Efficient search under constraints and not working memory resources supports creative action emergence in a convergent motor task

Creative (original and functional) solutions to problems can be facilitated by guiding search behavior. According to cognitive models, when solving convergent tasks (tasks with few solutions), high available working memory (WM) resources and capacity can guide creative solution emergence via repeated (persistent) search within a solution subcategory. However, no clear associations have been found of WM capacity on creative outcomes when tasks require the individual to enact solutions in divergent doing tasks. This study further tested constraints on WM resources on search behavior and creative outcomes in a convergent doing task. Novices to combat sports were asked to repeatedly strike a target with the intent to achieve an individualized target force. In order to manipulate available WM resources, every ten strikes, participants were asked to recall and then retain a sequence of 5 digits (high load group: n = 21) or 2 digits (low load group: n = 21). The task constraints favored the functionality (or appropriateness) of a qualitatively distinct, non-obvious solution. Functionality was assessed using the force registered for each strike. Originality was assessed in terms of how infrequently actions occurred. Finally, search behavior was quantified based on changes in which limb was used and changes in which part of the limb was used from one strike to the next. There were no significant effects of WM load on creativity outcomes, solution search, or task success. Rather, task success was related to efficient search and creativity. Future research should focus on constraints (other than WM resources) that promote efficient search.     

The Impossibility of Local Skepticism

According to global skepticism, we know nothing. According to local skepticism, we know nothing in some particular area or domain of discourse. Unlike their global counterparts, local skeptics think they can contain our invincible ignorance within limited bounds. I argue that they are mistaken. Local skepticism, particularly the kinds that most often get defended, cannot stay local: if there are domains whose truths we cannot know, then there must be claims outside those domains that we cannot know even if they are true. My argument focuses on one popular form of local skepticism, ethical skepticism, but I believe that the argument generalizes to cover other forms as well.

Understanding the supporters and opponents of Myanmar's civil disobedience movement against the military coup in 2021

In February 2021, the Myanmar military carried out a coup d'etat, which was then followed by a wave of civil protests. The present study aims to understand the support among people from Southeast Asia (specifically Indonesia) for the people of Myanmar who are fighting against a military coup. The data were collected from Muslim participants (N = 209) and non-Muslim participants (N = 192) in Indonesia. The findings indicate that the perceived country's internal problems, support for human rights in Myanmar, and the perceived country's important position in Southeast Asia are among the strongest predictors of the intention to support collective movements in other countries. Considerably, lack of empathy and how the victim/disadvantaged groups are perceived, like whether they have a negative rapport in treating other groups, also play a key role in the endorsement of solidarity. It is suggested that the dynamic relationships between these factors need to be considered to find ways to foster humanitarian solidarity. Please refer to the Supplementary Material section to find this article's Community and Social Impact Statement .     

An intensional epistemic logic

One of the fundamental properties inclassical equational reasoning isLeibniz's principle of substitution. Unfortunately, this propertydoes not hold instandard epistemic logic. Furthermore,Herbrand's lifting theorem which isessential to thecompleteness ofresolution andParamodulation in theclassical first order logic (FOL), turns out to be invalid in standard epistemic logic. In particular, unlike classical logic, there is no skolemization normal form for standard epistemic logic. To solve these problems, we introduce anintensional epistemic logic, based on avariation of Kripke's possible-worlds semantics that need not have a constant domain. We show how a weaker notion of substitution through indexed terms can retain the Herbrand theorem. We prove how the logic can yield a satisfibility preserving skolemization form. In particular, we present an intensional principle for unifing indexed terms. Finally, we describe asound andcomplete inference system for a Horn subset of the logic withequality, based onepistemic SLD-resolution.     

Understanding deceptive intentions behind pointing gestures in 12-15-month-old infants

We examined the comprehension of deceptive intentions revealed in searching task in infancy, on the theoretical basis of natural pedagogy and epistemic trust. The main findings showed that 12-15-month-old infants are able to discriminate the reliable and the deceptive actions of adults, but they do not generalize their previous experience in connection with a novel person, who is treated as a new reliable source of information.     

