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21.
有理论认为,模糊容忍性有助于个体发散性思维的发展,但部分实证研究却呈现出不一致的结论。本文考察了不同认识兴趣在模糊容忍性与发散性思维关系之间的中介和调节作用。结果发现:(1)I型认识兴趣在模糊容忍性和独创性、灵活性、流畅性间起完全中介作用;(2)模糊容忍性与独创性、灵活性的关系受到D型认识兴趣的调节,模糊容忍性与流畅性的关系不受D型认识兴趣的调节。 相似文献
22.
Matthew McGrath 《Synthese》2007,157(1):1-24
Much of the plausibility of epistemic conservatism derives from its prospects of explaining our rationality in holding memory
beliefs. In the first two parts of this paper, I argue for the inadequacy of the two standard approaches to the epistemology
of memory beliefs, preservationism and evidentialism. In the third, I point out the advantages of the conservative approach
and consider how well conservatism survives three of the strongest objections against it. Conservatism does survive, I claim,
but only if qualified in certain ways. Appropriately qualified, conservatism is no longer the powerful anti-skeptical tool
some have hoped for, but a doctrine closely connected with memory. 相似文献
23.
Martin E. Eigenberger Christine Critchley Karen A. Sealander 《Journal of research in personality》2007
This article reports the results of using a specially designed scaled questionnaire to investigate the dualistic properties of epistemic style. The scale is introduced as a measure of individual difference in epistemic style, conceptualized within the framework of dual-process notions of cognitive function. The study examined several psychometric components of the measure, including dimensional structure, distributional characteristics, and indications of construct validity. The instrument, called the Epistemic Preference Indicator, was found to be a reliable and valid measure of two dimensions that are negatively related—each reflecting incompatible epistemic assumptions and approaches to solving knowledge-dependent problems. Theoretical speculations are made concerning the nature of epistemic dualism and the dimension of cognitive processing that may underlie the two proposed epistemic preferences or styles. 相似文献
24.
Andy Egan 《Philosophical Studies》2007,133(1):1-22
I think that there are good reasons to adopt a relativist semantics for epistemic modal claims such as ``the treasure might
be under the palm tree', according to which such utterances determine a truth value relative to something finer-grained than
just a world (or a <world, time> pair). Anyone who is inclined to relativise truth to more than just worlds and times faces
a problem about assertion. It's easy to be puzzled about just what purpose would be served by assertions of this kind, and
how to understand what we'd be up to in our use of sentences like ``the treasure might be under the palm tree', if they have such peculiar truth conditions. After providing
a very quick argument to motivate a relativist view of epistemic modals, I bring out and attempt to resolve this problem in
making sense of the role of assertions with relativist truth conditions. Solving this problem should be helpful in two ways:
first, it eliminates an apparently forceful objection to relativism, and second, spelling out the relativist account of assertion
and communication will help to make clear just what the relativist position is, exactly, and why it's interesting.
Thanks to Brian Weatherson, John Hawthorne, Daniel Stoljar, Frank Jackson, Ben Blumson, Seth Yalcin, Karen Bennett, Kent Bach,
Matthew Weiner, Jonathan Kvanvig, Eric Swanson, David Chalmers, Agustin Rayo, Dustin Locke, Aaron Bronfman, Michael Allers,
Ivan Mayerhofer, and to the participants at the BSPC 2005 for helpful discussion. 相似文献
25.
Don Garrett 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(1):1-16
Is Hume a naturalist? Does he regard all or nearly all beliefs and actions as rationally unjustified? In order to settle these questions, it is necessary to examine their key terms (‘naturalism’ and ‘rational justification’) and to understand the character—especially the normative character—of Hume’s philosophical project. This paper argues (i) that Hume is a naturalist—and, in particular, both a moral and an epistemic naturalist—in quite robust ways; and (ii) that Hume can properly regard many actions and beliefs as “rationally justified” in several different senses of that term. 相似文献
26.
