功不可没,主要体现为：开辟了伦理学研究的新领域,确立了处理人与自然关系的新原则,培育了人对自然的新态度,对传统思想展开了新的系统批判,明确了人类在自然生活中扮演的新角色,对伦理学基本观念进行了新阐释,制定了人类行为新规范。     

试论罗尔斯顿环境伦理学的理论主旨

罗尔斯顿从整个西方伦理思想发展的角度出发,认为道德是人的存在方式,环境伦理的产生不是要推翻或取代人际伦理,而是要为自然共同体中的人类确立生存方式。人类道德之所以要观照自然生态系统,是因为自然生态系统具有自身的内在价值和存在目的,以文化方式生存于其中的人类须对此给予道德的尊重。环境伦理与人际伦理共同构成了完整的人之伦理,它们都是人的生存之道。