The Three Quines

This paper concerns Quine's stance on the issue of meaning normativity. I argue that three distinct and not obviously compatible positions on meaning normativity can be extracted from his philosophy of language - eliminative ]naturalism (Quine I), deflationary pragmatism (Quine II), and (restricted) strong normativism (Quine III) - which result from Quine's failure to separate adequately four different questions that surround the issue: the reality, source, sense, and scope of the normative dimension. In addition to the incompatibility of the views taken together, I argue on the basis of considerations due to Wittgenstein, Dummett, and Davidson that each view taken separately has self-standing problems. The first two fail to appreciate the ineliminability of the strong normativity of logic and so face a dilemma: they either smuggle it in illicitly, or insofar as they do not, fail to give an account of anything like a language. The third position's mixture of a universalism about logical concepts with a thorough-going relativism about non-logical concepts can be challenged once a distinction is drawn between the universalist and contextualist readings of strong normativity, a distinction inspired by Wittgenstein's distinction between grammatical and empirical judgements.     

Ambiguity,the Trinity,and Naturalism: From the Methodology of Pannenberg to the Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty

Abstract

Through an interpretation of Wolfhart Pannenberg's trinitarian methodology, this article presents the argument that theology and naturalism are ambiguously intertwined and that we once again have to determine how to methodologically address the relationship between theology and science. This study contends that Pannenberg's theology is important for our conception of the dialog between theology and science. However, I wish to offer a fundamentally new interpretation of Pannenberg which locates the ambiguous character of his methodology primarily in the substantive issue with which it deals. This redirects the dialogue between theology and science through Pannenberg's hermeneutic of history towards the contemporary phenomenology of the body and ultimately to the suggestion of a trinitarian-phenomenological approach beyond the methodology of Pannenberg.     

增加卫生改革的伦理含金量——兼论卫生改革中的效率与公平

卫生改革需要有包括卫生改革伦理学理念在内的全方位改革理念的联手支撑。伦理含金量缺失或者不足,卫生改革实践就难以取得圆满成功。因此,目前展开的新一轮卫生改革,必须以“效率与公平合理兼顾”为核心准则,在完善政策、规划目标、组织实施等全过程中切实保证卫生改革伦理学理念准确到位和正常运作。     

高校心理咨询师多重关系情境与决策类型的研究

为探索高校咨询师面临的多重关系伦理情境、决策过程,对访谈17名高校心理咨询师的资料进行分析。结果：常见情境主要包括接送礼物承载的新关系、来访者和咨询师除咨询关系外的师生关系、咨询师与和来访者有关的第三人有关系、咨询师在咨询室之外的场所偶遇来访者、来访者有咨询师的联系方式、来访者和咨询师有身体接触等。决策表现为两种：经验主导型,决策时未意识到处于伦理情境只凭经验决策;伦理主导型,决策时意识到处在伦理情境。结论：高校心理咨询存在一些特殊多重关系,心理咨询师需增加具有伦理意识的决策。     

Are country level prevalences of rule violations associated with knowledge overclaiming among students?

Cultural norms of behaviour influence desirable and problematic behaviours of individuals. In particular, cultural norms should influence individuals' dishonesty. In a recent Nature study, prevalence of rule violations was introduced as a new country‐level measure of behavioural norms. However, information on individuals' actual honesty was not available due to characteristics of the experimental design. Overcoming this limitation, we show that country‐level behavioural norms are related to individual‐level knowledge overclaiming behaviour (i.e., claiming to know concepts that do not exist, a measure of individuals' actual behavioural dishonesty) among 290,954 students from 57 countries (from the 2012 PISA study). Our study represents a crucial test of the argument that cultural norms influence individual's behaviour and of the validity of the measurement of countries' prevalences of rule violations. These results imply that shaping the behaviour of today's students may result in new behavioural norms that emphasise honesty and rule adherence more strongly.     

Anti-Autonomism Defended: A Reply to Hill

In the current issue of this journal, Scott Hill critiques some of my work on the “is”-“ought” controversy, the Hume-inspired debate over whether an ethical conclusion can be soundly, or even validly, derived from only non-ethical premises. I’ve argued that it can be; Hill is unconvinced. I reply to Hill’s critique, focusing on four key questions to which he and I give different answers.

Husserl’s transcendental philosophy and the critique of naturalism

Throughout his career, Husserl identifies naturalism as the greatest threat to both the sciences and philosophy. In this paper, I explicate Husserl’s overall diagnosis and critique of naturalism and then examine the specific transcendental aspect of his critique. Husserl agreed with the Neo-Kantians in rejecting naturalism. He has three major critiques of naturalism: First, it (like psychologism and for the same reasons) is ‘countersensical’ in that it denies the very ideal laws that it needs for its own justification. Second, naturalism essentially misconstrues consciousness by treating it as a part of the world. Third, naturalism is the inevitable consequence of a certain rigidification of the ‘natural attitude’ into what Husserl calls the ‘naturalistic attitude’. This naturalistic attitude ‘reifies’ and it ‘absolutizes’ the world such that it is treated as taken-for-granted and ‘obvious’. Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological analysis, however, discloses that the natural attitude is, despite its omnipresence in everyday life, not primary, but in fact is relative to the ‘absolute’ transcendental attitude. The mature Husserl’s critique of naturalism is therefore based on his acceptance of the absolute priority of the transcendental attitude. The paradox remains that we must start from and, in a sense, return to the natural attitude, while, at the same time, restricting this attitude through the on-going transcendental vigilance of the universal epoché.

爱因斯坦科技伦理思想的三个基本命题

爱因斯坦是科学道德权威的象征。他的科技伦理思想非常丰富,其中,道德是一切人类价值的基础、科技具有伦理二重性以及科学家和工程师担负着特别沉重的道义责任等三个命题构成了他的科技伦理思想的核心。这些思想对于人类在科技活动中正确把握真与善的关系具有重要启迪。