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111.
Participants (aged 5-6 yrs, 9-10 yrs and adults) rated (using a five-point scale) grammatical (intransitive) and overgeneralized (transitive causative)(1) uses of a high frequency, low frequency and novel intransitive verb from each of three semantic classes [Pinker, S. (1989a). Learnability and cognition: The acquisition of argument structure. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press]: "directed motion" (fall, tumble), "going out of existence" (disappear, vanish) and "semivoluntary expression of emotion" (laugh, giggle). In support of Pinker's semantic verb class hypothesis, participants' preference for grammatical over overgeneralized uses of novel (and English) verbs increased between 5-6 yrs and 9-10 yrs, and was greatest for the latter class, which is associated with the lowest degree of direct external causation (the prototypical meaning of the transitive causative construction). In support of Braine and Brooks's [Braine, M.D.S., & Brooks, P.J. (1995). Verb argument strucure and the problem of avoiding an overgeneral grammar. In M. Tomasello & W. E. Merriman (Eds.), Beyond names for things: Young children's acquisition of verbs (pp. 352-376). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum] entrenchment hypothesis, all participants showed the greatest preference for grammatical over ungrammatical uses of high frequency verbs, with this preference smaller for low frequency verbs, and smaller again for novel verbs. We conclude that both the formation of semantic verb classes and entrenchment play a role in children's retreat from argument-structure overgeneralization errors. 相似文献
112.
Peter J. Graham 《Synthese》2007,158(1):19-39
Radical skepticism about the external implies that no belief about the external is even prima facie justified. A theoretical reply to skepticism has four stages. First, show which theories of epistemic justification support
skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, entail skepticism). Second, show which theories
undermine skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, do not support the skeptic’s conclusion).
Third, show which of the latter theories (which non-skeptical theory) is correct, and in so doing show that all of the rival
theories of justification, skeptical and non-skeptical alike, are mistaken. Fourth, explain why skeptical doubts are sometimes
(or sometimes merely seem) intuitive, and thereby accommodate skeptical doubts without capitulation. Michael Williams has
pioneered the very idea of a theoretical reply. A theoretical diagnosis consists in just the first two stages. An adequate
reply, which is correct at each stage, would rebut the skeptic entirely. Williams’ own reply, I argue, is inadequate. I offer
in its place an exhaustive and accurate diagnosis of skepticism. I distinguish four kinds of skepticism and five theories
of justification. I then show which theories do, and which theories do not, support which kinds of skepticism. 相似文献
113.
C. S. Jenkins 《Synthese》2007,157(1):25-45
This paper takes the form of a critical discussion of Crispin Wright’s notion of entitlement of cognitive project. I examine
various strategies for defending the claim that entitlement can make acceptance of a proposition epistemically rational, including
one which appeals to epistemic consequentialism. Ultimately, I argue, none of these strategies is successful, but the attempt
to isolate points of disagreement with Wright issues in some positive proposals as to how an epistemic consequentialist should
characterize epistemic rationality. 相似文献
114.
There is some consensus that for S to know that p, it cannot be merely a matter of luck that S’s belief that p is true. This consideration has led Duncan Pritchard and others to propose a safety condition on knowledge. In this paper, we argue that the safety condition is not a proper formulation of the intuition that
knowledge excludes luck. We suggest an alternative proposal in the same spirit as safety, and find it lacking as well. 相似文献
115.
Joëlle Proust 《Synthese》2007,159(2):271-295
Metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. It is exemplified in all the activities through which one tries
to predict and evaluate one’s own mental dispositions, states and properties for their cognitive adequacy. This article discusses
the view that metacognition has metarepresentational structure. Properties such as causal contiguity, epistemic transparency
and procedural reflexivity are present in metacognition but missing in metarepresentation, while open-ended recursivity and
inferential promiscuity only occur in metarepresentation. It is concluded that, although metarepresentations can redescribe
metacognitive contents, metacognition and metarepresentation are functionally distinct. 相似文献
116.
M. Oreste Fiocco 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(3):387-399
The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance
to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability. In recent discussions, some have attempted to explicate the notion in terms of epistemic possibility. There are, however, two notions of epistemic possibility, a more familiar one and a novel one. I argue that these two notions
are independent of one another. Both are irrelevant to an account of modal knowledge on the predominant view of modal reality.
Only the novel notion is relevant and apt on the competing view of modal reality; but this latter view is problematic in light
of compelling counterexamples. Insufficient care regarding the independent notions of epistemic possibility can lead to two
problems: a gross problem of conflation and a more subtle problem of obscuring a crucial fact of modal epistemology. Either
problem needlessly hampers efforts to develop an adequate account of modal knowledge. I conclude that the familiar notion
of epistemic possibility (and the very term ‘epistemic possibility’) should be eschewed in the context of modal epistemology.
相似文献
M. Oreste FioccoEmail: |
117.
To explore the hypothesis that domain-specific identity development predicts reasoning biases, adolescents and young adults completed measures of domain-general and domain-specific identity, epistemic regulation, and intellectual ability and evaluated arguments that either supported or threatened their occupational goals. Biases were defined as the use of sophisticated reasoning to reject goal-threatening arguments and the use of cursory reasoning to accept goal-supportive arguments. Across two measures of bias, hierarchical regression analyses showed that domain-specific vocational identity and epistemic regulation best predicted reasoning biases. Neither age nor intellectual ability predicted significant variance in biases after vocational identity and epistemic regulation scores were entered into the regression equations. The results support the thesis that biases in specific domains can be explained both by domain-specific personality attributes and by domain-general metacognitive dispositions to monitor reasoning and decontextualize problem structure from superficial contents. A dual-process framework is proposed to explain the relationships among identity, epistemic regulation, age, intellectual ability, and reasoning biases. 相似文献
118.
Integrating findings on the effects of more alternatives with findings on the effects of more attributes, we offer a motivational decision-making model, suggesting that epistemic motivation moderates individuals’ responses to complex information. Study 1 empirically investigated the shared essence of four conceptualizations of epistemic motivation, further distinguishing it from the maximizing/satisficing motivation. A series of experiments indicate that epistemic motivation moderates the effect of complex information on one’s discomfort with a decision (Studies 2–4) and on the tendency to implement one’s choice in action (Study 3). Taken together, our findings indicate that individuals with low epistemic motivation experience more discomfort and are less likely to implement their decision when faced with complex information whereas those high on epistemic motivation portray a weaker or even an opposite effect. The consistent findings across conceptualizations (dispositional Need-for-Cognitive-Closure and manipulated Openness vs. Conservation values) indicate the robustness of the findings and the important role of epistemic motivation in complex decisions. 相似文献
119.
120.
Elizabeth Burns Coleman 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(2):375-376
According to Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics (E2D), expressions have a counterfactual intension and an epistemic intension. Epistemic intensions reflect cognitive significance such that sentences with necessary epistemic intensions are a priori. We defend E2D against an influential line of criticism: arguments from epistemic misclassification. We focus in particular on the arguments of Speaks [2010] and Schroeter [2005]. Such arguments conclude that E2D is mistaken from (i) the claim that E2D is committed to classifying certain sentences as a priori, and (ii) the claim that such sentences are a posteriori. We aim to show that these arguments are unsuccessful as (i) and (ii) undercut each other. One must distinguish the general framework of E2D from a specific implementation of it. The framework is flexible enough to avoid commitment to the apriority of any particular sentence; only specific implementations are so committed. Arguments from epistemic misclassification are therefore better understood as arguments for favouring one implementation of E2D over another, rather than as refutations of E2D. 相似文献