The persons‐in‐relation perspective: Towards a philosophy for counselling in society

This paper is the first in a planned series, which aims to articulate and synthesise the persons‐in‐relation perspective in counselling and psychotherapy, drawing together the contributions of the philosopher John Macmurray, the psychotherapist Ian Suttie and the psychoanalyst Ronald Fairbairn. The paper introduces the persons‐in‐relation perspective, derived from Macmurray's work. It outlines the historical and cultural context leading to the emergence of modernism, and the response of personalism. It summarises John Macmurray's life and philosophy, focusing on his account of knowledge, its relation to the senses and the emotions, and his view of persons, society and religion. The paper goes on to develop a hypothesis about the rise of counselling in Britain, linking it to the decline of religion, the conflict between individualism and collectivism, and the re‐emergence of the persons‐in‐relation perspective. It concludes by posing challenges for the person‐centred and psychodynamic orientations, and for counselling as a whole.     

Two-dimensionalism and the epistemology of recognition

There is reason to expect a reasonable account of a priori knowledge to be linked with an account of the nature of conceptual thought. Recent “two-dimensionalist” accounts of conceptual thought propose an extremely direct connection between the two: on such views, being in a position to know a priori a large number of non-trivial propositions is a necessary condition of concept-possession. In this paper I criticize this view, by arguing that it requires an implausibly internalist and intellectualist conception of capacities we bring to bear in applying concepts in experience. Empirical concept-application depends on the exercise of a variety of capacities, many of which can be grouped together under the general label “recognitional”. As I argue, two-dimensionalism cannot accommodate a plausible account of such capacities. This suggests that the link between a priori knowledge and the nature of conceptual thought is not as direct as twodimensionalists take it to be. I close by briefly sketching a different way to think of that link.

Epistemology without metaphysics

The paper outlines a view of normativity that combines elements of relativism and expressivism, and applies it to normative concepts in epistemology. The result is a kind of epistemological anti-realism, which denies that epistemic norms can be (in any straightforward sense) correct or incorrect; it does allow some to be better than others, but takes this to be goal-relative and is skeptical of the existence of best norms. It discusses the circularity that arises from the fact that we need to use epistemic norms to gather the facts with which to evaluate epistemic norms; relatedly, it discusses how epistemic norms can rationally evolve. It concludes with some discussion of the impact of this view on “ground level” epistemology.

Inference and update

We look at two fundamental logical processes, often intertwined in planning and problem solving: inference and update. Inference is an internal process with which we uncover what is implicit in the information we already have. Update, on the other hand, is produced by external communication, usually in the form of announcements and in general in the form of observations, giving us information that might not have been available (even implicitly) before. Both processes have received attention from the logic community, usually separately. In this work, we develop a logical language that allows us to describe them together. We present syntax, semantics and a complete axiom system; we discuss similarities and differences with other approaches and mention how the work can be extended.     

Soft Libertarianism and Hard Compatibilism

In this paper I discuss two kinds of attempts to qualify incompatibilist and compatibilist conceptions of freedom to avoid what have been thought to be incredible commitments of these rival accounts. One attempt -- which I call soft libertarianism -- is represented by Robert Kane's work. It hopes to defend an incompatibilist conception of freedom without the apparently difficult metaphysical costs traditionally incurred by these views. On the other hand, in response to what I call the robot objection (that if compatibilism is true, human beings could be the products of design), some compatibilists are tempted to soften their position by placing restrictions on the origins of agency. I argue that both of these attempts are misguided. Hard libertarianism and hard compatibilism are the only theoretical options.     

The Impossibility of Local Skepticism

According to global skepticism, we know nothing. According to local skepticism, we know nothing in some particular area or domain of discourse. Unlike their global counterparts, local skeptics think they can contain our invincible ignorance within limited bounds. I argue that they are mistaken. Local skepticism, particularly the kinds that most often get defended, cannot stay local: if there are domains whose truths we cannot know, then there must be claims outside those domains that we cannot know even if they are true. My argument focuses on one popular form of local skepticism, ethical skepticism, but I believe that the argument generalizes to cover other forms as well.

