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91.
意见收敛定理是主观主义概率论的一条重要定理,它表明随着证据的增加,验前概率的主观性将被验后概率的客观性所代替。意见收敛定理被看作主观概率的动态合理性原则,因而被用来解决休谟问题,即归纳合理性问题。然而,哈金有说服力地表明,意见收敛定理证明的是条件概率Pr(h/e)的收敛,而不是验后概率Pre(h)的收敛。主观主义概率论暗中接受的一个等式是:Pre(h)=Pr(h/e),通常称之为“条件化规则”。这样,归纳法的合理性问题变成条件化规则的合理性问题。为此,本文提出一个新的合理性原则,即“最少初始概率原则”,将它同“局部合理性”观念结合起来便可为条件化规则的合理性加以辩护。 相似文献
92.
Logics with the Qualitative Probability Operator 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Ognjanovic Zoran; Perovic Aleksandar; Raskovic Miodrag 《Logic Journal of the IGPL》2008,16(2):105-120
The paper presents several strongly complete axiomatizationsof qualitative probability within the framework of probabilisticlogic. We show that in the proposed semantics qualitative probabilitiesare characterized by probability functions, so they also arecomparative probabilities. 相似文献
93.
Michael Blome-Tillmann 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(1):29-53
Epistemic contextualism—the view that the content of the predicate ‘know’ can change with the context of utterance—has fallen
into considerable disrepute recently. Many theorists have raised doubts as to whether ‘know’ is context-sensitive, typically
basing their arguments on data suggesting that ‘know’ behaves semantically and syntactically in a way quite different from
recognised indexicals such as ‘I’ and ‘here’ or ‘flat’ and ‘empty’. This paper takes a closer look at three pertinent objections
of this kind, viz. at what I call the Error-Theory Objection, the Gradability Objection and the Clarification-Technique Objection.
The paper concludes that none of these objections can provide decisive evidence against contextualism. 相似文献
94.
Josef Schurz 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2007,38(1):163-165
Summary Evolution is a time process. It proceeds in steps of definite length. The probability of each step is relatively high, so
self organization of complex systems will be possible in finite time. Prerequisite for such a process is a selection rule,
which certainly exists in evolution. Therefore, it would be wrong to calculate the probability of the formation of a complex
system solely on the basis of the number of its components and as a momentary event. 相似文献
95.
Conditionals in natural language are central to reasoning and decision making. A theoretical proposal called the Ramsey test implies the conditional probability hypothesis: that the subjective probability of a natural language conditional, P(if p then q), is the conditional subjective probability, P(q/p). We report three experiments on causal indicative conditionals and related counterfactuals that support this hypothesis. We measured the probabilities people assigned to truth table cases, P(pq), P(p notq), P( notpq) and P( notp notq). From these ratings, we computed three independent predictors, P(p), P(q/p) and P(q/ notp), that we then entered into a regression equation with judged P(if p then q) as the dependent variable. In line with the conditional probability hypothesis, P(q/p) was by far the strongest predictor in our experiments. This result is inconsistent with the claim that causal conditionals are the material conditionals of elementary logic. Instead, it supports the Ramsey test hypothesis, implying that common processes underlie the use of conditionals in reasoning and judgments of conditional probability in decision making. 相似文献
96.
Jeffrey C. King 《Philosophical Studies》2007,133(3):443-453
Robert Stalnaker is an actualist who holds that merely possible worlds are uninstantiated properties that might have been
instantiated. Stalnaker also holds that there are no metaphysically impossible worlds: uninstantiated properties that couldn't
have been instantiated. These views motivate Stalnaker's "two dimensional" account of the necessary a posteriori on which
there is no single proposition that is both necessary and a posteriori. For a (metaphysically) necessary proposition is true
in all (metaphysically) possible worlds. If there were necessary a posteriori propositions, that would mean that there were
propositions true in all possible worlds but which could only be known to be true by acquiring empirical evidence. Consider
such a purported proposition P. The role of empirical evidence for establishing P's truth would have to be to rule out worlds
in which P is false. If there were no such worlds to be ruled out, we would not require evidence for P. But by hypothesis,
P is necessary and so true in all metaphysically possible worlds. And on Stalnaker's view, the metaphysically possible worlds
are all the worlds there are. So there can be no proposition that is true in all possible worlds, but that we require evidence
to know. In this way, the motivation for Stalnaker's two dimensional account of the necessary a posteriori rests on his denying
that there are metaphysically impossible Worlds. I argue that given his view of what possible worlds are, Stalnaker has no
principled reason for denying that there are metaphysically impossible worlds. If I am right, this undercuts Stalnaker's motivation
for his two dimensional account of the necessary a posteriori.
相似文献
Jeffrey C. KingEmail: |
97.
Fintan J. Costello 《决策行为杂志》2009,22(3):213-234
The conjunction fallacy occurs when people judge a conjunctive statement B‐and‐A to be more probable than a constituent B, in contrast to the law of probability that P(B ∧ A) cannot exceed P(B) or P(A). Researchers see this fallacy as demonstrating that people do not follow probability theory when judging conjunctive probability. This paper shows that the conjunction fallacy can be explained by the standard probability theory equation for conjunction if we assume random variation in the constituent probabilities used in that equation. The mathematical structure of this equation is such that random variation will be most likely to produce the fallacy when one constituent has high probability and the other low, when there is positive conditional support between the constituents, when there are two rather than three constituents, and when people rank probabilities rather than give numerical estimates. The conjunction fallacy has been found to occur most frequently in exactly these situations. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
98.
Standard Kripke models are inadequate to model situations of inexact knowledge with introspection, since positive and negative
introspection force the relation of epistemic indiscernibility to be transitive and euclidean. Correlatively, Williamson’s
margin for error semantics for inexact knowledge invalidates axioms 4 and 5. We present a new semantics for modal logic which
is shown to be complete for K45, without constraining the accessibility relation to be transitive or euclidean. The semantics corresponds to a system of
modular knowledge, in which iterated modalities and simple modalities are not on a par. We show how the semantics helps to
solve Williamson’s luminosity paradox, and argue that it corresponds to an integrated model of perceptual and introspective
knowledge that is psychologically more plausible than the one defended by Williamson. We formulate a generalized version of
the semantics, called token semantics, in which modalities are iteration-sensitive up to degree n and insensitive beyond n. The multi-agent version of the semantics yields a resource-sensitive logic with implications for the representation of common
knowledge in situations of bounded rationality. 相似文献
99.
研究结合数学分析方法,提出了基于非逻辑机制的条件推理模型:P-Q映射模型。并根据这个模型,对人们在不同命题类型奈件下的推理行为进行了预测。预测结果显示,当推理前提为LH和HL型命题时,基于P-Q映射模型的预测结果与基于条件概率模型的预测结果完全一致。但当推理前提为LL和HH型命题时,两种模型给出的预测结果存在差异。实验结果表明,当前提命题为LL和HH型命题时,被试的条件推理行为与P-Q映射模型的预言完全一致。 相似文献
100.
研究从先验概率、概率表征、推理任务等方面探讨了经典贝叶斯推理研究中存在的不足,试图在"知识和试题双重模型"框架下,探索现实和标准贝叶斯试题的形式结构的同质性,结果表明:1)自然频次表征比百分比表征的贝叶斯推算题正确率高,这是因为试题的形式结构不同,与概率表征无关;2)贝叶斯判断题与贝叶斯推算题的试题形式结构存在显著差异;3)贝叶斯推算题中,概率词表征与其它两种表征的试题形式结构存在显著差异,其实质是贝叶斯判断。 相似文献