排序方式: 共有185条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
91.
Samuel Murray 《Philosophical explorations》2016,19(3):268-275
Timothy O’Connor has recently defended a version of libertarianism that has significant advantages over similar accounts. One of these is an argument that secures indeterminism on the basis of an argument that shows how causal determinism threatens agency in virtue of the nature of the causal relation involved in free acts. In this paper, I argue that while it does turn out that free acts are not causally determined on O’Connor’s view, this fact is merely stipulative and the argument that he presents for this conclusion begs the question. 相似文献
92.
Julius Moravcsik 《The Journal of Ethics》2001,5(1):39-56
This paper presents an interpretation of Plato's moral psychology in two books of the Republic that construes Plato as adopting a strong unity for the moral agent. Within this conception reason influences both emotion and action directly. This view is contrasted with the current prevailing interpretation according to which all three parts of the soul have their own reason, feeling, and desire. The latter construal is shown to be both philosophically weak, and less plausible as a historical reconstruction. 相似文献
93.
Andrés Perea 《Synthese》2007,158(2):251-271
Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present the following conditions: (1) belief in the opponents’ rationality (BOR), stating that a player believes that every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, (2) self-referential beliefs (SRB), stating that a player believes that his opponents hold correct beliefs about his own beliefs, (3) projective beliefs (PB), stating that i believes that j’s belief about k’s choice is the same as i’s belief about k’s choice, and (4) conditionally independent beliefs (CIB), stating that a player believes that opponents’ types choose their strategies independently. We show that, if a player
satisfies BOR, SRB and CIB, and believes that every opponent satisfies BOR, SRB, PB and CIB, then he will choose a Nash strategy
(that is, a strategy that is optimal in some Nash equilibrium). We thus provide a sufficient collection of one-person conditions
for Nash strategy choice. We also show that none of these seven conditions can be dropped. 相似文献
94.
O'Connor PA 《American journal of community psychology》2007,39(3-4):393-403
Successful community-based interventions require that change agents give attention to the complexities of interwoven systems, described in the literature as complicated or complex, purposeful or purposive. The author further notes the separate standards, norms, principles and/or goals (here-named systems-guides) of systems. This paper describes the author's experience as a consultant to a multi-system collaboration where observed tensions among participants resulted in the author's implementation of a three-step systems-guides model, which can increase change agents' effectiveness with systems. The steps comprise: detection (of systems, systems-guides, and discrepancies between them; here through observation); documentation (of discrepancies; here through small group discussions); dissemination (to systems participants; here to the collaboration). Two small but fundamental systems changes emerged from systems participants, not from the change agent/author who facilitated systems members' recognition of discrepancies. A major limitation in the implementation of this systems-guides model centers on the critical necessity of the close relationship change agents must have with the involved systems. 相似文献
95.
96.
Anders Schinkel 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(3):267-277
Whom I call ‘epistemic reductionists’ in this article are critics of the notion of ‘moral luck’ that maintain that all supposed
cases of moral luck are illusory; they are in fact cases of what I describe as a special form of epistemic luck, the only
difference lying in what we get to know about someone, rather than in what (s)he deserves in terms of praise or blame. I argue
that epistemic reductionists are mistaken. They implausibly separate judgements of character from judgements concerning acts,
and they assume a conception of character that is untenable both from a common sense perspective and with a view to findings
from social psychology. I use especially the example of Scobie, the protagonist of Graham Greene’s novel The Heart of the Matter, to show that moral luck is real—that there are cases of moral luck that cannot be reduced to epistemic luck. The reality
of moral luck, in this example at least, lies in its impact on character and personal and moral identity.
相似文献
Anders SchinkelEmail: |
97.
Donald Beggs 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(3):219-234
This paper begins with a critical part and concludes with a constructive part. First, with reference to a definition of liberalism
and using immanent critique, I show deficiencies in the claims of four selfprofessed postliberals to have articulated non-liberal
positions. Then, I argue that postliberal political theory consists in acknowledging that in political contexts some voluntary
groups as such can be moral, not merely political, agents. Analysis of what moral autonomy is for persons as empirical (not
noumenal) agents reveals that that account can be transposed to some groups. A key common element among the four rejected
positions is their emphasis on the normative authority of some practices as over against principles. My proposal congeals
that normative emphasis on the social into group-moral authority. Recognition of some voluntary groups’ episodic moral authority
over their members is non-liberal but not anti-liberal.
相似文献
Donald BeggsEmail: |
98.
Christian Piller 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(4):413-428
The fact that we ought to prefer what is comparatively more likely to be good, I argue, does, contrary to consequentialism,
not rest on any evaluative facts. It is, in this sense, a deontological requirement. As such it is the basis of our valuing
those things which are in accordance with it. We value acting (and believing) well, i.e. we value acting (and believing) as
we ought to act (and to believe). In this way, despite the fact that our interest in justification depends on our interest
in truth, we value believing with justification on non-instrumental grounds. A deontological understanding of justification,
thus, solves the Value of Knowledge Problem.
相似文献
Christian PillerEmail: |
99.
Lisa Warenski 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(3):403-426
This paper argues that a priori justification is, in principle, compatible with naturalism—if the a priori is understood in
a way that is free of the inessential properties that, historically, have been associated with the concept. I argue that empirical
indefeasibility is essential to the primary notion of the a priori; however, the indefeasibility requirement should be interpreted
in such a way that we can be fallibilist about apriori-justified claims. This fallibilist notion of the a priori accords with
the naturalist’s commitment to scientific methodology in that it allows for apriori-justified claims to be sensitive to further
conceptual developments and the expansion of evidence. The fallibilist apriorist allows that an a priori claim is revisable
in only a purely epistemic sense. This modal claim is weaker than what is required for a revisability thesis to establish
empiricism, so fallibilist apriorism represents a distinct position.
相似文献
Lisa WarenskiEmail: |
100.
Dynamic epistemic logic with branching temporal structures 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
van Bentham et al. (Merging frameworks for interaction: DEL and ETL, 2007) provides a framework for generating the models
of Epistemic Temporal Logic (ETL: Fagin et al., Reasoning about knowledge, 1995; Parikh and Ramanujam, Journal of Logic, Language, and Information, 2003)
from the models of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL: Baltag et al., in: Gilboa (ed.) Tark 1998, 1998; Gerbrandy, Bisimulations on Planet Kripke, 1999). We consider the logic
TDEL on the merged semantic framework, and its extension with the labeled past-operator “P
ϵ” (“The event ϵ has happened before which. . .”). To axiomatize the extension, we introduce a method for transforming a given
model into a normal form in a suitable sense. These logics suggest further applications of DEL in the theory of agency, the theory of learning, etc. 相似文献