Understanding cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game

In the standard one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game, participants often choose to cooperate, when the optimal strategy is to defect. This puzzling finding has attracted considerable interest both in terms of possible computational frameworks for modeling human judgment, but also regarding the more general debate of human altruism. In this research, we ask how much of human behavior in this task can be explained by a putative bias for cooperative behavior and whether this, in turn, is influenced by personality. We compared performance on the standard task with performance on a matched neutral one; we manipulated the optimal strategy (defect or cooperate); and we manipulated the amount of payoff for responding optimally. Results revealed little evidence for a bias for cooperative behavior, but significant associations with the personality factors of Behavioural Activation System (BAS) Reward Responsivity and Agreeableness were found. These findings are discussed in terms of the attempt to explain judgment in one-shot, Prisoner’s Dilemma tasks with statistical or probabilistic models.     

Qualia im Knotenpunkt zwischen Leib und Seele: „Argumentatives“ Dilemma in der gegenwärtigen Diskussion über die Subjektivität mentaler Zustände

Qualia in the node-point between mind and body: Dilemma of present discussion about the subjectivity of mental states. The present discussion about qualia shows a bewildering variety of different positions. We show implicit assumptions about brain, subject, and qualia of this complex discussion. By means of three assumptions we divide the discussion about qualia into three different positions (proposition, opposition, intermediate solutions). These positions and their exemplaric authors are briefly presented along the lines of the three assumptions. The next step shows how each position solves the dilemma which arises if one relates all three assumptions by eliminating at least one of the three assumptions. Finally, general problems in the discussion of qualia are shown by means of which the dilemma of the relation between brain, subject and qualia may be brought closer to a solution without eliminating one assumption.     

On Irony Interpretation: Socratic Method in Plato's Euthyphro

Socratic Method in the Euthyphro can be fruitfully analysed as a method of irony interpretation. Socrates' method – the irony of irony interpretation – is to pretend that Euthyphro is an ironist in order to transform him into a self-ironist. To be a self-ironist is to ironize one's knowledge of virtue in order to bring an intuitive and unarticulated awareness of virtue to mind. The exercise of the capacity for self-irony is then a mode of striving for the good.     

Socrates,the primary question,and the unity of virtue

For Socrates, the virtues are a kind of knowledge, and the virtues form a unity. Sometimes, Socrates suggests that the virtues are all ‘one and the same’ thing. Other times, he suggests they are ‘parts of a single whole.’ I argue that (i) the ‘what is x?’ question is sophisticated, it gives rise to two distinct kinds of investigations into virtue, a conceptual investigation into the ousia and a psychological investigation into the dunamis, (ii) Plato recognized the difference between definitional accounts of the ousia and a psychological accounts of the dunamis, and (iii) the distinction between these two investigations can effectively resolve various interpretive puzzles regarding the unity of the virtues. It is argued that the virtues are ‘one and the same’ psychologically, while they are ‘parts of a single whole’ conceptually.     

Rationality and bounded information in repeated games, with application to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Actions in a repeated game can in principle depend on all previous outcomes. Given this vast policy space, human players may often be forced to use heuristics that base actions on incomplete information, such as the outcomes of only the most recent trials. Here it is proven that such bounded rationality is often fully rational, in that the optimal policy based on some limited information about the game's history will be universally optimal (i.e., within the full policy space), provided that one's opponents are restricted to using this same information. It is then shown how this result allows explicit calculation of subgame-perfect equilibria (SPEs) for any repeated or stochastic game. The technique is applied to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma for the case of 1-back memory. Two classes of SPEs are derived, which exhibit varying degrees of (individually rational) cooperation as a result of repeated interaction.     

Responses to Conflict and Cooperation in Adolescents with Anxiety and Mood Disorders

This study examined patterns of behavioral and emotional responses to conflict and cooperation in adolescents with anxiety/mood disorders and healthy peers. We compared performance on and emotional responses to the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game, an economic exchange task involving conflict and cooperation, between adolescents with anxiety/depressive disorders (A/D) (N=21) and healthy comparisons (n = 29). Participants were deceived to believe their co-player (a pre-programmed computer algorithm) was another study participant. A/D adolescents differed significantly from comparisons in patterns of play and emotional response to the game. Specifically, A/D participants responded more cooperatively to cooperative overtures from their co-players; A/D girls also reported more anger toward co-players than did comparison girls. Our findings indicate that A/D adolescents, particularly females, respond distinctively to stressful social interchanges. These findings offer a first step toward elucidating the mechanisms underlying social impairment in youth with internalizing disorders. This research was supported by the Intramural Research Program of the NIH, NIMH.     

