Mental representation of symbols as revealed by vocabulary errors in two bonobos (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Pan paniscus</Emphasis>)

Error analysis has been used in humans to detect implicit representations and categories in language use. The present study utilizes the same technique to report on mental representations and categories in symbol use from two bonobos (Pan paniscus). These bonobos have been shown in published reports to comprehend English at the level of a two-and-a-half year old child and to use a keyboard with over 200 visuographic symbols (lexigrams). In this study, vocabulary test errors from over 10 years of data revealed auditory, visual, and spatio-temporal generalizations (errors were more likely items that looked like sounded like, or were frequently associated with the sample item in space or in time), as well as hierarchical and conceptual categorizations. These error data, like those of humans, are a result of spontaneous responding rather than specific training and do not solely depend upon the sample mode (e.g. auditory similarity errors are not universally more frequent with an English sample, nor were visual similarity errors universally more frequent with a photograph sample). However, unlike humans, these bonobos do not make errors based on syntactical confusions (e.g. confusing semantically unrelated nouns), suggesting that they may not separate syntactical and semantic information. These data suggest that apes spontaneously create a complex, hierarchical, web of representations when exposed to a symbol system. Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.     

Gassing, braking, and self-regulating: Error self-regulation, well-being, and goal-related processes

Social cognitive models point to a widespread appreciation for the role that self-regulation functions play in mediating social outcomes. The present five studies, involving 527 undergraduate participants, sought to build on such models in the context of individual differences in error self-regulation. In this respect, the studies used a robust cognitive model, namely one that proposes that people seek to interrupt processing routines after making an error in choice reaction time tasks. Studies 1-3 showed that greater tendencies toward error self-regulation predicted higher levels of well-being. Studies 4-5 extended such results by showing that greater tendencies toward error self-regulation predicted superior abilities to recognize motive-relevant stimuli (Study 4) and override a prior task set in favor of a new task set (Study 5). Overall, the findings both point to the functionality of individual differences in error self-regulation and help to elucidate the processing basis of such relations.     

WITHIN‐TRIAL CONTRAST: WHEN IS A FAILURE TO REPLICATE NOT A TYPE I ERROR?

Vasconcelos, Urcuioli, and Lionello-DeNolf (2007) report the results of five experiments that fail to replicate the results of our within-trial contrast study (Clement, Feltus, Kaiser, & Zentall, 2000) and suggest that our results may represent a Type I Error. We believe that this conclusion is not warranted because (a) there is considerable evidence in support of the effect and (b) the amount of training that they gave to their pigeons prior to test may not have been sufficient to observe the effect reliably. We suggest that when sufficient training is provided, reliable contrast can be found.     

A Bayesian approach to the evolution of perceptual and cognitive systems

We describe a formal framework for analyzing how statistical properties of natural environments and the process of natural selection interact to determine the design of perceptual and cognitive systems. The framework consists of two parts: a Bayesian ideal observer with a utility function appropriate for natural selection, and a Bayesian formulation of Darwin's theory of natural selection. Simulations of Bayesian natural selection were found to yield new insights, for example, into the co‐evolution of camouflage, color vision, and decision criteria. The Bayesian framework captures and generalizes, in a formal way, many of the important ideas of other approaches to perception and cognition.     

Learning climate scale: Construction,reliability and initial validity evidence

The current study developed an instrument for measuring learning climate in organizations. A review of the organizational learning and facilitation of workplace learning literature resulted in three theoretically relevant dimensions referring to facilitation, appreciation, and error avoidance. The 3-dimensional learning climate scale (LCS) was tested in a heterogeneous sample of Dutch wage earners (N = 1013). Confirmatory factor analysis and analysis of measurement invariance were conducted to establish the factorial structure of the measure. Also, convergent, divergent, and construct validity of the LCS were investigated. The findings showed that the newly developed instrument for learning climate has good psychometric properties: the three-factor structure was supported and the sub-scales were reliable. Furthermore, the LCS showed good convergent and divergent validity.     

