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121.
Robert Audi 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):43-54
This paper explores what constitutes reliability in persons, particularly intellectual reliability. It considers global reliability, the overall reliability of persons, encompassing both the theoretical and practical realms; sectorial reliability, that of a person in a subject-matter (or behavioral) domain; and focal reliability, that of a particular element, such as a belief. The paper compares reliability with predictability of the kind most akin
to it and distinguishes reliability as an intellectual virtue from reliability as an intellectual power. The paper also connects
reliability with insight, reasoning, knowledge, and trust. It is argued that insofar as reliability is an intellectual virtue,
it must meet both external standards of correctitude and internal standards of justification.
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Robert AudiEmail: |
122.
John Turri 《Synthese》2009,170(1):147-153
I respond to John Greco’s argument that all forms of internalism in epistemology are either false or uninteresting. The paper
divides into two sections. First, I explain precisely what internalists and externalists in epistemology disagree over. This
puts us in a position to assess whether Greco’s argument succeeds. Second, I present Greco’s argument and offer two objections. 相似文献
123.
Max Kölbel 《Synthese》2009,166(2):375-395
The aim of this paper is to examine the kind of evidence that might be adduced in support of relativist semantics of a kind
that have recently been proposed for predicates of personal taste, for epistemic modals, for knowledge attributions and for
other cases. I shall concentrate on the case of taste predicates, but what I have to say is easily transposed to the other
cases just mentioned. I shall begin by considering in general the question of what kind of evidence can be offered in favour
of some semantic theory or framework of semantic theorizing. In other words, I shall begin with the difficult question of
the empirical significance of semantic theorizing. In Sect. 2, I outline a relativist semantic theory, and in Sect. 3, I review
four types of evidence that might be offered in favour of a relativistic framework. I show that the evidence is not conclusive
because a sophisticated form of contextualism (or indexical relativism) can stand up to the evidence. However, the evidence
can be taken to support the view that either relativism or the sophisticated form of contextualism is correct. 相似文献
124.
125.
C. S. Jenkins 《Synthese》2007,157(1):25-45
This paper takes the form of a critical discussion of Crispin Wright’s notion of entitlement of cognitive project. I examine
various strategies for defending the claim that entitlement can make acceptance of a proposition epistemically rational, including
one which appeals to epistemic consequentialism. Ultimately, I argue, none of these strategies is successful, but the attempt
to isolate points of disagreement with Wright issues in some positive proposals as to how an epistemic consequentialist should
characterize epistemic rationality. 相似文献
126.
There is some consensus that for S to know that p, it cannot be merely a matter of luck that S’s belief that p is true. This consideration has led Duncan Pritchard and others to propose a safety condition on knowledge. In this paper, we argue that the safety condition is not a proper formulation of the intuition that
knowledge excludes luck. We suggest an alternative proposal in the same spirit as safety, and find it lacking as well. 相似文献
127.
Peter J. Graham 《Synthese》2007,158(1):19-39
Radical skepticism about the external implies that no belief about the external is even prima facie justified. A theoretical reply to skepticism has four stages. First, show which theories of epistemic justification support
skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, entail skepticism). Second, show which theories
undermine skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, do not support the skeptic’s conclusion).
Third, show which of the latter theories (which non-skeptical theory) is correct, and in so doing show that all of the rival
theories of justification, skeptical and non-skeptical alike, are mistaken. Fourth, explain why skeptical doubts are sometimes
(or sometimes merely seem) intuitive, and thereby accommodate skeptical doubts without capitulation. Michael Williams has
pioneered the very idea of a theoretical reply. A theoretical diagnosis consists in just the first two stages. An adequate
reply, which is correct at each stage, would rebut the skeptic entirely. Williams’ own reply, I argue, is inadequate. I offer
in its place an exhaustive and accurate diagnosis of skepticism. I distinguish four kinds of skepticism and five theories
of justification. I then show which theories do, and which theories do not, support which kinds of skepticism. 相似文献
128.
Joëlle Proust 《Synthese》2007,159(2):271-295
Metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. It is exemplified in all the activities through which one tries
to predict and evaluate one’s own mental dispositions, states and properties for their cognitive adequacy. This article discusses
the view that metacognition has metarepresentational structure. Properties such as causal contiguity, epistemic transparency
and procedural reflexivity are present in metacognition but missing in metarepresentation, while open-ended recursivity and
inferential promiscuity only occur in metarepresentation. It is concluded that, although metarepresentations can redescribe
metacognitive contents, metacognition and metarepresentation are functionally distinct. 相似文献
129.
M. Oreste Fiocco 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(3):387-399
The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance
to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability. In recent discussions, some have attempted to explicate the notion in terms of epistemic possibility. There are, however, two notions of epistemic possibility, a more familiar one and a novel one. I argue that these two notions
are independent of one another. Both are irrelevant to an account of modal knowledge on the predominant view of modal reality.
Only the novel notion is relevant and apt on the competing view of modal reality; but this latter view is problematic in light
of compelling counterexamples. Insufficient care regarding the independent notions of epistemic possibility can lead to two
problems: a gross problem of conflation and a more subtle problem of obscuring a crucial fact of modal epistemology. Either
problem needlessly hampers efforts to develop an adequate account of modal knowledge. I conclude that the familiar notion
of epistemic possibility (and the very term ‘epistemic possibility’) should be eschewed in the context of modal epistemology.
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M. Oreste FioccoEmail: |
130.
To explore the hypothesis that domain-specific identity development predicts reasoning biases, adolescents and young adults completed measures of domain-general and domain-specific identity, epistemic regulation, and intellectual ability and evaluated arguments that either supported or threatened their occupational goals. Biases were defined as the use of sophisticated reasoning to reject goal-threatening arguments and the use of cursory reasoning to accept goal-supportive arguments. Across two measures of bias, hierarchical regression analyses showed that domain-specific vocational identity and epistemic regulation best predicted reasoning biases. Neither age nor intellectual ability predicted significant variance in biases after vocational identity and epistemic regulation scores were entered into the regression equations. The results support the thesis that biases in specific domains can be explained both by domain-specific personality attributes and by domain-general metacognitive dispositions to monitor reasoning and decontextualize problem structure from superficial contents. A dual-process framework is proposed to explain the relationships among identity, epistemic regulation, age, intellectual ability, and reasoning biases. 相似文献