Three decades of lay epistemics: The why,how, and who of knowledge formation

A conceptual integration and review are presented of three separate research programmes informed by the theory of lay epistemics (Kruglanski, 1989 Kruglanski, A. W. 1989. Lay epistemics and human knowledge: Cognitive and motivational bases, New York: Plenum. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). They respectively address the “why”, “how”, and “who” questions about human knowledge formation. The “why” question is treated in work on the need for cognitive closure that propels epistemic behaviour and affects individual, interpersonal, and group phenomena. The “how” question is addressed in work on the unimodel (Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, Erb, & Chun, 2007 Kruglanski, A. W., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., Erb, H. P. and Chun, W. Y. 2007. “On the parameters of social judgement”. In Advances in experimental social psychology, Edited by: Zanna, M. P. Vol. 39, 255–296. New York: Academic Press.  [Google Scholar]) depicting the process of drawing conclusions from the “information given”. The “who” question is addressed in work on “epistemic authority” highlighting the centrality of source effects (including oneself as a source) in human epistemic behaviour. These separate research paradigms explore facets of epistemic behaviour that jointly produce human knowledge, of essential significance to people's’ individual and social functioning.     

Knowledge-telling and knowledge-transforming arguments in mock jurors' verdict justifications

According to the “story model” a juror constructs an implicit mental model of a story telling what happened as the basis for the verdict choice. But the explicit justification of a verdict choice could take the form of a story (knowledge telling) or the form of a relational (knowledge-transforming) argument structure that brings together diverse, non-chronologically related pieces of evidence. The study investigates whether people tend towards knowledge telling or knowledge transforming, and whether use of these argument structure types are related to skilled argument and epistemic understanding. A sample of people on jury duty chose and justified verdicts in two abridged cases. Participants tended to display the same argument structure and argument skill across cases. Those using knowledge-transforming structures were more successful at the juror argument skills task and had a higher level of epistemic understanding. The discussion suggests that jurors approach their task with an epistemic orientation towards knowledge telling or knowledge transforming.     

Adults see vision to be more informative than it is

Humans gain a wide range of knowledge through interacting with the environment. Each aspect of our perceptual experiences offers a unique source of information about the world—colours are seen, sounds heard and textures felt. Understanding how perceptual input provides a basis for knowledge is thus central to understanding one's own and others' epistemic states. Developmental research suggests that 5-year-olds have an immature understanding of knowledge sources and that they overestimate the knowledge to be gained from looking. Without evidence from adults, it is not clear whether the mature reasoning system outgrows this overestimation. The current study is the first to investigate whether an overestimation of the knowledge to be gained from vision occurs in adults. Novel response time paradigms were adapted from developmental studies. In two experiments, participants judged whether an object or feature could be identified by performing a specific action. Adult participants found it disproportionately easy to accept looking as a proposed action when it was informative, and difficult to reject looking when it was not informative. This suggests that adults, like children, overestimate the informativeness of vision. The origin of this overestimation and the implications that the current findings bear on the interpretation of children's overestimation are discussed.     

With a little help from my friends: A computational model for the role of social support in mood regulation

The growing interest in the role of social support in mental and physical health has led to the development of several intelligent systems that aim to use social mechanisms to simulate healthy behaviour. In this paper a computational model of a human agent is presented which describes the effect of social support on mood. According to the literature, social support can either refer to the social resources that individuals perceive to be available or to the support that is actually provided in problematic situations. The proposed model distinguishes between both roles of social support. The role of social network characteristics has been taken into account, as an individual can perceive or receive social support through his/her social network. In addition, the number of connections (friends), strength of ties (relationships), social isolation and social integration have been studied. Simulation experiments have been done to analyze the effect of the different types of support in different scenarios and also to analyze the role of various social network characteristics on the mood level. It is shown that support can help to reduce the induced stress and thus can contribute to healthy mood regulation and prevention of depression. The presented model provides a basis for an intelligent support system for people with mood regulation problems that take the social network of people into account.     

A mechanism for biasing the appraisal process in affective agents

In this paper we present a mechanism to model the influence of agents’ internal and external factors on the emotional evaluation of stimuli in computational models of emotions. We propose the modification of configurable appraisal dimensions (such as desirability and pleasure) based on influencing factors. As part of the presented mechanism, we introduce influencing models to define the relationship between a given influencing factor and a given set of configurable appraisal dimensions utilized in the emotional evaluation phase. Influencing models translate factors’ influences (on the emotional evaluation) into fuzzy logic adjustments (e.g., a shift in the limits of fuzzy membership functions), which allow biasing the emotional evaluation of stimuli. We implemented a proof-of-concept computational model of emotions based on real-world data about individuals’ emotions. The obtained empirical evidence indicates that the proposed mechanism can properly affect the emotional evaluation of stimuli while preserving the overall behavior of the model of emotions.     

Team situation awareness within the context of human-autonomy teaming

Effective team communication, a fundamental part of team coordination, is crucial for both effective Team Situation Awareness (TSA) and team performance. In this study, we looked at the role that team interaction (i.e., more specifically team verbal behaviors) played in TSA and team performance in order to better understand Human-Autonomy Teaming (HAT). We first analyzed team verbal behaviors (i.e., pushing and pulling information) across conditions of human-autonomy teams and human-human teams, and then analyzed their relationship with TSA and team performance via Growth Curve Modelling (GCM). Good teamwork involves anticipating the needs of teammates and that means pushing information before it is requested. Therefore, if things are going well, there should be little need for pulling information. In this study’s task, participants were instructed to push information to others, and over time master the specific timing of information sharing to the intended recipient. Findings indicate that pushing information was positively associated with TSA and team performance, and human-autonomy teams had lower levels of both pushing and pulling information than all-human teams. Through this study, we have learned that anticipation of other team member behaviors and information requirements in human-autonomy teams are important for effective TSA and team performance. In order to make HAT more effective in terms of teamwork, we need to develop mechanisms to enhance pushing information within HAT.     

Agent causation as a solution to the problem of action

My primary aim is to defend a nonreductive solution to the problem of action. I argue that when you are performing an overt bodily action, you are playing an irreducible causal role in bringing about, sustaining, and controlling the movements of your body, a causal role best understood as an instance of agent causation. Thus, the solution that I defend employs a notion of agent causation, though emphatically not in defence of an account of free will, as most theories of agent causation are. Rather, I argue that the notion of agent causation introduced here best explains how it is that you are making your body move during an action, thereby providing a satisfactory solution to the problem of action.     

Reasoning through doing. Epistemic mediators in scientific discovery

The recent epistemological and cognitive studies concentrate on the concept of abduction, as a means to originate and refine new ideas. Traditional cognitive science and computational accounts concerning abduction aim at illustration discovery and creativity processes in terms of theoretical and “internal” aspects, by means of computational simulations and/or abstract cognitive models. I will illustrate in this paper that some typical internal abductive processes are involved in scientific reasoning and discovery (for example through radical innovations). Nevertheless, especially concrete manipulations of the external world constitute a fundamental passage in science: by a process of manipulative abduction it is possible to build prostheses (epistemic mediators) for human minds, by interacting with external objects and representations in a constructive way. In this manner it is possible to create implicit knowledge through doing and to produce various opportunity to find, for example, anomalies and fruitful new risky perspectives. This kind of embodied and unexpressed knowledge holds a key role in the subsequent processes of scientific comprehension and discovery.