排序方式: 共有131条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
31.
Pierre Le Morvan 《Metaphilosophy》2005,36(5):688-707
Abstract: In this article I argue that the prevalence of intersubjective disagreement in epistemology poses a serious problem for Epistemic Externalism. I put the problem in the form of a dilemma: either Epistemic Externalism is not a complete account of epistemic justification or it's implausible to claim that the belief that Epistemic Externalism is true is itself an externalistically justified belief. 相似文献
32.
33.
Richard Feldman 《Synthese》2008,161(3):339-355
Deontologism in epistemology holds that epistemic justification may be understood in terms of “deontological” sentences about
what one ought to believe or is permitted to believe, or what one deserves praise for believing, or in some similar way. If
deonotologism is true, and people have justified beliefs, then the deontological sentences can be true. However, some say,
these deontological sentences can be true only if people have a kind of freedom or control over their beliefs that they do
not in fact have. Thus, deontologism in epistemology, combined with anti-skepticism, has implausible implications. I first
describe one sort of control that people typically have over ordinary actions but do not have over typical beliefs. I then
argue that there is a paradigmatic type of epistemic evaluation that does properly apply to beliefs even though we lack this
sort of control over them. Finally, I argue that these paradigmatic epistemic evaluations are sufficient to make true some
of the deontological sentences. 相似文献
34.
Joel Pust 《Synthese》2008,160(1):97-101
With the notable exception of David Lewis, most of those writing on the Sleeping Beauty problem have argued that 1/3 is the
correct answer. Terence Horgan has provided the clearest account of why, contrary to Lewis, Beauty has evidence against the
proposition that the coin comes up heads when she awakens on Monday. In this paper, I argue that Horgan’s proposal fails because
it neglects important facts about epistemic probability. 相似文献
35.
Peter Tramel 《Synthese》2008,160(2):215-228
Susan Haack has always maintained that her unquestionably important foundherentist theory of epistemic justification is not a foundationalism. In a 1997 Synthese exchange, Laurence BonJour questioned her right to this claim, and she dug in and defended it. What was at stake is of timeless importance to epistemology: it goes directly to the question, “What is foundationalism?” I inquire with greater care than either Haack or BonJour took in 1997, and I find decisively in favor of the view that foundherentism is a foundationalism. In the process, I explore the outer limits of foundationalism: I examine just how far a foundationalism can go in allowing the relevance of coherence to epistemic justification. 相似文献
36.
Terry Horgan 《Synthese》2008,160(2):155-159
I maintain, in defending “thirdism,” that Sleeping Beauty should do Bayesian updating after assigning the “preliminary probability”
1/4 to the statement S: “Today is Tuesday and the coin flip is heads.” (This preliminary probability obtains relative to a
specific proper subset I of her available information.) Pust objects that her preliminary probability for S is really zero,
because she could not be in an epistemic situation in which S is true. I reply that the impossibility of being in such an
epistemic situation is irrelevant, because relative to I, statement S nonetheless has degree of evidential support 1/4. 相似文献
37.
Pamela Hieronymi 《Synthese》2008,161(3):357-373
Many assume that we can be responsible only what is voluntary. This leads to puzzlement about our responsibility for our beliefs,
since beliefs seem not to be voluntary. I argue against the initial assumption, presenting an account of responsibility and
of voluntariness according to which, not only is voluntariness not required for responsibility, but the feature which renders
an attitude a fundamental object of responsibility (that the attitude embodies one’s take on the world and one’s place in
it) also guarantees that it could not be voluntary. It turns out, then, that, for failing to be voluntary, beliefs are a central
example of the sort of thing for which we are most fundamentally responsible. 相似文献
38.
Evidence for the role of self-priming in epistemic action: expertise and the effective use of memory
Epistemic actions are physical actions people take to simplify internal problem solving rather than to move closer to an external goal. When playing the video game Tetris, for instance, experts routinely rotate falling shapes more than is strictly needed to place the shapes. Maglio and Kirsh [Kirsh, D., & Maglio, P. (1994). On distinguishing epistemic from pragmatic action. Cognitive Science, 18, 513-549; Maglio, P. P. (1995). The computational basis of interactive skill. PhD thesis, University of California, San Diego] proposed that such actions might serve the purpose of priming memory by external means, reducing the need for internal computation (e.g., mental rotation), and resulting in performance improvements that exceed the cost of taking additional actions. The present study tests this priming hypothesis in a set of four experiments. The first three explored precisely the conditions under which priming produces benefits. Results showed that presentation of multiple orientations of a shape led to faster responses than did presentation of a single orientation, and that this effect depended on the interval between preview and test. The fourth explored whether the benefit of seeing shapes in multiple orientations outweighs the cost of taking the extra actions to rotate shapes physically. Benefits were measured using a novel statistical method for mapping reaction-time data onto an estimate of the increase in processing capacity afforded by seeing multiple orientations. Cost was measured using an empirical estimate of time needed to take action in Tetris. Results showed that indeed the increase in internal processing capacity obtained from seeing shapes in multiple orientations outweighed the time to take extra actions. 相似文献
39.
Markos Valaris 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(3):427-445
There is reason to expect a reasonable account of a priori knowledge to be linked with an account of the nature of conceptual
thought. Recent “two-dimensionalist” accounts of conceptual thought propose an extremely direct connection between the two:
on such views, being in a position to know a priori a large number of non-trivial propositions is a necessary condition of
concept-possession. In this paper I criticize this view, by arguing that it requires an implausibly internalist and intellectualist
conception of capacities we bring to bear in applying concepts in experience. Empirical concept-application depends on the
exercise of a variety of capacities, many of which can be grouped together under the general label “recognitional”. As I argue,
two-dimensionalism cannot accommodate a plausible account of such capacities. This suggests that the link between a priori
knowledge and the nature of conceptual thought is not as direct as twodimensionalists take it to be. I close by briefly sketching
a different way to think of that link.
相似文献
Markos ValarisEmail: |
40.
Hartry Field 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(2):249-290
The paper outlines a view of normativity that combines elements of relativism and expressivism, and applies it to normative
concepts in epistemology. The result is a kind of epistemological anti-realism, which denies that epistemic norms can be (in
any straightforward sense) correct or incorrect; it does allow some to be better than others, but takes this to be goal-relative
and is skeptical of the existence of best norms. It discusses the circularity that arises from the fact that we need to use
epistemic norms to gather the facts with which to evaluate epistemic norms; relatedly, it discusses how epistemic norms can
rationally evolve. It concludes with some discussion of the impact of this view on “ground level” epistemology.
相似文献
Hartry FieldEmail: |