The role of causal models in multiple judgments under uncertainty

Two studies examined a novel prediction of the causal Bayes net approach to judgments under uncertainty, namely that causal knowledge affects the interpretation of statistical evidence obtained over multiple observations. Participants estimated the conditional probability of an uncertain event (breast cancer) given information about the base rate, hit rate (probability of a positive mammogram given cancer) and false positive rate (probability of a positive mammogram in the absence of cancer). Conditional probability estimates were made after observing one or two positive mammograms. Participants exhibited a causal stability effect: there was a smaller increase in estimates of the probability of cancer over multiple positive mammograms when a causal explanation of false positives was provided. This was the case when the judgments were made by different participants (Experiment 1) or by the same participants (Experiment 2). These results show that identical patterns of observed events can lead to different estimates of event probability depending on beliefs about the generative causes of the observations.     

Minority religions in the census: the case of British Muslims

Abstract

This article considers the impact of census data on British Muslims, as well as the potential consequences of changes to the UK census beyond 2011 for minority religions. Focusing on the Muslim case, it reflects on data generated in previous censuses and the ways in which they have been used. The discussion explores the perceived need for social statistics on religion, particularly in relation to the increased identification of ‘Muslim’ as a religious rather than ethnic classification. It gives an overview of insights gained as a result of having data on religion in addition to ethnicity, notably: the high levels of socioeconomic disadvantage experienced by British Muslims and the ability to access information on Muslims that was hitherto hidden. Finally, the article provides a brief summary of proposed changes to the new census format and considers the likely outcomes for British Muslims if the scope of data collected on religion is reduced.     

Are summary statistics enough? Evidence for the importance of shape in guiding visual search

Peripheral vision outside the focus of attention may rely on summary statistics. We used a gaze-contingent paradigm to directly test this assumption by asking whether search performance differed between targets and statistically-matched visualizations of the same targets. Four-object search displays included one statistically-matched object that was replaced by an unaltered version of the object during the first eye movement. Targets were designated by previews, which were never altered. Two types of statistically-matched objects were tested: One that maintained global shape and one that did not. Differences in guidance were found between targets and statistically-matched objects when shape was not preserved, suggesting that they were not informationally equivalent. Responses were also slower after target fixation when shape was not preserved, suggesting an extrafoveal processing of the target that again used shape information. We conclude that summary statistics must include some global shape information to approximate the peripheral information used during search.     

Calibrated Bayes Factors Should Not Be Used: A Reply to Hoijtink,van Kooten,and Hulsker

Hoijtink, Kooten, and Hulsker (2016 Hoijtink, H., van Kooten, P., &; Hulsker, K. (2016). Why Bayesian psychologists should change the way they use the Bayes factor. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 51, 1--9. doi: 10.1080/00273171.2014.969364.[Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) present a method for choosing the prior distribution for an analysis with Bayes factor that is based on controlling error rates, which they advocate as an alternative to our more subjective methods (Morey &; Rouder, 2014 Morey, R.D., &; Rouder, J.N. (2014). Bayesfactor: Computation of Bayes factors for common designs. R package version 0.9.9. Retrieved from http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=BayesFactor [Google Scholar]; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, &; Iverson, 2009 Rouder, J.N., Speckman, P.L., Sun, D., Morey, R.D., &; Iverson, G. (2009). Bayesian t-tests for accepting and rejecting the null hypothesis. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 16, 225–237. doi: 10.3758/PBR.16.2.225[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, &; van der Maas, 2011 Wagenmakers, E.-J., Wetzels, R., Borsboom, D., &; van der Maas, H. (2011). Why psychologists must change the way they analyze their data: The case of psi. A comment on Bem (2011). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 426–432. doi: 10.1037/a0022790[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). We show that the method they advocate amounts to a simple significance test, and that the resulting Bayes factors are not interpretable. Additionally, their method fails in common circumstances, and has the potential to yield arbitrarily high Type II error rates. After critiquing their method, we outline the position on subjectivity that underlies our advocacy of Bayes factors.     

Sidman or statistics?

Murray Sidman's statements regarding variability, experimental control, and generality are interwoven with examples from the literature on conditional discrimination. Sidman's position was that statistical inferences from group studies produce no information about the behavior of individual subjects and that statistical treatment of individual subject data masks variability which may represent conditions that are not controlled. Sidman's work on conditional discrimination provides excellent examples of how complex discriminations should be examined in detail with accuracy levels obtained for each type of discrimination within an experiment. Sidman made important contributions to the foundation of behavior analysis with extensive basic research as well as applications of methods and principles to clinical and educational settings.