Prayer Utterances as Aligning Actions

Social actors use prayer utterances (e.g., statements such as “prayed over,”“prayed about,” or “spent time in prayer”) as aligning actions that justify problematic or questionable courses of action and prevent possible negative characterizations. The prayer utterance functions as an aligning action in American society because of Americans’ beliefs and actions concerning the efficacy of prayer in solving problems and because prayer is viewed as a sign of personal morality and trustworthiness. Three examples of individuals who use the prayer utterance as an aligning action serve as illustrations of this argument (Oprah Winfrey, Alabama State Supreme Court Justice Sue Bell Cobb, and President Barack Obama). Scholars should investigate the uses and functions of prayer utterances in social life and should also investigate the possible uses of other religious talk as aligning actions.     

Side-effect actions,acting for a reason,and acting intentionally

What is the relation between acting intentionally and acting for a reason? While this question has generated a considerable amount of debate in the philosophy of action, on one point there has been a virtual consensus: actions performed for a reason are necessarily intentional. Recently, this consensus has been challenged by Joshua Knobe and Sean Kelly, who argue against it on the basis of empirical evidence concerning the ways in which ordinary speakers of the English language describe and explain certain side-effect actions. Knobe and Kelly's argument is of interest not only because it challenges a widely accepted philosophical thesis on the basis of experimental evidence, but also because it indirectly raises an important and largely neglected question, the question of whether or in what sense an agent can perform a side-effect action for a reason. In this article, I address this question and provide a positive answer to it. Specifically, I argue that agents act for a reason whenever they perform side-effect actions as trade-offs. Thus, I claim that there are three distinct types of rational action: actions performed as ends in themselves, actions performed as means to further ends, and side-effect actions performed as trade-offs. Given this multiplicity of types of rational action, the question of whether or not actions performed for a reason are necessarily intentional is in need of refinement. The more specific question that lies at the heart of this article is whether or not side-effect actions performed as trade-offs are necessarily intentional. I conclude that, contrary to what Knobe and Kelly suggest, the question remains open.     

Attribution of movement: Potential links between subjective reports of agency and output monitoring

According to agency memory theory, individuals decide whether “I did it” based on a memory trace of “I am doing it”. The purpose of this study was to validate the agency memory theory. To this end, several hand actions were individually presented as samples, and participants were asked to perform the sample action, observe the performance of that action by another person, or imagine performing the action. Online feedback received by the participants during the action was manipulated among the different conditions, and output monitoring, in which participants were asked whether they had performed each hand action, was conducted. The rate at which respondents thought that they themselves had performed the action was higher when visual feedback was unaltered than when it was altered (Experiment 1A), and this tendency was observed across all types of altered feedback (Experiment 1B). The observation of an action performed by the hand of another person did not increase the rate at which respondents thought that they themselves had performed the action unless the participants actually did perform the action (Experiments 2A and 2B). In Experiment 3, a relationship was observed between the subjective feeling that “I am the one who is causing an action” and the memory that “I did perform the action”. These experiments support the hypothesis that qualitative information and sense of “self” are tagged in a memory trace and that such tags can be used as cues for judgements when the memory is related to the “self”.     

Acting virtuously as an end in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics

ABSTRACT

Sometimes, in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Aristotle describes virtuous actions as the sorts of actions that are ends; it is important for Aristotle to do so if he wants to maintain, as he seems to at least until NE 10.7–8, that virtuous actions are a constituent of eudaimonia. At other times, he claims that virtuous actions are the sorts of actions that are for the sake of ends beyond themselves; after all, no one would choose to go into battle or give away a significant portion of their wealth if it did not realize some good end. In this paper, I review the familiar problem raised by Aristotle’s discussion of the nature of virtuous actions, propose a solution to this problem by appealing to a distinction between virtuous actions and ‘acting virtuously’, and sketch the significance of this solution for understanding the relationship between virtue and human happiness.     

Memory for Actions of an Event: Older and Younger Adults Compared

Previous studies have shown increased false memory effects in older compared to younger adults. To investigate this phenomenon in event memory, in the present study, the authors presented younger and older adults with a robbery. A distinction was made between verbal and visual actions of the event, and recognition and subjective experience of retrieval (remember/know/guess judgments) were analyzed. Although there were no differences in hits, older adults accepted more false information as true and, consequently, showed less accurate recognition than younger adults. Moreover, older adults were more likely than younger adults to accompany these errors with remember judgments. Young adults accepted fewer false verbal actions than visual ones and awarded fewer remember judgments to their false alarms for verbal than for visual actions. Older adults, however, did not show this effect of type of information. These results suggest that aging is a relevant factor in memory for real-life eyewitness situations.