排序方式: 共有125条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
71.
Kelly Becker 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):245-260
There’s something deeply right in the idea that knowledge requires an ability to discriminate truth from falsity. Failing
to incorporate some version of the discrimination requirement into one’s epistemology generates cases of putative knowledge
that are at best problematic. On the other hand, many theories that include a discrimination requirement thereby appear to
entail violations of closure. This prima facie tension is resolved nicely in Jonathan Schaffer’s contrastivism, which I describe
herein. The contrastivist take on relevant alternatives is implausible, however, and this then threatens to undermine contrastivism’s
anti-skeptical results.
相似文献
Kelly BeckerEmail: |
72.
We examined the comprehension of deceptive intentions revealed in searching task in infancy, on the theoretical basis of natural pedagogy and epistemic trust. The main findings showed that 12-15-month-old infants are able to discriminate the reliable and the deceptive actions of adults, but they do not generalize their previous experience in connection with a novel person, who is treated as a new reliable source of information. 相似文献
73.
In this paper I explore the nature of confabulatory explanations of action guided by implicit bias. I claim that such explanations can have significant epistemic benefits in spite of their obvious epistemic costs, and that such benefits are not otherwise obtainable by the subject at the time at which the explanation is offered. I start by outlining the kinds of cases I have in mind, before characterising the phenomenon of confabulation by focusing on a few common features. Then I introduce the notion of epistemic innocence to capture the epistemic status of those cognitions which have both obvious epistemic faults and some significant epistemic benefit. A cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some epistemic benefit to the subject which would not be attainable otherwise because alternative (less epistemically faulty) cognitions that could deliver the same benefit are unavailable to the subject at that time. I ask whether confabulatory explanations of actions guided by implicit bias have epistemic benefits and whether there are genuine alternatives to forming a confabulatory explanation in the circumstances in which subjects confabulate. On the basis of my analysis of confabulatory explanations of actions guided by implicit bias, I argue that such explanations have the potential for epistemic innocence. I conclude that epistemic evaluation of confabulatory explanations of action guided by implicit bias ought to tell a richer story, one which takes into account the context in which the explanation occurs. 相似文献
74.
《Quarterly journal of experimental psychology (2006)》2013,66(5):872-883
By age 3, children track a speaker's record of past accuracy and use it as a cue to current reliability. Two experiments (N?=?95 children) explored whether preschoolers' judgements about, and trust in, the accuracy of a previously reliable informant extend to other members of the informant's group. In Experiment 1, both 3- and 4-year-olds consistently judged an animated character who was associated with a previously accurate speaker more likely to be correct than a character associated with a previously inaccurate speaker, despite possessing no information about these characters' individual records of reliability. They continued to show this preference one week later. Experiment 2 presented 4- and 5-year-olds with a related task using videos of human actors. Both showed preferences for members of previously accurate speakers' groups on a common measure of epistemic trust. This result suggests that by at least age 4, children's trust in speaker testimony spreads to members of a previously accurate speaker's group. 相似文献
75.
76.
Eric Pacuit 《Studia Logica》2007,86(3):435-454
Adam Brandenburger and H. Jerome Keisler have recently discovered a two person Russell-style paradox. They show that the following
configurations of beliefs is impossible: Ann believes that Bob assumes that Ann believes that Bob’s assumption is wrong. In [7] a modal logic interpretation of this paradox is proposed. The idea is to introduce two modal operators intended to
represent the agents’ beliefs and assumptions. The goal of this paper is to take this analysis further and study this paradox from the point of view of a modal logician.
In particular, we show that the paradox can be seen as a theorem of an appropriate hybrid logic.
Special Issue Formal Epistemology II. Edited by Branden Fitelson 相似文献
77.
C. Behan McCullagh 《Sophia》2007,46(1):21-34
One cannot prove the truth of theological statement, but perhaps one can justify believing them because of the good consequences
of doing so. It is irrational to believe statements of which there are good reasons to think false, but those of which there
is some, albeit inconclusive, evidence can be believed for pragmatic reasons. However, in the interest of simplicity, it must
not be possible to achieve those good consequences without such faith. John Bishop and others have argued that one need only
assume theological statements to be true to enjoy the good consequences of a religious life, but in fact, faith is needed
for most of these consequences to be achieved.
相似文献
C. Behan McCullaghEmail: |
78.
79.
A non-monotonic logic, the Logic of Plausible Reasoning (LPR), capable of coping with the demands of what we call complex reasoning, is introduced. It is argued that creative complex reasoning is the way of reasoning required in many instances of scientific
thought, professional practice and common life decision taking. For managing the simultaneous consideration of multiple scenarios
inherent in these activities, two new modalities, weak and strong plausibility, are introduced as part of the Logic of Plausible
Deduction (LPD), a deductive logic specially designed to serve as the monotonic support for LPR. Axiomatics and semantics
for LPD, together with a completeness proof, are provided. Once LPD has been given, LPR may be defined via a concept of extension
over LPD. Although the construction of LPR extensions is first presented in standard style, for the sake of comparison with
existing non-monotonic formalisms, alternative more elegant and intuitive ways for constructing non-monotonic LPR extensions
are also given and proofs of their equivalence are presented. 相似文献
80.
Duncan Pritchard 《Synthese》2007,158(3):277-297
In this paper, I do three things. First, I offer an overview of an anti-luck epistemology, as set out in my book, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005). Second, I attempt to meet some of the main criticisms that one might level against
the key theses that I propose in this work. And finally, third, I sketch some of the ways in which the strategy of anti-luck
epistemology can be developed in new directions. 相似文献