The Three Quines

This paper concerns Quine's stance on the issue of meaning normativity. I argue that three distinct and not obviously compatible positions on meaning normativity can be extracted from his philosophy of language - eliminative ]naturalism (Quine I), deflationary pragmatism (Quine II), and (restricted) strong normativism (Quine III) - which result from Quine's failure to separate adequately four different questions that surround the issue: the reality, source, sense, and scope of the normative dimension. In addition to the incompatibility of the views taken together, I argue on the basis of considerations due to Wittgenstein, Dummett, and Davidson that each view taken separately has self-standing problems. The first two fail to appreciate the ineliminability of the strong normativity of logic and so face a dilemma: they either smuggle it in illicitly, or insofar as they do not, fail to give an account of anything like a language. The third position's mixture of a universalism about logical concepts with a thorough-going relativism about non-logical concepts can be challenged once a distinction is drawn between the universalist and contextualist readings of strong normativity, a distinction inspired by Wittgenstein's distinction between grammatical and empirical judgements.     

Duty orientation: Theoretical development and preliminary construct testing

We develop and test the construct of duty orientation that we propose is valuable to advancing knowledge about ethical behavior in organizations. Duty orientation represents an individual’s volitional orientation to loyally serve and faithfully support other members of the group, to strive and sacrifice to accomplish the tasks and missions of the group, and to honor its codes and principles. We test the construct validity and predictive validity of a measure of duty orientation across five studies and six samples. Consistent with the conceptualization of duty orientation as a malleable construct, we found in separate field studies that duty orientation mediates the relationship between ethical leadership and ethical and unethical behaviors, and between transformational leadership and ethical behavior. In predicting ethical and unethical behavior, duty orientation demonstrated incremental predictive validity beyond the effects of affective organizational commitment, organizational identification, experienced job responsibility, collective self-construal, and organizational values congruence.     

Ethical ends: Effect of abstract mindsets in ethical decisions for the greater social good

We explore the impact of construal level on decisions involving conflicts between multiple ethical principles. Whereas abstract mindsets are associated with a focus on ethical issues and superordinate concerns, concrete mindsets are associated with financial self-interest. With abstract mindsets, we find that people abide by rather than violate ethical principles when only the self would benefit (single principle) but they violate ethical principles when doing so is a conduit for a greater social good (multiple principles). With concrete mindsets, people violate ethical principles for personal gain with less concern for the impact on the greater social good. Specifically, with abstract mindsets, people were dishonest to secure larger donations (Study 1) and dishonest to make larger (smaller) donations to charities that supported (threatened) the greater social good (Study 2a, Study 2b) whereas with concrete mindsets, people focused more on dishonesty for personal gain (Study 1, Study 2a, Study 2b).     

Ego depletion and its paradoxical effects on ethical decision making

Whereas previous research has shown that ego depletion can lead to an increase in unethical behavior, we suggest that this effect hinges on the social consensus of the unethical behavior. Drawing from theories on social consensus and dual-process decision-making, we hypothesize and confirm that ego depletion is associated with increased unethical behavior of comparatively low social consensus. We then find that, as hypothesized, ego depletion is associated with decreased unethical behavior of high social consensus (Studies 1 and 2). Results further suggest that, controlling for state self-control resources, depleted participants are less likely to engage in unethical behavior of high social consensus as a result of increased subjective fatigue (Study 3). Taken together, our findings challenge a widely-held assumption about the negative effects of ego depletion on ethical decision making.     

Two kinds of naturalism in ethics

What are the conditions on a successful naturalistic account of moral properties? In this paper I discuss one such condition: the possibility of moral concepts playing a role in good empirical theories on a par with those of the natural and social sciences. I argue that Peter Railton’s influential account of moral rightness fails to meet this condition, and thus is only viable in the hands of a naturalist who doesn’t insist on it. This conclusion generalises to all versions of naturalism that give a significant role to a dispositional characterisation of moral properties. I also argue, however, that the epistemological and semantic motivations behind naturalism are consistent with a version of naturalism that doesn’t insist on the explanatory condition. The conclusion is that those naturalists who are attracted to accounts of moral properties such as Railton’s would do better not to insist on this\break condition.     

