首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
文章检索
  按 检索   检索词:      
出版年份:   被引次数:   他引次数: 提示:输入*表示无穷大
  收费全文   1135篇
  免费   58篇
  国内免费   28篇
  1221篇
  2025年   2篇
  2024年   19篇
  2023年   30篇
  2022年   7篇
  2021年   34篇
  2020年   63篇
  2019年   66篇
  2018年   67篇
  2017年   76篇
  2016年   59篇
  2015年   46篇
  2014年   43篇
  2013年   179篇
  2012年   32篇
  2011年   38篇
  2010年   37篇
  2009年   51篇
  2008年   62篇
  2007年   58篇
  2006年   39篇
  2005年   36篇
  2004年   37篇
  2003年   24篇
  2002年   18篇
  2001年   22篇
  2000年   19篇
  1999年   13篇
  1998年   7篇
  1997年   5篇
  1996年   6篇
  1995年   6篇
  1994年   6篇
  1993年   3篇
  1992年   3篇
  1991年   2篇
  1990年   1篇
  1989年   1篇
  1988年   2篇
  1985年   1篇
  1984年   1篇
排序方式: 共有1221条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
281.
Meta-analysis was used to quantify how well the Theories of Reasoned Action and Planned Behaviour have predicted intentions to attend screening programmes and actual attendance behaviour. Systematic literature searches identified 33 studies that were included in the review. Across the studies as a whole, attitudes had a large-sized relationship with intention, while subjective norms and perceived behavioural control (PBC) possessed medium-sized relationships with intention. Intention had a medium-sized relationship with attendance, whereas the PBC–attendance relationship was small sized. Due to heterogeneity in results between studies, moderator analyses were conducted. The moderator variables were (a) type of screening test, (b) location of recruitment, (c) screening cost and (d) invitation to screen. All moderators affected theory of planned behaviour relationships. Suggestions for future research emerging from these results include targeting attitudes to promote intention to screen, a greater use of implementation intentions in screening information and examining the credibility of different screening providers.  相似文献   
282.
    
The theory of reasoned action (TRA) specifies a set of expectancy-value, belief-based frameworks that underpin attitude (behavioural beliefs × outcome evaluations) and subjective norm (normative beliefs × motivation to comply). Unfortunately, the most common method for analysing these frameworks generates statistically uninterpretable findings, resulting in what has been termed the ‘expectancy-value muddle’. Recently, however, a dimensional salience approach was found to resolve this muddle for the belief-based framework underpinning attitude. An online survey of 262 participants was therefore conducted to determine whether the dimensional salience approach could also be applied to the belief-based framework underpinning subjective norm. Results revealed that motivations to comply were greater for salient, as opposed to non-salient, social referents. The belief-based framework underpinning subjective norm was therefore represented by evaluating normative belief ratings for salient social referents. This modified framework was found to predict subjective norm, although predictions were greater when participants were forced to select five salient social referents rather than being free to select any number of social referents. These findings validate the use of the dimensional salience approach for examining the belief-based frameworks underpinning subjective norm. As such, this approach provides a complete solution to addressing the expectancy-value muddle in the TRA.  相似文献   
283.
The present study used a within-participants design to (a) assess the predictive validity of prototype identification versus intention for adolescents’ health behaviours and (b) examine whether control of health behaviour by intention relative to identification is associated with key individual difference variables. Participants were school children (N = 136) who completed measures of intention, perceived behavioural control and prototype identification for 14 health-related behaviours at Time 1, and reported their behaviour 2 weeks later (Time 2). A hierarchical regression showed that prototype identification and intention exhibited similar predictive validity in the prediction of adolescents’ health behaviour. Importantly, identification contributed an additional 6% to the variance in behaviour, after controlling for intention and perceived behavioural control from the theory of planned behaviour [TPB: Ajzen, I. (1991 Ajzen, I. 1991. The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50: 179211. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50, 179–211.]. Additional analyses showed that greater social comparison tendencies, lower agreeableness, greater intellect and less emotional stability were all related to greater control of behaviour by prototype identification. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.  相似文献   
284.
    
