Situational information and the design of representative learning tasks: What impact does a scoreboard have on expert taekwondo fighters' behaviour and affective-cognitive responses?

Designing representative learning tasks is one means to enhance sports practice. Recent work has highlighted how the presence of situational information could help the design of these tasks by shaping intentions and enhancing the affective demands of practice, however this has yet to be empirically tested. This study tested this hypothesis by manipulating the presence of a scoreboard featuring time and score situational information as expert taekwondo athletes fought in practice. Nine taekwondo fighters fought with and without situational information in a counterbalanced order. Behaviour was assessed by tracking fighters' location coordinates to assess fighter-fighter dyad coordination and through notational analysis of attacking actions. Affect and cognition were assessed with mixed-methods that included perceptual scales measuring anxiety, arousal, mental effort, score perception, and post-fight video-facilitated confrontational interviews to explore how conditions differed. The results revealed that the presence of the situational information had significant effects on taekwondo players. When present, fighters reported greater cognitive anxiety (d = 0.39, p < 0.05), somatic anxiety (d = 1.11, p < 0.05) and emotion intensity (d = 0.33, p < 0.05). The enhanced affective demands were associated with behaviour changes that included fighters preferring to spend time at closer distances (d = 0.25, p < 0.05), and more predictable technique selection (d = 1.04, p < 0.05). Qualitative data supported these findings. Players also reported their intentions were coupled to the context of scoreboard. This study reveals that situational information changes the affective and behavioural demands of practice to be more like competition. Further, situational sampling affords performers the opportunity to practice attuning to the relevant affordances for a specific context.     

首词素位置概率信息未参与汉语阅读的词切分：基于副中央凹加工的证据

本研究采用边界范式,考察汉语阅读中读者是否在副中央凹处利用首词素的位置概率信息进行词切分和词识别。采用2（首词素位置概率：高、低）×２（预视类型：相同预视、假字预视）的被试内实验设计,以双字词为目标词,记录大学生阅读句子时的眼动轨迹。结果发现,在跳读率和第一遍阅读的眼动指标中,被试在高、低首词素位置概率条件中获得的预视效益量无显著差异。该结果表明,读者并未在副中央凹处加工首词素的位置概率信息。结合前期研究推断,首词素位置概率信息没有作用于汉语阅读的词切分和词识别。     

Sometimes it does hurt to ask: The constructive role of articulating impressions

Decisions can sometimes have a constructive role, so that the act of, for example, choosing one option over another creates a preference for that option (e.g., , ,  and ). In this work we explore the constructive role of just articulating an impression, for a presented visual stimulus, as opposed to making a choice (specifically, the judgments we employ are affective evaluations). Using quantum probability theory, we outline a cognitive model formalizing such a constructive process. We predict a simple interaction, in relation to how a second image is evaluated, following the presentation of a first image, depending on whether there is a rating for the first image or not. The interaction predicted by the quantum model was confirmed across three experiments and a variety of control manipulations. The advantages of using quantum probability theory to model the present results, compared with existing models of sequence order effects in judgment (e.g., Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992) or other theories of constructive processes when a choice is made (e.g.,  and ) are discussed.     

On the logical structure of de Finetti's notion of event

This paper sheds new light on the subtle relation between probability and logic by (i) providing a logical development of Bruno de Finetti's conception of events and (ii) suggesting that the subjective nature of de Finetti's interpretation of probability emerges in a clearer form against such a logical background. By making explicit the epistemic structure which underlies what we call Choice-based probability we show that whilst all rational degrees of belief must be probabilities, the converse doesn't hold: some probability values don't represent decision-relevant quantifications of uncertainty.     

Modeling effects of risk and social distance on vaccination choice

Despite vaccines' consistently demonstrated effectiveness, vaccination rates remain suboptimal due to vaccine refusal. Low vaccination rates are particularly problematic for individuals who cannot be vaccinated for medical reasons and thus must rely on herd immunity (i.e., protection of vulnerable individuals due to the high rate of vaccination of other—often socially distant—individuals). The current study uses a novel decision‐making task to examine how three variables impacted participants' highest acceptable probability of side effects to their children: 1) the severity of the side effects their children experience, 2) the social distance to the beneficiary of the vaccination, and 3) the probability that the vaccine will prevent disease for that designated beneficiary. Participants' willingness to risk potential side effects of vaccination systematically decreased as the 1) effectiveness of the vaccination decreased, 2) the beneficiary of the vaccination became more socially distant, and 3) the severity of side effects increased. These data were well‐described by behavioral economic models used to examine the discounting of other health behavior.     

Do Bettors Correctly Perceive Odds? Three Studies of How Bettors Interpret Betting Odds as Probabilistic Information

This paper reports on three studies investigating how accurately bettors (=people who regularly bet on sports events) interpret the probabilistic information implied by betting odds. All studies were based on data collected by web surveys prompting a total of 186 experienced bettors to convert sets of representative odds into frequency judgments. Bayesian statistical methods were used to analyze the data. From the results, the following conclusions were made: (i) On the whole, the bettors produced well‐calibrated judgments, indicating that they have realistic perceptions of odds. (ii) Bettors were unable to consciously adjust judgments for different margins. (iii) Although their interval judgments often covered the estimates implied by the odds, the bettors tended to overestimate the variation of expected profitable bets between months. The results are consistent with prior research showing that people tend to make accurate probability judgments when faced with tasks characterized by constant and clear feedback. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The epistemic innocence of motivated delusions

Delusions are defined as irrational beliefs that compromise good functioning. However, in the empirical literature, delusions have been found to have some psychological benefits. One proposal is that some delusions defuse negative emotions and protect one from low self-esteem by allowing motivational influences on belief formation. In this paper I focus on delusions that have been construed as playing a defensive function (motivated delusions) and argue that some of their psychological benefits can convert into epistemic ones. Notwithstanding their epistemic costs, motivated delusions also have potential epistemic benefits for agents who have faced adversities, undergone physical or psychological trauma, or are subject to negative emotions and low self-esteem. To account for the epistemic status of motivated delusions, costly and beneficial at the same time, I introduce the notion of epistemic innocence. A delusion is epistemically innocent when adopting it delivers a significant epistemic benefit, and the benefit could not be attained if the delusion were not adopted. The analysis leads to a novel account of the status of delusions by inviting a reflection on the relationship between psychological and epistemic benefits.     

Changing epistemologies under conditions of social change in two Arab communities in Israel

The study of epistemic thinking focuses on how people understand and coordinate objective and subjective aspects of knowing and make sense of multiple and discrepant knowledge claims. Typically described in terms of normative development, cross‐cultural studies show differences in epistemic development and characteristics of epistemic thinking. This study focuses on within‐culture variations of epistemic thinking, with the assumption that social change will produce changes in development. Arab society in Israel has undergone notable change over the last half century. In this cross‐sectional research design, cross‐generational comparison and rural–urban comparison were used as proxies for longitudinal social change. Three generations of Muslim Arab women in a village in Israel (20 adolescents, 20 mothers and 20 grandmothers) and 20 Muslim Arab adolescents from a large, mixed city in the same region responded to six dilemmas invoking epistemic thinking. Village adolescents were more subjectivist than their mothers and grandmothers. Sociodemographic characteristics representing greater exposure to diverse people and ideas accounted for generational differences. Both urban and rural adolescents tended towards subjectivist perspectives, and they did not differ. Parents' education levels emerged as the sociodemographic variables most consistently related to epistemic thinking. Epistemic thinking mediated the relationship between generation and gender role/cross‐sex relation values.