Responsibility for believing

Many assume that we can be responsible only what is voluntary. This leads to puzzlement about our responsibility for our beliefs, since beliefs seem not to be voluntary. I argue against the initial assumption, presenting an account of responsibility and of voluntariness according to which, not only is voluntariness not required for responsibility, but the feature which renders an attitude a fundamental object of responsibility (that the attitude embodies one’s take on the world and one’s place in it) also guarantees that it could not be voluntary. It turns out, then, that, for failing to be voluntary, beliefs are a central example of the sort of thing for which we are most fundamentally responsible.     

Evidence for the role of self-priming in epistemic action: expertise and the effective use of memory

Epistemic actions are physical actions people take to simplify internal problem solving rather than to move closer to an external goal. When playing the video game Tetris, for instance, experts routinely rotate falling shapes more than is strictly needed to place the shapes. Maglio and Kirsh [Kirsh, D., & Maglio, P. (1994). On distinguishing epistemic from pragmatic action. Cognitive Science, 18, 513-549; Maglio, P. P. (1995). The computational basis of interactive skill. PhD thesis, University of California, San Diego] proposed that such actions might serve the purpose of priming memory by external means, reducing the need for internal computation (e.g., mental rotation), and resulting in performance improvements that exceed the cost of taking additional actions. The present study tests this priming hypothesis in a set of four experiments. The first three explored precisely the conditions under which priming produces benefits. Results showed that presentation of multiple orientations of a shape led to faster responses than did presentation of a single orientation, and that this effect depended on the interval between preview and test. The fourth explored whether the benefit of seeing shapes in multiple orientations outweighs the cost of taking the extra actions to rotate shapes physically. Benefits were measured using a novel statistical method for mapping reaction-time data onto an estimate of the increase in processing capacity afforded by seeing multiple orientations. Cost was measured using an empirical estimate of time needed to take action in Tetris. Results showed that indeed the increase in internal processing capacity obtained from seeing shapes in multiple orientations outweighed the time to take extra actions.     

Organizing Components into Combinations: How Stage Transition Works

This paper investigates the nature of transition between stages. The Model of Hierarchical Complexity of tasks leads to a quantal notion of stage, and therefore delineates the nature of stage transition. Piaget's dialectical model of stage change was extended and precisely specified. Transition behavior was shown to consist of alternations in previous-stage behavior. As transition proceeded, the alternations increased in rate until the previous stage behaviors were “smashed” together. Once the smashed-together pieces became coordinated, new-stage behavior could be said to have formed. Because stage transition is quantal, individuals can only change performance by whole stage. We reviewed theories of the specific means by which new-stage behavior may be acquired and the emotions and personalities associated with steps in transition. Contemporary challenges in the society increasingly call for transition to postformal and postconventional responses on the part of both individuals and institutions as the examples illustrate.     

Blueprint for a dynamic deontic logic

Extending the idiom of dynamic logic we outline a deontic logic in which deontic operators operate on terms rather than on formulæ. In a second step we distinguish between what we call real and deontic actions.     

Two-dimensionalism and the epistemology of recognition

There is reason to expect a reasonable account of a priori knowledge to be linked with an account of the nature of conceptual thought. Recent “two-dimensionalist” accounts of conceptual thought propose an extremely direct connection between the two: on such views, being in a position to know a priori a large number of non-trivial propositions is a necessary condition of concept-possession. In this paper I criticize this view, by arguing that it requires an implausibly internalist and intellectualist conception of capacities we bring to bear in applying concepts in experience. Empirical concept-application depends on the exercise of a variety of capacities, many of which can be grouped together under the general label “recognitional”. As I argue, two-dimensionalism cannot accommodate a plausible account of such capacities. This suggests that the link between a priori knowledge and the nature of conceptual thought is not as direct as twodimensionalists take it to be. I close by briefly sketching a different way to think of that link.

Epistemology without metaphysics

The paper outlines a view of normativity that combines elements of relativism and expressivism, and applies it to normative concepts in epistemology. The result is a kind of epistemological anti-realism, which denies that epistemic norms can be (in any straightforward sense) correct or incorrect; it does allow some to be better than others, but takes this to be goal-relative and is skeptical of the existence of best norms. It discusses the circularity that arises from the fact that we need to use epistemic norms to gather the facts with which to evaluate epistemic norms; relatedly, it discusses how epistemic norms can rationally evolve. It concludes with some discussion of the impact of this view on “ground level” epistemology.

Inference and update

We look at two fundamental logical processes, often intertwined in planning and problem solving: inference and update. Inference is an internal process with which we uncover what is implicit in the information we already have. Update, on the other hand, is produced by external communication, usually in the form of announcements and in general in the form of observations, giving us information that might not have been available (even implicitly) before. Both processes have received attention from the logic community, usually separately. In this work, we develop a logical language that allows us to describe them together. We present syntax, semantics and a complete axiom system; we discuss similarities and differences with other approaches and mention how the work can be extended.     

选择、自我表达与选择扩散效应

自我表达会影响西方人的态度, 产生选择扩散效应。国外相关的跨文化研究发现东方人不存在该效应。通过4个实验研究中国文化下自我表达对选择态度的影响, 发现选择方式(主动、被动)和自我表达形式(直接、间接)对选择态度产生影响。无论是自己的主动选择还是强加的被动选择, 直接的自我表达会增加对所获对象的喜爱程度, 表现为对获得性的肯定。研究者认为, 两种选择方式下不同的心理加工过程导致了这种获得性：直接表达使个人态度暴露在外, 进行主动选择时要对他人的给予做出肯定回应; 而进行被动选择时, 人们要减缓因利益受损可能导致的失调, 同时中国文化下的面子策略也使人们增加对所获对象的喜爱程度。不过, 间接的自我表达对选择态度的影响不明显。研究者认为, 多个影响因素的相互消长使选择态度得以维持。