On the construction of reality and truth. Towards an epistemology of community social psychology

An expression of community social psychology based on the need to transform social reality, and to consider people as the constructors of that reality, is examined from an epistemological point of view. Dualism, the position considering that object and subject are separate entities, and monism, the perspective stating that there is only one substance, are discussed. The consequences of both conceptions for community social psychology, and their incompatibility, as well as the notions of reality and truth are analyzed. That analysis deals with the problems of defining reality, of separating subject and object of knowledge, of language's role, and of relativism and truth. Finally, a constructionist view of monism based on relatedness, and action, is proposed, stating the mutually influencing union of subject and object in the construction of reality.     

The Situational Context <Emphasis Type="Italic">on the Nature of Political Philosophy</Emphasis>

Rationalism in political philosophy is the view that politics should be governed by moral principles and that those principles can and should be justified independently of the situations and circumstances that make up political reality. This traditional view of political philosophy implies that the meaning of right political action is determined by moral principles the rational authority of which derives from abstract philosophical reasoning, not from the situations and circumstances that are the substance of political reality. In this essay I argue that rationalist moralities must presuppose the understanding of particular situations and circumstances for their meaningful and correct interpretation. This means, I argue, that the rightness of political judgement and action is immanent in particular situations, not in abstract moralities. And this, I argue, suggests a shift from the traditional view of political society as the embodiment of abstract principles, towards a view of political society as the embodiment of the activity of situational judgement. A society worth hoping for, then, is one in which we can live in the light of our understanding of the situations and circumstances that are the substance of everyday life, rather than in the shadow of abstract moralities. Such a society would be sensitive to the particularities and complexities of political reality, but at the same time it does not succumb to moral relativism and skepticism.     

决策渐进调整过程的个案研究

许多以全面理性为基础的决策理论都倾向于把决策者对事物的认识作为决策的前提,认为一项好的决策只有在充分认识了事物的情况下才是可能的.许多心理学的研究发现,这种假设并不符合实际的情况.本研究以"行动理性"为出发点,运用个案分析技术,深入剖析了某电子原件厂历时半年的生产经营决策过程,揭示了决策在执行的过程中逐步调整和发展的特征.研究发现,作为决策的前提的认识,实际上是在该决策的执行过程中不断发展和完善的.决策者是在决策执行结果的评价基础之上,逐步深入地认识决策的关键问题,包括(1)决策所要解决的问题,(2)决策方案会产生什么样的结果,(3)决策执行方法是否适当,(4)决策应采取什么样的程序和方法,(5)决策的形势和条件如何.正是这些"后见",使决策者能够逐步调整决策,实现决策的"渐进发展".这种行动决策的思想,把决策者的认识、决策和决策执行三者的关系看做一种循环发展的过程.     

Understanding Religion: The Challenge of E. O. Wilson

E. O. Wilson's fundamental challenge is to bring knowledge and sensibility into an effective working relationship. Both ambivalence and opaqueness characterize his analysis of religion. Ambivalence refers to his conviction on the one hand that religion is essential for societal well-being and genetically resourced and his prediction, on the other hand, that religion will be superseded by scientific reason; the opaqueness refers to his strange insistence that religion be subjected to tests of literal facticity, whereas, in contrast, the arts are exempted from this test, because they constitute a delivery system that impacts the sensibilities directly, with no particular concern for literalness. Wilson's analysis of religion should be brought into consonance with his view of the arts, thereby recognizing the importance of myth, symbol, metaphor, and analogy in religious formulations and their status as direct delivery systems to the sensibilities. Wilson's distinction between empiricist/materialist and transcendentaliist worldviews is reshaped by distinguishing between metaphysical and methodological transcendentalism. This reshaping enables us to recognize how the action required by human existence depends both on scientific knowledge and symbolic formulations that extend to human action, even though certain knowledge is lacking.     

The role of subjective group memberships and perceptions of power in industrial conflict

A survey conducted with university academics (N = 187) investigated self‐reported behaviour, explanations, social identification and perceptions of power during a period of industrial disputation. The results point to the importance of subjective experience of group memberships rather than overt group memberships in understanding behaviour and perceptions of power during industrial conflict and demonstrate very little support for the idea that industrial action or inaction reflects coerced behaviour. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reflexive action research: Developing knowledge through practice

This paper gives an overview of different ways of conducting counselling and psychotherapy research. An approach to research is described which overcomes the research‐practice gap: reflexive action research. It is argued that this approach to research is particularly appropriate and relevant for practitioners since it draws upon skills and awareness necessary for clinical work, and can complement positivist methods of research which are already well established in the profession. The wider use of systematic clinical case studies is suggested as a means of promoting the reflexive action research approach. Further consideration of issues of validity and reliability is required on the part of those intending to apply this approach within the field of therapy research.     

Policy, Principle, and Incrementalism: Dworkin's Jurisprudence of Race

For several decades, Ronald Dworkinhas been one of the most prominent voicesdefending the legality and justifiability ofrace-conscious programs aimed at undoing thecontinuing effects of prejudice. Writingwithin the framework of a liberal legalphilosophy, he has formulated powerfularguments against the view that color-blindpolicies are the only defensible ones. Nonetheless, I argue that a more completeliberal defense of race-conscious policieswould need to develop and modify Dworkin's lineof argument. Such a defense would go beyondhis policy-based arguments and incorporatearguments of principle. Race-conscious policiesdo not only promote the general good; they arealso required in order to help realize theconstitutional right of equal citizenship.     

Moral Testimony and its Authority

A person sometimes forms moral beliefs by relying on another person's moral testimony. In this paper I advance a cognitivist normative account of this phenomenon. I argue that for a person's actions to be morally good, they must be based on a recognition of the moral reasons bearing on action. Morality requires people to act from an understanding of moral claims, and consequently to have an understanding of moral claims relevant to action. A person sometimes fails to meet this requirement when she relies on another person's moral testimony, and so there are moral limits on such reliance.     

Memory and epistemic conservatism

Much of the plausibility of epistemic conservatism derives from its prospects of explaining our rationality in holding memory beliefs. In the first two parts of this paper, I argue for the inadequacy of the two standard approaches to the epistemology of memory beliefs, preservationism and evidentialism. In the third, I point out the advantages of the conservative approach and consider how well conservatism survives three of the strongest objections against it. Conservatism does survive, I claim, but only if qualified in certain ways. Appropriately qualified, conservatism is no longer the powerful anti-skeptical tool some have hoped for, but a doctrine closely connected with memory.