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81.
Kelly Becker 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):245-260
There’s something deeply right in the idea that knowledge requires an ability to discriminate truth from falsity. Failing
to incorporate some version of the discrimination requirement into one’s epistemology generates cases of putative knowledge
that are at best problematic. On the other hand, many theories that include a discrimination requirement thereby appear to
entail violations of closure. This prima facie tension is resolved nicely in Jonathan Schaffer’s contrastivism, which I describe
herein. The contrastivist take on relevant alternatives is implausible, however, and this then threatens to undermine contrastivism’s
anti-skeptical results.
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Kelly BeckerEmail: |
82.
83.
The typical empirical approach to studying consciousness holds that we can only observe the neural correlates of experiences, not the experiences themselves. In this paper we argue, in contrast, that experiences are concrete physical phenomena that can causally interact with other phenomena, including observers. Hence, experiences can be observed and scientifically modelled. We propose that the epistemic gap between an experience and a scientific model of its neural mechanisms stems from the fact that the model is merely a theoretical construct based on observations, and distinct from the concrete phenomenon it models, namely the experience itself. In this sense, there is a gap between any natural phenomenon and its scientific model. On this approach, a neuroscientific theory of the constitutive mechanisms of an experience is literally a model of the subjective experience itself. We argue that this metatheoretical framework provides a solid basis for the empirical study of consciousness. 相似文献
84.
Helmut Tributsch 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2006,37(2):287-306
Summary Well known quantum and time paradoxes, and the difficulty to derive the second law of thermodynamics, are proposed to be the
result of our historically grown paradigm for energy: it is just there, the capacity to do work, not directly related to change.
When the asymmetric nature of energy is considered, as well as the involvement of energy turnover in any change, so that energy
can be understood as fundamentally “dynamic”, and time-oriented (new paradigm), these paradoxes and problems dissolve. The
most basic consequence concerns the particle-wave dualism. For a reversible inter-conversion of a particle into a wave, subject
to a dynamic energy, a self-image of information has to be generated: quantum theory has to be complemented by a theory of
information. Then, quantum processes can be derived from classical ones and the second law of thermodynamics with the tendency
of increasing entropy follows in a straightforward way. 相似文献
85.
In this paper I explore the nature of confabulatory explanations of action guided by implicit bias. I claim that such explanations can have significant epistemic benefits in spite of their obvious epistemic costs, and that such benefits are not otherwise obtainable by the subject at the time at which the explanation is offered. I start by outlining the kinds of cases I have in mind, before characterising the phenomenon of confabulation by focusing on a few common features. Then I introduce the notion of epistemic innocence to capture the epistemic status of those cognitions which have both obvious epistemic faults and some significant epistemic benefit. A cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some epistemic benefit to the subject which would not be attainable otherwise because alternative (less epistemically faulty) cognitions that could deliver the same benefit are unavailable to the subject at that time. I ask whether confabulatory explanations of actions guided by implicit bias have epistemic benefits and whether there are genuine alternatives to forming a confabulatory explanation in the circumstances in which subjects confabulate. On the basis of my analysis of confabulatory explanations of actions guided by implicit bias, I argue that such explanations have the potential for epistemic innocence. I conclude that epistemic evaluation of confabulatory explanations of action guided by implicit bias ought to tell a richer story, one which takes into account the context in which the explanation occurs. 相似文献
86.
《Quarterly journal of experimental psychology (2006)》2013,66(5):872-883
By age 3, children track a speaker's record of past accuracy and use it as a cue to current reliability. Two experiments (N?=?95 children) explored whether preschoolers' judgements about, and trust in, the accuracy of a previously reliable informant extend to other members of the informant's group. In Experiment 1, both 3- and 4-year-olds consistently judged an animated character who was associated with a previously accurate speaker more likely to be correct than a character associated with a previously inaccurate speaker, despite possessing no information about these characters' individual records of reliability. They continued to show this preference one week later. Experiment 2 presented 4- and 5-year-olds with a related task using videos of human actors. Both showed preferences for members of previously accurate speakers' groups on a common measure of epistemic trust. This result suggests that by at least age 4, children's trust in speaker testimony spreads to members of a previously accurate speaker's group. 相似文献
87.
Dale Jacquette 《Metaphilosophy》2013,44(1-2):145-156
This essay considers arguments for and against syntactical constraints on the proper formalization of definitions, originally owing to Alfred Tarski. It discusses and refutes an application of the constraints generalized to include a prohibition against not only object‐place but also predicate‐place variables in higher‐order logic in a criticism of a recent effort to define the concept of heterologicality in a strengthened derivation of Grelling's paradox within type theory requirements. If the objections were correct, they would offer a more general moral for the proper formal definition of terms in philosophical logic. The criticism nevertheless seems mistaken both in the substance and specific application with respect to legitimate synctactical constraints on definitions of key concepts in the case of Grelling's paradox. As such, the critique provides no justification for overturning previous conclusions concerning the possibility of resurrecting a type‐observant version of Grelling's heterologicality paradox. 相似文献
88.
89.
Eric Pacuit 《Studia Logica》2007,86(3):435-454
Adam Brandenburger and H. Jerome Keisler have recently discovered a two person Russell-style paradox. They show that the following
configurations of beliefs is impossible: Ann believes that Bob assumes that Ann believes that Bob’s assumption is wrong. In [7] a modal logic interpretation of this paradox is proposed. The idea is to introduce two modal operators intended to
represent the agents’ beliefs and assumptions. The goal of this paper is to take this analysis further and study this paradox from the point of view of a modal logician.
In particular, we show that the paradox can be seen as a theorem of an appropriate hybrid logic.
Special Issue Formal Epistemology II. Edited by Branden Fitelson 相似文献
90.
C. Behan McCullagh 《Sophia》2007,46(1):21-34
One cannot prove the truth of theological statement, but perhaps one can justify believing them because of the good consequences
of doing so. It is irrational to believe statements of which there are good reasons to think false, but those of which there
is some, albeit inconclusive, evidence can be believed for pragmatic reasons. However, in the interest of simplicity, it must
not be possible to achieve those good consequences without such faith. John Bishop and others have argued that one need only
assume theological statements to be true to enjoy the good consequences of a religious life, but in fact, faith is needed
for most of these consequences to be achieved.
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C. Behan McCullaghEmail: |