Reactions to threat by defensive and congruent internals and externals: A self-esteem analysis

The hypothesis that vulnerable self-esteem internals and externals would react more defensively to negative intellectual and personality feedback than congruent (more secure self-esteem) internals and externals was investigated in two experiments. The defensive (DE)-congruent (CE) external distinction was strongly confirmed in both cases. In Experiment 1, DEs assumed less personal responsibility for failure than for success, while CEs assumed little personal responsibility for either outcome. Defensive externals performed more poorly than CEs on a task described as an IQ test, suggesting greater anxiety in the face of possible failure. In Experiment 2, DEs rated themselves more favorably and derogated evaluator's competence more than CEs following receipt of negative information regarding their interpersonal skills. Congruent internals (CI) performed more poorly than defensive internals (DI) on the “IQ” task, while male DIs attributed responsibility for outcomes more defensively. It was suggested that a consistently internal view of causation may increase stress in evaluative situations. Implications of these findings for better understanding the relationship between locus of control and maladjustment were discussed, and suggestions for future research were presented.     

Kant and the transparency of the mind

ABSTRACT

It has become standard to treat Kant’s characterization of pure apperception as involving the claim that questions about what I think are transparent to questions about the world. By contrast, empirical apperception is thought to be non-transparent, since it involves a kind of inner observation of my mental states. I propose a reading that reverses this: pure apperception is non-transparent, because conscious only of itself, whereas empirical apperception is transparent to the world. The reading I offer, unlike the standard one, can accommodate Kant’s claim that the I of pure apperception is the same as the I of empirical apperception.