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61.
Andrés Perea 《Synthese》2007,158(2):251-271
Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present the following conditions: (1) belief in the opponents’ rationality (BOR), stating that a player believes that every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, (2) self-referential beliefs (SRB), stating that a player believes that his opponents hold correct beliefs about his own beliefs, (3) projective beliefs (PB), stating that i believes that j’s belief about k’s choice is the same as i’s belief about k’s choice, and (4) conditionally independent beliefs (CIB), stating that a player believes that opponents’ types choose their strategies independently. We show that, if a player
satisfies BOR, SRB and CIB, and believes that every opponent satisfies BOR, SRB, PB and CIB, then he will choose a Nash strategy
(that is, a strategy that is optimal in some Nash equilibrium). We thus provide a sufficient collection of one-person conditions
for Nash strategy choice. We also show that none of these seven conditions can be dropped. 相似文献
62.
63.
Anders Schinkel 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(3):267-277
Whom I call ‘epistemic reductionists’ in this article are critics of the notion of ‘moral luck’ that maintain that all supposed
cases of moral luck are illusory; they are in fact cases of what I describe as a special form of epistemic luck, the only
difference lying in what we get to know about someone, rather than in what (s)he deserves in terms of praise or blame. I argue
that epistemic reductionists are mistaken. They implausibly separate judgements of character from judgements concerning acts,
and they assume a conception of character that is untenable both from a common sense perspective and with a view to findings
from social psychology. I use especially the example of Scobie, the protagonist of Graham Greene’s novel The Heart of the Matter, to show that moral luck is real—that there are cases of moral luck that cannot be reduced to epistemic luck. The reality
of moral luck, in this example at least, lies in its impact on character and personal and moral identity.
相似文献
Anders SchinkelEmail: |
64.
Christian Piller 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(4):413-428
The fact that we ought to prefer what is comparatively more likely to be good, I argue, does, contrary to consequentialism,
not rest on any evaluative facts. It is, in this sense, a deontological requirement. As such it is the basis of our valuing
those things which are in accordance with it. We value acting (and believing) well, i.e. we value acting (and believing) as
we ought to act (and to believe). In this way, despite the fact that our interest in justification depends on our interest
in truth, we value believing with justification on non-instrumental grounds. A deontological understanding of justification,
thus, solves the Value of Knowledge Problem.
相似文献
Christian PillerEmail: |
65.
Lisa Warenski 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(3):403-426
This paper argues that a priori justification is, in principle, compatible with naturalism—if the a priori is understood in
a way that is free of the inessential properties that, historically, have been associated with the concept. I argue that empirical
indefeasibility is essential to the primary notion of the a priori; however, the indefeasibility requirement should be interpreted
in such a way that we can be fallibilist about apriori-justified claims. This fallibilist notion of the a priori accords with
the naturalist’s commitment to scientific methodology in that it allows for apriori-justified claims to be sensitive to further
conceptual developments and the expansion of evidence. The fallibilist apriorist allows that an a priori claim is revisable
in only a purely epistemic sense. This modal claim is weaker than what is required for a revisability thesis to establish
empiricism, so fallibilist apriorism represents a distinct position.
相似文献
Lisa WarenskiEmail: |
66.
Dynamic epistemic logic with branching temporal structures 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
van Bentham et al. (Merging frameworks for interaction: DEL and ETL, 2007) provides a framework for generating the models
of Epistemic Temporal Logic (ETL: Fagin et al., Reasoning about knowledge, 1995; Parikh and Ramanujam, Journal of Logic, Language, and Information, 2003)
from the models of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL: Baltag et al., in: Gilboa (ed.) Tark 1998, 1998; Gerbrandy, Bisimulations on Planet Kripke, 1999). We consider the logic
TDEL on the merged semantic framework, and its extension with the labeled past-operator “P
ϵ” (“The event ϵ has happened before which. . .”). To axiomatize the extension, we introduce a method for transforming a given
model into a normal form in a suitable sense. These logics suggest further applications of DEL in the theory of agency, the theory of learning, etc. 相似文献
67.
68.
We formalise a notion of dynamic rationality in terms of a logic of conditional beliefs on (doxastic) plausibility models.
Similarly to other epistemic statements (e.g. negations of Moore sentences and of Muddy Children announcements), dynamic rationality
changes its meaning after every act of learning, and it may become true after players learn it is false. Applying this to
extensive games, we “simulate” the play of a game as a succession of dynamic updates of the original plausibility model: the
epistemic situation when a given node is reached can be thought of as the result of a joint act of learning (via public announcements)
that the node is reached. We then use the notion of “stable belief”, i.e. belief that is preserved during the play of the
game, in order to give an epistemic condition for backward induction: rationality and common knowledge of stable belief in
rationality. This condition is weaker than Aumann’s and compatible with the implicit assumptions (the “epistemic openness
of the future”) underlying Stalnaker’s criticism of Aumann’s proof. The “dynamic” nature of our concept of rationality explains
why our condition avoids the apparent circularity of the “backward induction paradox”: it is consistent to (continue to) believe
in a player’s rationality after updating with his irrationality. 相似文献
69.
Bridging learning theory and dynamic epistemic logic 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Nina Gierasimczuk 《Synthese》2009,169(2):371-384
This paper discusses the possibility of modelling inductive inference (Gold 1967) in dynamic epistemic logic (see e.g. van
Ditmarsch et al. 2007). The general purpose is to propose a semantic basis for designing a modal logic for learning in the
limit. First, we analyze a variety of epistemological notions involved in identification in the limit and match it with traditional
epistemic and doxastic logic approaches. Then, we provide a comparison of learning by erasing (Lange et al. 1996) and iterated
epistemic update (Baltag and Moss 2004) as analyzed in dynamic epistemic logic. We show that finite identification can be
modelled in dynamic epistemic logic, and that the elimination process of learning by erasing can be seen as iterated belief-revision
modelled in dynamic doxastic logic. Finally, we propose viewing hypothesis spaces as temporal frames and discuss possible
advantages of that perspective. 相似文献
70.
Mark Jago 《Synthese》2009,167(2):327-341
Gaining information can be modelled as a narrowing of epistemic space. Intuitively, becoming informed that such-and-such is the case rules out certain scenarios or would-be possibilities. Chalmers’s
account of epistemic space treats it as a space of a priori possibility and so has trouble in dealing with the information
which we intuitively feel can be gained from logical inference. I propose a more inclusive notion of epistemic space, based
on Priest’s notion of open worlds yet which contains only those epistemic scenarios which are not obviously impossible. Whether something is obvious is not
always a determinate matter and so the resulting picture is of an epistemic space with fuzzy boundaries. 相似文献