Analysing driver’s decision in dilemma zone at signalized intersections under disordered traffic conditions

Delay in the decision-making process of stop or go during the amber phase of the signal cycle often leads to abrupt hard deceleration or red light violations at signalized intersections. The indecisiveness or the dilemma in decision making often results in compromised safety of the road users. The present study attempts to analyze the driver’s behaviour in order to make the decision of stop or go and developed a binary logistic regression model while considering different traffic behaviour parameters exhibited and observed after the onset of the amber phase. Empirical vehicular trajectory data from three signalized intersections covering 121 signal cycles and 1347 vehicles are used in the study. The study presents two dilemma zone identification models based on distance from the stop line, focusing on easy-to-use and static driver assistance and dynamic-realtime driver assistance systems. Both the models are observed to show good fit and prediction accuracy. The models are validated internally and externally for their adaptability in the field. The effect of different traffic parameters on the dilemma zone is explored, and a possible real-time application of the dynamic model as a driver assistance system in decision-making is explored.     

Monty Hall Dilemma的困难原因探讨

采用Monty Hall Dilemma的经典研究范式,探讨了大学生被试在不同提示条件下对MHD问题的解决情况,结果发现只有在条件关系提示下,MHD的作业成绩才得到了明显的改善,但是正确率也只有35.7%。这表明MHD问题困难的原因很可能是多方面的,如认为主持人的行为完全是随机事件,很难意识到参与者的最初选择与主持人打开特定盒子间的三种条件关系;多数被试作出选择的理由是非理性的,如“坚持第一选择,相信自己的直觉”;不能正确判断MHD问题的内在概率关系以及缺乏认真思考的动力等。     

An evaluation of the effectiveness of countermeasures for improving the safety of dilemma zones: A driving simulator study

The main objective of this driving simulator study is to analyze the behavior of the driver at the start of the yellow signal of a signalized rural intersection and identify the most effective countermeasures for tackling the dilemma zone, namely an area on the intersection approach where vehicles at the start of the yellow phase can neither safely stop before the stop line nor cross the intersection. The following countermeasures were tested in the study on a sample of 48 drivers: green signal countdown timers, GSCT (C₁); a new pattern of vertical and horizontal warning signs (C₂); and an advanced on-board driver assistance system based on augmented reality (AR) and connected vehicle technologies (C₃). These countermeasures were tested and compared to a baseline condition (B) where no countermeasures were applied. Based on the results of this study, the C₂ and C₃ countermeasures have proven to be valid tools for reducing driver indecision when approaching signalized intersections at the start of the yellow signal. In fact, using C₂ and C₃, the length of the dilemma zone was equal to 30 m and 36 m, respectively, with a reduction of about 50%, as compared to the baseline condition (B). Moreover, a reduced number of false behaviors was recorded, as well as a greater consistency in driver decision-making behaviors. Conversely, the C₁ countermeasure did not lead to a significant improvement in the dilemma zone: an unnecessary increase in early stop rates was recorded, resulting in reduced intersection efficiency and operations.     

"是-应该"问题及其解答

休谟提出如何从“是”推出“应该”,亦即如何从事实判断推出价值判断的问题。本文以该问题为线索,评述和澄清休谟道德哲学的主要观点,并对与此问题密切相关的“囚徒困境”作了探讨。在此基础上,提出一种新的解答,即：“是一应该”问题是不能彻底解决的,在这个意义上,休谟的“是一应该”论题是正确的。但是,在另一种意义上,“是一应该”问题是可以解决的,即对于那些已经把长远利益作为追求目标的人而言是如此。因为对他们来说,追求长远利益已经是一个事实,因而必须考虑与他人或社会的合作,这使他们原有的同情心得到加强,从而产生名誉感和自尊心,进而达到正义和仁慈的德行。这样便从追求长远利益的“是”得出正义和仁慈的“应该”。