Evidence for a role of the responding agent in the joint compatibility effect

The present study explored the role of the responding agent in a social context. To do so, we developed a compatibility task with socially relevant but task-irrelevant stimuli (own face, neutral face, and a friend's face). Participants were required to perform naming responses to coloured diamonds, while the faces were presented as irrelevant stimuli. We observed faster responses in face–name compatible than in incompatible conditions. When the task was distributed among two friends, we observed a compatibility effect in a joint go/no-go condition, in which both participants performed their go/no-go tasks together. In contrast, no compatibility effect was obtained in an individual go/no-go condition. Further, the experiment showed that this joint compatibility effect was based on the compatibility between the irrelevant face and the responding agent. This result demonstrates that features of the responding agent play a crucial role in the joint compatibility effect.     

First Order Common Knowledge Logics

In this paper we investigate first order common knowledge logics; i.e., modal epistemic logics based on first order logic with common knowledge operators. It is shown that even rather weak fragments of first order common knowledge logics are not recursively axiomatizable. This applies, for example, to fragments which allow to reason about names only; that is to say, fragments the first order part of which is based on constant symbols and the equality symbol only. Then formal properties of "quantifying into" epistemic contexts are investigated. The results are illustrated by means of epistemic representations of Nash Equilibria for finite games with mixed strategies.     

Influence of perceived emotion and gender on social motor coordination

Theorists have long postulated that facial properties such as emotion and sex are potent social stimuli that influence how individuals act. Yet extant scientific findings were mainly derived from investigations on the prompt motor response upon the presentation of affective stimuli, which were mostly delivered by means of pictures, videos, or text. A theoretical question remains unaddressed concerning how the perception of emotion and sex would modulate the dynamics of a continuous coordinated behaviour. Conceived in the framework of dynamical approach to interpersonal motor coordination, the present study aimed to address this question by adopting the coupled-oscillators paradigm. Twenty-one participants performed in-phase and anti-phase coordination with two avatars (male and female) displaying three emotional expressions (neutral, happy, and angry) at different frequencies (100% and 150% of the participant's preferred frequency) by executing horizontal rhythmic left-right oscillatory movements. Time to initiate movement (TIM), mean relative phase error (MnRP), and standard deviation of relative phase (SDRP) were calculated as indices of reaction time, deviation from the intended pattern of coordination, and coordination stability, respectively. Results showed that in anti-phase condition at 150% frequency, MnRP was lower with the angry and the female avatar. In addition, coordination was found to be more stable with the male avatar than the female one when both displaying neutral emotion. But the happy female avatar was found to elicit more stable coordination than the neutral female avatar. These results implied that individuals are more relaxed to coordinate with the female than the male, and the sensorimotor system becomes more flexible to coordinate with an angry person. It is also suggested social roles influence how people coordinate, and individuals attend more to interact with a happy female. In sum, the present study evidenced that social perception is embodied in the interactive behaviour during social interaction.     

模糊容忍性与发散性思维的关系：不同认识兴趣的作用

有理论认为,模糊容忍性有助于个体发散性思维的发展,但部分实证研究却呈现出不一致的结论。本文考察了不同认识兴趣在模糊容忍性与发散性思维关系之间的中介和调节作用。结果发现：（1）I型认识兴趣在模糊容忍性和独创性、灵活性、流畅性间起完全中介作用;（2）模糊容忍性与独创性、灵活性的关系受到D型认识兴趣的调节,模糊容忍性与流畅性的关系不受D型认识兴趣的调节。     

Memory and epistemic conservatism

Much of the plausibility of epistemic conservatism derives from its prospects of explaining our rationality in holding memory beliefs. In the first two parts of this paper, I argue for the inadequacy of the two standard approaches to the epistemology of memory beliefs, preservationism and evidentialism. In the third, I point out the advantages of the conservative approach and consider how well conservatism survives three of the strongest objections against it. Conservatism does survive, I claim, but only if qualified in certain ways. Appropriately qualified, conservatism is no longer the powerful anti-skeptical tool some have hoped for, but a doctrine closely connected with memory.     

Individual differences in epistemic style: A dual-process perspective

This article reports the results of using a specially designed scaled questionnaire to investigate the dualistic properties of epistemic style. The scale is introduced as a measure of individual difference in epistemic style, conceptualized within the framework of dual-process notions of cognitive function. The study examined several psychometric components of the measure, including dimensional structure, distributional characteristics, and indications of construct validity. The instrument, called the Epistemic Preference Indicator, was found to be a reliable and valid measure of two dimensions that are negatively related—each reflecting incompatible epistemic assumptions and approaches to solving knowledge-dependent problems. Theoretical speculations are made concerning the nature of epistemic dualism and the dimension of cognitive processing that may underlie the two proposed epistemic preferences or styles.     

Epistemic modals, relativism and assertion

I think that there are good reasons to adopt a relativist semantics for epistemic modal claims such as ``the treasure might be under the palm tree', according to which such utterances determine a truth value relative to something finer-grained than just a world (or a <world, time> pair). Anyone who is inclined to relativise truth to more than just worlds and times faces a problem about assertion. It's easy to be puzzled about just what purpose would be served by assertions of this kind, and how to understand what we'd be up to in our use of sentences like ``the treasure might be under the palm tree', if they have such peculiar truth conditions. After providing a very quick argument to motivate a relativist view of epistemic modals, I bring out and attempt to resolve this problem in making sense of the role of assertions with relativist truth conditions. Solving this problem should be helpful in two ways: first, it eliminates an apparently forceful objection to relativism, and second, spelling out the relativist account of assertion and communication will help to make clear just what the relativist position is, exactly, and why it's interesting. Thanks to Brian Weatherson, John Hawthorne, Daniel Stoljar, Frank Jackson, Ben Blumson, Seth Yalcin, Karen Bennett, Kent Bach, Matthew Weiner, Jonathan Kvanvig, Eric Swanson, David Chalmers, Agustin Rayo, Dustin Locke, Aaron Bronfman, Michael Allers, Ivan Mayerhofer, and to the participants at the BSPC 2005 for helpful discussion.