大学生的认知风格与逻辑推理的关系

以大学生为被试,探讨认知风格与逻辑推理的关系。结果表明：（1）在三段论推理中,场依存型学生和场独立型学生推理成绩不存在显著差异,学过和未学过逻辑学的学生推理成绩也不存在显著差异,但男生和女生推理成绩差异显著,女生比男生更易受“气氛”的影响。（2）在命题推理中,对抽象材料构成的命题,场独立型学生和场依存型学生的推理存在显著差异,场独立型学生表现出更强的证伪倾向,场依存型学生表现出更强的换位倾向;对具体材料构成的命题,场独立型学生和场依存型学生的推理不存在显著差异。     

Two for the show: Anti-luck and virtue epistemologies in consonance

This essay extends my side of a discussion begun earlier with Duncan Pritchard, the recent author of Epistemic Luck.Pritchard’s work contributes significantly to improving the “diagnostic appeal” of a neo-Moorean philosophical response to radical scepticism. While agreeing with Pritchard in many respects, the paper questions the need for his concession to the sceptic that the neo-Moorean is capable at best of recovering “‘brute’ externalist knowledge”. The paper discusses and directly responds to a dilemma that Pritchard poses for virtue epistemologies (VE). It also takes issue with Pritchard’s “merely safety-based” alternative. Ultimately, however, the criticisms made here of Pritchard’s dilemma and its underlying contrast of “anti-luck” and “virtue” epistemologies are intended to help realize his own aspirations for a better diagnosis of radical scepticism to inform a still better neo-Moorean response.     

假言推理的否定词效应

介绍假言推理中的4种否定词效应,以及相关的理论模型。被试在进行假言推理时,对前提或结论所表示的事件加进了否定词, 产生了一系列的心理效应。研究发现,范畴前提含有否定词,被试更难做出正确的推论;如果结论中含有否定词,被试却更容易做出正确的推论。为此,心理模型理论,规则理论,概率模型理论以及我国的学者对该问题都作了研究和阐述。     

小学儿童两维空间方位传递性推理能力的发展

研究了小学儿童两维空间方位传递性推理能力的发展水平及认知策略,同时,对心理模型理论进行了检验。被试为城市中等小学7岁、9岁、11岁儿童各24名,男女各半。单模型和双模型两种实验任务均为四前提。采用个别实验,儿童在前提呈现的情况下进行推理。主要研究结果：（1）7岁儿童开始萌发了两维空间方位传递性推理能力,9岁儿童和11岁儿童的推理能力处于发展和提高过程中;（2）随着年龄增长,使用模型建构策略解决问题的儿童人次越来越多,绝大部分11岁儿童都能使用这一策略进行推理。但即使儿童使用了模型建构策略,他们的推理成绩也没有反映出模型数量所造成的任务难度差异,即不符合心理模型理论关于模型数量的主要预期;（3）即使儿童能自发生成模型建构策略,儿童在两维空间方位传递性推理中使用这一策略的有效性程度并不高。     

Normische Gesetzeshypothesen und die wissenschaftsphilosophische Bedeutung des nichtmonotonen Schliessens

Normic Laws and the Significance of Nonmonotonic Reasoning for Philosophy of Science. Normic laws have the form ‘if A then normally B’. They have been discovered in the explanation debate, but were considered as empirically vacuous (§1). I argue that the prototypical (or ideal) normality of normic laws implies statistical normality (§2), whence normic laws have empirical content. In §3–4 I explain why reasoning from normic laws is nonmonotonic, and why the understanding of the individual case is so important here. After sketching some foundations of nonmonotonic reasoning as developed by AI-researchers (§5), Iargue that normic laws are also the best way to understand ceteris paribus laws (§6). §7 deals with the difference between physical and non-physical disciplines and §9 with the difference between normicity and approximation. In §8 it is shown how nonmonotonic reasoning provides a new understanding of the protection of theories against falsification by auxiliary hypotheses. §10, finally, gives a system- and evolution-theoretical explanation of the deeper reason for the omnipresence of normic laws in practice and science, and forthe connection between ideal and statistical normality. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Propositional Plausible Logic: Introduction and Implementation

Plausible Logic allows defeasible deduction with arbitrary propositions, and yet when sufficiently simplified it is very similar to the Defeasible Logics of Billington and Nute. This paper presents Plausible Logic, explains some of the ideas behind the definitions, applies Plausible Logic to an example, and proves a coherence result which indicates that Plausible Logic is well behaved. We also report the first complete implementation of propositional Plausible Logic. The implementation has a web interface which makes it available to researchers and students everywhere. The implementation is evaluated experimentally, and is shown to be capable of handling tens of thousands of rules and sufficiently many disjunctions for realistic problems.     

Diversity-Based Reasoning in Children

One of the hallmarks of inductive reasoning by adults is the diversity effect, namely that people draw stronger inferences from a diverse set of evidence than from a more homogenous set of evidence. However, past developmental work has not found consistent diversity effects with children age 9 and younger. We report robust sensitivity to diversity in children as young as 5, using everyday stimuli such as pictures of objects with people. Experiment 1 showed the basic diversity effect in 5- to 9-year-olds. Experiment 2 showed that, like adults, children restrict their use of diversity information when making inferences about remote categories. Experiment 3 used other stimulus sets to overcome an alternate explanation in terms of sample size rather than diversity effects. Finally, Experiment 4 showed that children more readily draw on diversity when reasoning about objects and their relations with people than when reasoning about objects' internal, hidden properties, thus partially explaining the negative findings of previous work. Relations to cross-cultural work and models of induction are discussed.