增加卫生改革的伦理含金量——兼论卫生改革中的效率与公平

卫生改革需要有包括卫生改革伦理学理念在内的全方位改革理念的联手支撑。伦理含金量缺失或者不足,卫生改革实践就难以取得圆满成功。因此,目前展开的新一轮卫生改革,必须以“效率与公平合理兼顾”为核心准则,在完善政策、规划目标、组织实施等全过程中切实保证卫生改革伦理学理念准确到位和正常运作。     

Husserl’s transcendental philosophy and the critique of naturalism

Throughout his career, Husserl identifies naturalism as the greatest threat to both the sciences and philosophy. In this paper, I explicate Husserl’s overall diagnosis and critique of naturalism and then examine the specific transcendental aspect of his critique. Husserl agreed with the Neo-Kantians in rejecting naturalism. He has three major critiques of naturalism: First, it (like psychologism and for the same reasons) is ‘countersensical’ in that it denies the very ideal laws that it needs for its own justification. Second, naturalism essentially misconstrues consciousness by treating it as a part of the world. Third, naturalism is the inevitable consequence of a certain rigidification of the ‘natural attitude’ into what Husserl calls the ‘naturalistic attitude’. This naturalistic attitude ‘reifies’ and it ‘absolutizes’ the world such that it is treated as taken-for-granted and ‘obvious’. Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological analysis, however, discloses that the natural attitude is, despite its omnipresence in everyday life, not primary, but in fact is relative to the ‘absolute’ transcendental attitude. The mature Husserl’s critique of naturalism is therefore based on his acceptance of the absolute priority of the transcendental attitude. The paradox remains that we must start from and, in a sense, return to the natural attitude, while, at the same time, restricting this attitude through the on-going transcendental vigilance of the universal epoché.

Anti-Autonomism Defended: A Reply to Hill

In the current issue of this journal, Scott Hill critiques some of my work on the “is”-“ought” controversy, the Hume-inspired debate over whether an ethical conclusion can be soundly, or even validly, derived from only non-ethical premises. I’ve argued that it can be; Hill is unconvinced. I reply to Hill’s critique, focusing on four key questions to which he and I give different answers.

高校心理咨询师多重关系情境与决策类型的研究

为探索高校咨询师面临的多重关系伦理情境、决策过程,对访谈17名高校心理咨询师的资料进行分析。结果：常见情境主要包括接送礼物承载的新关系、来访者和咨询师除咨询关系外的师生关系、咨询师与和来访者有关的第三人有关系、咨询师在咨询室之外的场所偶遇来访者、来访者有咨询师的联系方式、来访者和咨询师有身体接触等。决策表现为两种：经验主导型,决策时未意识到处于伦理情境只凭经验决策;伦理主导型,决策时意识到处在伦理情境。结论：高校心理咨询存在一些特殊多重关系,心理咨询师需增加具有伦理意识的决策。     

Hume’s naturalistic theory of representation

Hume is a naturalist in many different respects and about many different topics; this paper argues that he is also a naturalist about intentionality and representation. It does so in the course of answering four questions about his theory of mental representation: (1) Which perceptions represent? (2) What can perceptions represent? (3) Why do perceptions represent at all? (4) Howdo perceptions represent what they do? It appears that, for Hume, all perceptions except passions can represent; and they can represent bodies, minds, and persons, with their various qualities. In addition, ideas can represent impressions and other ideas. However, he explicitly rejects the view that ideas are inherently representational, and he implicitly adopts a view according to which things (whether mental or non-mental) represent in virtue of playing, through the production of mental effects and dispositions, a significant part of the causal and/or functional role of what they represent. It is in virtue of their particular functional roles that qualitatively identical ideas are capable of representing particulars or general kinds; substances or modes; relations; past, present, or future; and individuals or compounds.