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171.
We present a generic denotational semantic framework for protocols for dialogs between rational and autonomous agents over
action which allows for retraction and revocation of proposals for action. The semantic framework views participants in a
deliberation dialog as jointly and incrementally manipulating the contents of shared spaces of action-intention tokens. The
framework extends prior work by decoupling the identity of an agent who first articulates a proposal for action from the identity
of any agent then empowered to retract or revoke the proposal, thereby permitting proposals, entreaties, commands, promises,
etc., to be distinguished semantically. 相似文献
172.
C. S. Jenkins 《Synthese》2007,157(1):25-45
This paper takes the form of a critical discussion of Crispin Wright’s notion of entitlement of cognitive project. I examine
various strategies for defending the claim that entitlement can make acceptance of a proposition epistemically rational, including
one which appeals to epistemic consequentialism. Ultimately, I argue, none of these strategies is successful, but the attempt
to isolate points of disagreement with Wright issues in some positive proposals as to how an epistemic consequentialist should
characterize epistemic rationality. 相似文献
173.
There is some consensus that for S to know that p, it cannot be merely a matter of luck that S’s belief that p is true. This consideration has led Duncan Pritchard and others to propose a safety condition on knowledge. In this paper, we argue that the safety condition is not a proper formulation of the intuition that
knowledge excludes luck. We suggest an alternative proposal in the same spirit as safety, and find it lacking as well. 相似文献
174.
Peter J. Graham 《Synthese》2007,158(1):19-39
Radical skepticism about the external implies that no belief about the external is even prima facie justified. A theoretical reply to skepticism has four stages. First, show which theories of epistemic justification support
skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, entail skepticism). Second, show which theories
undermine skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, do not support the skeptic’s conclusion).
Third, show which of the latter theories (which non-skeptical theory) is correct, and in so doing show that all of the rival
theories of justification, skeptical and non-skeptical alike, are mistaken. Fourth, explain why skeptical doubts are sometimes
(or sometimes merely seem) intuitive, and thereby accommodate skeptical doubts without capitulation. Michael Williams has
pioneered the very idea of a theoretical reply. A theoretical diagnosis consists in just the first two stages. An adequate
reply, which is correct at each stage, would rebut the skeptic entirely. Williams’ own reply, I argue, is inadequate. I offer
in its place an exhaustive and accurate diagnosis of skepticism. I distinguish four kinds of skepticism and five theories
of justification. I then show which theories do, and which theories do not, support which kinds of skepticism. 相似文献
175.
Joëlle Proust 《Synthese》2007,159(2):271-295
Metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. It is exemplified in all the activities through which one tries
to predict and evaluate one’s own mental dispositions, states and properties for their cognitive adequacy. This article discusses
the view that metacognition has metarepresentational structure. Properties such as causal contiguity, epistemic transparency
and procedural reflexivity are present in metacognition but missing in metarepresentation, while open-ended recursivity and
inferential promiscuity only occur in metarepresentation. It is concluded that, although metarepresentations can redescribe
metacognitive contents, metacognition and metarepresentation are functionally distinct. 相似文献
176.
M. Oreste Fiocco 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(3):387-399
The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance
to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability. In recent discussions, some have attempted to explicate the notion in terms of epistemic possibility. There are, however, two notions of epistemic possibility, a more familiar one and a novel one. I argue that these two notions
are independent of one another. Both are irrelevant to an account of modal knowledge on the predominant view of modal reality.
Only the novel notion is relevant and apt on the competing view of modal reality; but this latter view is problematic in light
of compelling counterexamples. Insufficient care regarding the independent notions of epistemic possibility can lead to two
problems: a gross problem of conflation and a more subtle problem of obscuring a crucial fact of modal epistemology. Either
problem needlessly hampers efforts to develop an adequate account of modal knowledge. I conclude that the familiar notion
of epistemic possibility (and the very term ‘epistemic possibility’) should be eschewed in the context of modal epistemology.
相似文献
M. Oreste FioccoEmail: |
177.
As technology advances, many human-like robots are being developed. Although these humanoid robots should be classified as objects, they share many properties with human beings. This raises the question of how infants classify them. Based on the looking-time paradigm used by [Legerstee, M., Barna, J., & DiAdamo, C., (2000). Precursors to the development of intention at 6 months: understanding people and their actions. Developmental Psychology, 36, 5, 627-634.], we investigated whether 10-month-old infants expected people to talk to a humanoid robot. In a familiarization period, each infant observed an actor and an interactive robot behaving like a human, a non-interactive robot remaining stationary, and a non-interactive robot behaving like a human. In subsequent test trials, the infants were shown another actor talking to the robot and to the actor. We found that infants who had previously observed the interactive robot showed no difference in looking-time between the two types of test events. Infants in the other conditions, however, looked longer at the test event where the second experimenter talked to the robot rather than where the second experimenter talked to the person. These results suggest that infants interpret the interactive robot as a communicative agent and the non-interactive robot as an object. Our findings imply that infants categorize interactive humanoid robots as a kind of human being. 相似文献
178.
To explore the hypothesis that domain-specific identity development predicts reasoning biases, adolescents and young adults completed measures of domain-general and domain-specific identity, epistemic regulation, and intellectual ability and evaluated arguments that either supported or threatened their occupational goals. Biases were defined as the use of sophisticated reasoning to reject goal-threatening arguments and the use of cursory reasoning to accept goal-supportive arguments. Across two measures of bias, hierarchical regression analyses showed that domain-specific vocational identity and epistemic regulation best predicted reasoning biases. Neither age nor intellectual ability predicted significant variance in biases after vocational identity and epistemic regulation scores were entered into the regression equations. The results support the thesis that biases in specific domains can be explained both by domain-specific personality attributes and by domain-general metacognitive dispositions to monitor reasoning and decontextualize problem structure from superficial contents. A dual-process framework is proposed to explain the relationships among identity, epistemic regulation, age, intellectual ability, and reasoning biases. 相似文献
179.
条件反射性免疫调节的动物研究 总被引:8,自引:3,他引:8
心理神经免疫学是一个新兴的跨学科研究领域,其研究内容涉及许多方面。其中条件反射性免疫调节是心理神经免疫学研究中最引人注目的研究领域。本文着重介绍了有关条件反射性免疫药理学效应及抗原作为非条件刺激所致的条件反射性的免疫效应的基本的实验设计和研究方法,讨论了对其实验结果的不同解释,对条件反射性免疫效应方向的预测及所包含的学习过程也进行了一定的分析。 相似文献
180.
Katherine A. Burson David Faro Yuval Rottenstreich 《Organizational behavior and human decision processes》2010
We experimentally investigate people’s evaluations of incentive pay contracts and people’s predictions of others’ evaluations of incentive pay contracts. We emphasize that the construction of evaluations and predictions often includes two substeps, involving likelihood judgment and likelihood weighting. Predictors appear to be biased at both substeps but in opposing directions. Accurate overall predictions thus sometimes reflect two errors that are of the same magnitude and thereby offset. Moreover, predictions can become more inaccurate if one step is debiased but the other is left untouched. Importantly, principals deciding whether to delegate a task are susceptible to just one of the biases. Delegation assessments are thus often flawed, reflecting a single error that is not offset. 相似文献