排序方式: 共有125条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
91.
Duncan Pritchard 《Synthese》2007,158(3):277-297
In this paper, I do three things. First, I offer an overview of an anti-luck epistemology, as set out in my book, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005). Second, I attempt to meet some of the main criticisms that one might level against
the key theses that I propose in this work. And finally, third, I sketch some of the ways in which the strategy of anti-luck
epistemology can be developed in new directions. 相似文献
92.
A non-monotonic logic, the Logic of Plausible Reasoning (LPR), capable of coping with the demands of what we call complex reasoning, is introduced. It is argued that creative complex reasoning is the way of reasoning required in many instances of scientific
thought, professional practice and common life decision taking. For managing the simultaneous consideration of multiple scenarios
inherent in these activities, two new modalities, weak and strong plausibility, are introduced as part of the Logic of Plausible
Deduction (LPD), a deductive logic specially designed to serve as the monotonic support for LPR. Axiomatics and semantics
for LPD, together with a completeness proof, are provided. Once LPD has been given, LPR may be defined via a concept of extension
over LPD. Although the construction of LPR extensions is first presented in standard style, for the sake of comparison with
existing non-monotonic formalisms, alternative more elegant and intuitive ways for constructing non-monotonic LPR extensions
are also given and proofs of their equivalence are presented. 相似文献
93.
The paper aims at providing the multi-modal propositional logicLTK with a sound and complete axiomatisation. This logic combinestemporal and epistemic operators and focuses on m odeling thebehaviour of a set of agents operating in a system on the backgroundof a temporal framework. Time is represented as linear and discrete,whereas knowledge is modeled as an S5-like modality. A furthermodal operator intended to represent environment knowledge isadded to the system in order to achieve the expressive powersufficient to describe the piece of information available tothe agents at each moment in the flow of time. 相似文献
94.
Automatic verification of multi-agent systems by model checking via ordered binary decision diagrams 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We present a methodology for the verification of multi-agent systems, whose properties are specified by means of a modal logic that includes a temporal, an epistemic, and a modal operator to reason about correct behaviour of agents. The verification technique relies on model checking via ordered binary decision diagrams. We present an implementation and report on experimental results for two scenarios: the bit transmission problem with faults and the protocol of the dining cryptographers. 相似文献
95.
Starting off from the infinitary system for common knowledge over multi-modal epistemic logic presented in [L. Alberucci, G. Jäger, About cut elimination for logics of common knowledge, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 133 (2005) 73–99], we apply the finite model property to “finitize” this deductive system. The result is a cut-free, sound and complete sequent calculus for common knowledge. 相似文献
96.
The typical empirical approach to studying consciousness holds that we can only observe the neural correlates of experiences, not the experiences themselves. In this paper we argue, in contrast, that experiences are concrete physical phenomena that can causally interact with other phenomena, including observers. Hence, experiences can be observed and scientifically modelled. We propose that the epistemic gap between an experience and a scientific model of its neural mechanisms stems from the fact that the model is merely a theoretical construct based on observations, and distinct from the concrete phenomenon it models, namely the experience itself. In this sense, there is a gap between any natural phenomenon and its scientific model. On this approach, a neuroscientific theory of the constitutive mechanisms of an experience is literally a model of the subjective experience itself. We argue that this metatheoretical framework provides a solid basis for the empirical study of consciousness. 相似文献
97.
98.
99.
Elizabeth Burns Coleman 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(2):375-376
According to Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics (E2D), expressions have a counterfactual intension and an epistemic intension. Epistemic intensions reflect cognitive significance such that sentences with necessary epistemic intensions are a priori. We defend E2D against an influential line of criticism: arguments from epistemic misclassification. We focus in particular on the arguments of Speaks [2010] and Schroeter [2005]. Such arguments conclude that E2D is mistaken from (i) the claim that E2D is committed to classifying certain sentences as a priori, and (ii) the claim that such sentences are a posteriori. We aim to show that these arguments are unsuccessful as (i) and (ii) undercut each other. One must distinguish the general framework of E2D from a specific implementation of it. The framework is flexible enough to avoid commitment to the apriority of any particular sentence; only specific implementations are so committed. Arguments from epistemic misclassification are therefore better understood as arguments for favouring one implementation of E2D over another, rather than as refutations of E2D. 相似文献
100.
Integrating findings on the effects of more alternatives with findings on the effects of more attributes, we offer a motivational decision-making model, suggesting that epistemic motivation moderates individuals’ responses to complex information. Study 1 empirically investigated the shared essence of four conceptualizations of epistemic motivation, further distinguishing it from the maximizing/satisficing motivation. A series of experiments indicate that epistemic motivation moderates the effect of complex information on one’s discomfort with a decision (Studies 2–4) and on the tendency to implement one’s choice in action (Study 3). Taken together, our findings indicate that individuals with low epistemic motivation experience more discomfort and are less likely to implement their decision when faced with complex information whereas those high on epistemic motivation portray a weaker or even an opposite effect. The consistent findings across conceptualizations (dispositional Need-for-Cognitive-Closure and manipulated Openness vs. Conservation values) indicate the robustness of the findings and the important role of epistemic motivation in complex decisions. 相似文献