An intensional epistemic logic

One of the fundamental properties inclassical equational reasoning isLeibniz's principle of substitution. Unfortunately, this propertydoes not hold instandard epistemic logic. Furthermore,Herbrand's lifting theorem which isessential to thecompleteness ofresolution andParamodulation in theclassical first order logic (FOL), turns out to be invalid in standard epistemic logic. In particular, unlike classical logic, there is no skolemization normal form for standard epistemic logic. To solve these problems, we introduce anintensional epistemic logic, based on avariation of Kripke's possible-worlds semantics that need not have a constant domain. We show how a weaker notion of substitution through indexed terms can retain the Herbrand theorem. We prove how the logic can yield a satisfibility preserving skolemization form. In particular, we present an intensional principle for unifing indexed terms. Finally, we describe asound andcomplete inference system for a Horn subset of the logic withequality, based onepistemic SLD-resolution.     

Understanding deceptive intentions behind pointing gestures in 12-15-month-old infants

We examined the comprehension of deceptive intentions revealed in searching task in infancy, on the theoretical basis of natural pedagogy and epistemic trust. The main findings showed that 12-15-month-old infants are able to discriminate the reliable and the deceptive actions of adults, but they do not generalize their previous experience in connection with a novel person, who is treated as a new reliable source of information.     

情感代理能否提高多媒体学习的效果?

近年来,情感代理如何影响学习受到了研究者们的高度重视。情感代理是可以通过面部表情、声音、肢体动作和言语信息等影响学习者情感体验的教学代理。以往研究主要关注两种类型的情感代理：表达型情感代理和移情型情感代理。表达型情感代理是仅通过自身的情绪表达(如：使用微笑的面部表情和热情的声音)以影响学习者情绪体验的代理。移情型情感代理则是能根据学习者的学习表现或情绪状态给予情感反馈(如;点头、鼓励和共情)的代理,其目的是为了调节学习者的情绪、激励其继续努力。虽然不同的研究者对情感代理的具体操作有所不同,但无论哪种类型的情感代理均是为了增加学习者的积极情绪,提高内部动机,最终促进学习。关于情感代理的潜在作用,研究者基于不同的理论观点给出了不同的解释。情绪感染理论认为一个人的情绪状态容易受到另一个人情绪表达的影响,因此界面代理的情绪会直接影响学习者的情绪和动机。情绪反应理论认为如果教师的言语和非言语线索诱发了积极的情绪,学习者就会产生趋近学习的行为(例如,制定相应的学习计划)。多媒体学习认知情感理论强调了学习过程中情感和动机的重要性。基于多媒体学习认知情感理论,情感代理能唤起学习者的积极情绪,增加学习动机,进而提高学习成绩。而认知负荷理论和干扰理论却认为情感代理丰富的面部表情和手势动作可能会增加学习者的外部认知负荷,吸引学习者的注意力,减少对关键信息的注意,因此干扰学习效果。在上述理论的指导下,研究者们对情感代理的效果进行了探究,结果发现,情感代理可以有效地唤起学习者的积极情绪(d_积极情绪= 0.45),提高学习动机(d_内部动机= 0.52)。但不一定能影响认知负荷（d_{内部认知负荷} = -0.01;d_{外部认知负荷} = 0.09;d_{相关认知负荷} = 0.08）,并且在学习效果上的作用也比较微弱(d_保持 = 0.18;d_理解 = 0.32;d_迁移 = 0.14;d_联合 = 0.32)。情感代理在学习效果上的作用不稳健的原因可能是受到了潜在调节因素的影响。例如,学习者的个体特征（如,工作记忆能力和年级水平）、情感代理的类型、任务特征和测验时间等。总之,尽管目前关于情感代理的研究结果存在不一致,但整体而言,在积极情感代理条件下,学习者更加快乐,更有动力。因此,在教育实践中,教学设计者可以考虑为学习者呈现一个积极的教学代理以帮助他们更加快乐地学习。未来关于情感代理的研究需要继续关注情感代理的操纵和评定方法;探究影响情感代理效果的边界条件;考察情感代理影响学习背后的神经机制;提高情感代理研究的生态效度等。