Individual differences in epistemic style: A dual-process perspective

This article reports the results of using a specially designed scaled questionnaire to investigate the dualistic properties of epistemic style. The scale is introduced as a measure of individual difference in epistemic style, conceptualized within the framework of dual-process notions of cognitive function. The study examined several psychometric components of the measure, including dimensional structure, distributional characteristics, and indications of construct validity. The instrument, called the Epistemic Preference Indicator, was found to be a reliable and valid measure of two dimensions that are negatively related—each reflecting incompatible epistemic assumptions and approaches to solving knowledge-dependent problems. Theoretical speculations are made concerning the nature of epistemic dualism and the dimension of cognitive processing that may underlie the two proposed epistemic preferences or styles.     

Epistemic modals, relativism and assertion

I think that there are good reasons to adopt a relativist semantics for epistemic modal claims such as ``the treasure might be under the palm tree', according to which such utterances determine a truth value relative to something finer-grained than just a world (or a <world, time> pair). Anyone who is inclined to relativise truth to more than just worlds and times faces a problem about assertion. It's easy to be puzzled about just what purpose would be served by assertions of this kind, and how to understand what we'd be up to in our use of sentences like ``the treasure might be under the palm tree', if they have such peculiar truth conditions. After providing a very quick argument to motivate a relativist view of epistemic modals, I bring out and attempt to resolve this problem in making sense of the role of assertions with relativist truth conditions. Solving this problem should be helpful in two ways: first, it eliminates an apparently forceful objection to relativism, and second, spelling out the relativist account of assertion and communication will help to make clear just what the relativist position is, exactly, and why it's interesting. Thanks to Brian Weatherson, John Hawthorne, Daniel Stoljar, Frank Jackson, Ben Blumson, Seth Yalcin, Karen Bennett, Kent Bach, Matthew Weiner, Jonathan Kvanvig, Eric Swanson, David Chalmers, Agustin Rayo, Dustin Locke, Aaron Bronfman, Michael Allers, Ivan Mayerhofer, and to the participants at the BSPC 2005 for helpful discussion.     

Reasons to act and believe: naturalism and rational justification in Hume’s philosophical project

Is Hume a naturalist? Does he regard all or nearly all beliefs and actions as rationally unjustified? In order to settle these questions, it is necessary to examine their key terms (‘naturalism’ and ‘rational justification’) and to understand the character—especially the normative character—of Hume’s philosophical project. This paper argues (i) that Hume is a naturalist—and, in particular, both a moral and an epistemic naturalist—in quite robust ways; and (ii) that Hume can properly regard many actions and beliefs as “rationally justified” in several different senses of that term.     

“无为”之为和循证医学

"无为"治疗是为理性所认可的,实为有为的,既有利于患者又有利于医疗资源配置的治疗观念,但在医疗实践中很难推行。循证医学在我国的推广,对推行"无为"治疗有着特殊的意义。它有利于为病人作出最佳医疗决策,有利于人性化的医学实践,还有利于为诊治检验作出规范,这和"无为"治疗观念是合拍的。     

知觉与行为的分离在视错觉研究中的验证

知觉与行为的分离是指人的视觉对物体的知觉与对行为的控制属于两个不同的系统。最早人们从临床病例中发现存在知觉与行为的分离,以后Aglioti等利用铁钦纳错觉实验证实正常人中也存在这一分离现象。一些研究者将两者的分离看作是两个不同视觉皮层通路（腹侧知觉系统和背侧视觉运动系统）的结果。围绕这一分离现象的实验和假说引发了不少的争论。该文回顾了十年来利用错觉实验所做的众多验证性研究,分析了支持和否定分离现象存在的各类证据,对一些重要结果和观点进行了总结,并由此提出了自己的看法。     

Realism,Rational Action,and the Humean Theory of Motivation

Realists about practical reasons agree that judgments regarding reasons are beliefs. They disagree, however, over the question of how such beliefs motivate rational action. Some adopt a Humean conception of motivation, according to which beliefs about reasons must combine with independently existing desires in order to motivate rational action; others adopt an anti-Humean view, according to which beliefs can motivate rational action in their own right, either directly or by giving rise to a new desire that in turn motivates the action. I argue that the realist who adopts a Humean model for explaining rational action will have a difficult time giving a plausible account of the role that desire plays in this explanation. I explore four interpretations of this role and argue that none allows a Humean theory to explain rational action as convincingly as an anti-Humean theory does. The first two models, in different ways, make acting on a reason impossible. The third allows this possibility, but only by positing a reason-sensitive desire that itself demands an explanation. The fourth avoids this explanatory challenge only by retreating to an empty form of the Humean view. In contrast, an anti-Humean theory can provide an intuitively plausible explanation of rational action. I conclude that the realist about reasons should adopt an anti-Humean theory to explain rational action.

儿童早期词汇获得的词类差

儿童早期词汇获得存在词类差异,很多语言中名词比例都要高于其他词类,因此一些研究者提出“名词优势”理论。但是,一些对汉语和韩语的研究发现,儿童早期获得的动词比例与名词没有显著差异,甚至高于名词,同时汉语和韩语动词比例也远大于英语动词比例。针对不同语言儿童早期获得的动、名词比例差异现象,研究者认为语言结构特征和成人对孩子的言语输入可以解释不同语言儿童早期词汇中动、名词比例的差异,其中成人言语中词类的频率、单词位置、词形变化复杂性和语用等因素都会影响儿童早期词汇获得。此外,不同的词汇测量方法、观察情境、词类定义、词汇量水平、单词理解与说出也会造成不同研究结果之间的差异     

正义的战争与战争的正义——关于战争伦理的反思

War can be defined as organized political violence among two or more nations. In accordance with the purpose, processes and results of war, the ethics of war generally comprises three aspects: right ethics, action ethics and duty ethics. The most important issue in ethics of war is “justice”. “Justice” and “injustice” as a conceptual pair do not prescribe the objective character of war but rather convey a subjective attitude and ethical position that have the potential to compel a populace to either support or oppose a war. Translated by Zuo Gaoshan and Xi Yunpeng from Lunlixue Yanjiu 伦理学研究 (Studies in Ethtics), 2005, (6): 43–48