The appeal to expert opinion is an argument form that uses the verdict of an expert to support a position or hypothesis. A previous scheme‐based treatment of the argument form is formalized within a Bayesian network that is able to capture the critical aspects of the argument form, including the central considerations of the expert's expertise and trustworthiness. We propose this as an appropriate normative framework for the argument form, enabling the development and testing of quantitative predictions as to how people evaluate this argument, suggesting that such an approach might be beneficial to argumentation research generally. We subsequently present two experiments as an example of the potential for future research in this vein, demonstrating that participants' quantitative ratings of the convincingness of a proposition that has been supported with an appeal to expert opinion were broadly consistent with the predictions of the Bayesian model. 相似文献
27.
Sapphira R. Thorne Jake Quilty-Dunn Joulia Smortchkova Nicholas Shea James A. Hampton 《Cognitive Science》2021,45(5):e12978
This paper reports the first empirical investigation of the hypothesis that epistemic appraisals form part of the structure of concepts. To date, studies of concepts have focused on the way concepts encode properties of objects and the way those features are used in categorization and in other cognitive tasks. Philosophical considerations show the importance of also considering how a thinker assesses the epistemic value of beliefs and other cognitive resources and, in particular, concepts. We demonstrate that there are multiple, reliably judged, dimensions of epistemic appraisal of concepts. Four of these dimensions are accounted for by a common underlying factor capturing how well people believe they understand a concept. Further studies show how dimensions of concept appraisal relate to other aspects of concepts. First, they relate directly to the hierarchical organization of concepts, reflecting the increase in specificity from superordinate to basic and subordinate levels. Second, they predict inductive choices in category-based induction. Our results suggest that epistemic appraisals of concepts form a psychologically important yet previously overlooked aspect of the structure of concepts. These findings will be important in understanding why individuals sometimes abandon and replace certain concepts; why social groups do so, for example, during a “scientific revolution”; and how we can facilitate such changes when we engage in deliberate “conceptual engineering” for epistemic, social, and political purposes. 相似文献
28.
We conducted two studies to determine whether there is a relationship between dispositional optimism and the attribution of good or bad luck to ambiguous luck scenarios. Study 1 presented five scenarios that contained both a lucky and an unlucky component, thereby making them ambiguous in regard to being an overall case of good or bad luck. Participants rated each scenario in toto on a four-point Likert scale and then completed an optimism questionnaire. The results showed a significant correlation between optimism and assignments of luck: more optimistic people rated the characters in the ambiguous scenarios as more lucky while more pessimistic people rated the same characters in the same scenarios as more unlucky. Study 2 separated the good and bad luck components of the study 1 scenarios and presented the components individually to a new group of participants. Participants rated the luckiness of each component on the same four-point scale and then completed the optimism questionnaire. We found that the luckiness of the bad luck component could be significantly predicted by their level of optimism. We discuss how these findings pose problems for philosophical accounts that treat luck as an objective property. 相似文献
29.
Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada Fernando Soler-Toscano Ángel Nepomuceno-Fernández 《Journal of Applied Logic》2013,11(4):505-522
We propose a study of abductive reasoning addressing it as an epistemic process that involves both an agent?s information and the actions that modify this information. More precisely, we present and discuss definitions of an abductive problem and an abductive solution in terms of an agent?s information, that is, in terms of knowledge and beliefs. The discussion is then formalised by ‘implementing’ our definitions in a dynamic epistemic logic framework, where the properties of these definitions are studied, an epistemic action that represents the application of an abductive step is introduced, and an illustrative example is provided. A number of the most interesting properties of abductive reasoning (those highlighted by Peirce) are shown to be better modelled within this approach. 相似文献
30.
Pierre Le Morvan 《Metaphilosophy》2005,36(5):688-707
Abstract: In this article I argue that the prevalence of intersubjective disagreement in epistemology poses a serious problem for Epistemic Externalism. I put the problem in the form of a dilemma: either Epistemic Externalism is not a complete account of epistemic justification or it's implausible to claim that the belief that Epistemic Externalism is true is itself an externalistically justified belief. 相似文献