ABSTRACT

In order to efficiently control our actions, stimuli and responses made to them are stored and integrated into event files. This integration is not restricted to relevant stimuli. Even irrelevant stimuli or features that co-occur at responding can be integrated with the response. In the presence of only one irrelevant feature, binding effects for that feature are generally observed. In the presence of more than one irrelevant features, empirical evidence is inconsistent. The present experiments tested feature-response binding effects for irrelevant features when more than one irrelevant feature was present. In two experiments feature-response binding effects for three irrelevant features (colour, shape, and location) were tested in a block-wise manner. In each block one feature was orthogonally varied to the response while the others were held constant (Experiment 1) or always changed (Experiment 2). Significant binding effects were observed for each of three features when the other two were held constant (Exp. 1). However, when the other two features were varied, significant binding effects were only observed for colour and location, but not for shape (Exp. 2). The results suggest that strength of feature-response binding effects is influenced by the variation of simultaneously presented features.  相似文献   
285.
    
Abstract

This paper argues that Collingwood's philosophy of mind offers an interesting and compelling account of the nature of the mind and of the irreducibility of the mental, an account whose viability and relevance to contemporary debates ought to be given serious consideration. I suggest that the reason why Collingwood's contribution to the philosophy of mind has been neglected is due to the fact that his philosophy of mind is widely, even if mistakenly, regarded as the target of Ryle's attacks on the dogma of the ghost in the machine and proceed to undermine the assumption that Collingwood is a twentieth century adherent of the dogma.  相似文献   
286.
    
A con-reason is a reason which plays a role in motivating and explaining an agent's behaviour, but which the agent takes to count against the course of action taken. Most accounts of motivating reasons in the philosophy of action do not allow such things to exist. In this essay, I pursue two aims. First, I argue that, whatever metaphysical story we tell about the relation between motivating reasons and action, con-reasons need to be acknowledged, as they play an explanatory role not played by pro-reasons (the reason the agent takes to count in favour of the action taken). Second, I respond to an argument recently developed by David-Hillel Ruben to the effect that a causal theory of action – still known as ‘the standard story’ – cannot account for con-reasons. His argument attempts to show that a fundamental principle of the causal theory cannot be reconciled with the role con-reasons play in a certain kind of imagined case. I first argue that a causal theorist is not, in fact, committed to the problematic principle; this argument has an added benefit, since the principle has been taken by many to show that the causal theory generates a puzzle about the possibility of weak-willed action. I then argue that a causal theorist has good reason to reject the possibility of Ruben's imagined cases. If successful, my arguments make clearer the commitments of the causal theory and show that it can accommodate con-reasons in the way I think they ought to be accommodated.  相似文献   
287.
    
Psychoanalysis is concerned with neurotic behaviour that counts as an action if one takes into account “repressed” mental states. Freud's paradigmatic examples are a challenge for philosophical theories of action explanation. The main problem is that such symptomatic behaviour is, in a characteristic way, irrational. In line with standard interpretations, I will recap that psychoanalytic action explanation is not in accordance with Davidson's classical reason-explanation model, and I will recall that Freud's unconsciousness is not a second mind with its own rationality but that it is non-propositional in character. However, I then will argue that this characterization is not discriminating enough to explain the dynamical unconscious and overlooks the crucial role of “counter-cathexis”. With counter-cathexis the relevant desire turns out to be a complex with two inseparable aspects (“double-aspect view”), so that the causing belief–desire pair is still part of the space of reasons, although it cannot rationalize the behaviour. Psychoanalytic action explanation is hence still Davidsonian, albeit in a modified way.  相似文献   
288.
This article explores the conceptual connections between free action and action for which the agent is morally responsible. Questions addressed include the following. Can agents who are never morally responsible for anything sometimes act freely? Can agents who never act freely be morally responsible for some of their actions? Various compatibilist and incompatibilist responses to these questions are discussed, as is the control over their behavior that ordinary agents attribute to themselves.  相似文献   
289.
    
In this paper, the ontological, terminological, epistemological, and ethical aspects of omission are considered in a coherent and balanced framework, based on the idea that there are omissions which are actions and omissions which are non-actions. In particular, we suggest that the approach to causation which best deals with omission is Mackie's INUS conditional proposal. We argue that omissions are determined partly by the ontological conditional structure of reality, and partly by the interests, beliefs, and values of observers. The final upshot is that moral judgments involved in cases of omissions cannot be grounded on, but are the ground for judgments about what INUS conditions count as omissions.  相似文献   
290.
    
In this paper we raise three questions of clarification about Alfred Mele's fine recent book, Free Will and Luck. Our questions concern the following topics: (i) Mele's combination of ‘luck’ and ‘Frankfurt-style’ objections to libertarianism, (ii) Mele's stipulations about ‘compatibilism’ and the relation between questions about free action and questions about moral responsibility, and (iii) Mele's treatment of the Consequence Argument.  相似文献   
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号