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101.
Timo Kajamies 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):525-534
In his topical article, Andrew Cling claims that the best extant formulation of the so-called epistemic regress problem rests
on five assumptions that are too strong. Cling offers an improved version that rests on a different set of three core epistemic
assumptions, each of which he argues for. Despite of owing a great deal to Cling’s ideas, I argue that the epistemic regress
problem surfaces from more fundamental assumptions than those offered by Cling. There are ultimately two core assumptions—in
fact two contradictory strands within the concept of epistemic support—which jointly create a powerful challenge for our pursuit
of paramount epistemic values.
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Timo KajamiesEmail: |
102.
Luca Moretti 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(2):229-246
Brogaard and Salerno (2005, Nous, 39, 123–139) have argued that antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth is flawed because it commits a conditional
fallacy by entailing the absurdity that there is necessarily an epistemic agent. Brogaard and Salerno’s argument relies on
a formal proof built upon the criticism of two parallel proofs given by Plantinga (1982, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 56, 47–70) and Rea (2000, Nous, 34, 291–301). If this argument were conclusive, antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth should probably be
abandoned. I argue however that the antirealist is not committed to a controversial reading of counterfactuals presupposed
in Brogaard and Salerno’s proof, and that the antirealist can in principle adopt an alternative reading that makes this proof
invalid. My conclusion is that no reductio of antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth has yet been provided.
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Luca MorettiEmail: |
103.
104.
Peter J. Graham 《Synthese》2007,158(1):19-39
Radical skepticism about the external implies that no belief about the external is even prima facie justified. A theoretical reply to skepticism has four stages. First, show which theories of epistemic justification support
skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, entail skepticism). Second, show which theories
undermine skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, do not support the skeptic’s conclusion).
Third, show which of the latter theories (which non-skeptical theory) is correct, and in so doing show that all of the rival
theories of justification, skeptical and non-skeptical alike, are mistaken. Fourth, explain why skeptical doubts are sometimes
(or sometimes merely seem) intuitive, and thereby accommodate skeptical doubts without capitulation. Michael Williams has
pioneered the very idea of a theoretical reply. A theoretical diagnosis consists in just the first two stages. An adequate
reply, which is correct at each stage, would rebut the skeptic entirely. Williams’ own reply, I argue, is inadequate. I offer
in its place an exhaustive and accurate diagnosis of skepticism. I distinguish four kinds of skepticism and five theories
of justification. I then show which theories do, and which theories do not, support which kinds of skepticism. 相似文献
105.
C. S. Jenkins 《Synthese》2007,157(1):25-45
This paper takes the form of a critical discussion of Crispin Wright’s notion of entitlement of cognitive project. I examine
various strategies for defending the claim that entitlement can make acceptance of a proposition epistemically rational, including
one which appeals to epistemic consequentialism. Ultimately, I argue, none of these strategies is successful, but the attempt
to isolate points of disagreement with Wright issues in some positive proposals as to how an epistemic consequentialist should
characterize epistemic rationality. 相似文献
106.
There is some consensus that for S to know that p, it cannot be merely a matter of luck that S’s belief that p is true. This consideration has led Duncan Pritchard and others to propose a safety condition on knowledge. In this paper, we argue that the safety condition is not a proper formulation of the intuition that
knowledge excludes luck. We suggest an alternative proposal in the same spirit as safety, and find it lacking as well. 相似文献
107.
Joëlle Proust 《Synthese》2007,159(2):271-295
Metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. It is exemplified in all the activities through which one tries
to predict and evaluate one’s own mental dispositions, states and properties for their cognitive adequacy. This article discusses
the view that metacognition has metarepresentational structure. Properties such as causal contiguity, epistemic transparency
and procedural reflexivity are present in metacognition but missing in metarepresentation, while open-ended recursivity and
inferential promiscuity only occur in metarepresentation. It is concluded that, although metarepresentations can redescribe
metacognitive contents, metacognition and metarepresentation are functionally distinct. 相似文献
108.
M. Oreste Fiocco 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(3):387-399
The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance
to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability. In recent discussions, some have attempted to explicate the notion in terms of epistemic possibility. There are, however, two notions of epistemic possibility, a more familiar one and a novel one. I argue that these two notions
are independent of one another. Both are irrelevant to an account of modal knowledge on the predominant view of modal reality.
Only the novel notion is relevant and apt on the competing view of modal reality; but this latter view is problematic in light
of compelling counterexamples. Insufficient care regarding the independent notions of epistemic possibility can lead to two
problems: a gross problem of conflation and a more subtle problem of obscuring a crucial fact of modal epistemology. Either
problem needlessly hampers efforts to develop an adequate account of modal knowledge. I conclude that the familiar notion
of epistemic possibility (and the very term ‘epistemic possibility’) should be eschewed in the context of modal epistemology.
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M. Oreste FioccoEmail: |
109.
John Turri 《Synthese》2009,170(1):147-153
I respond to John Greco’s argument that all forms of internalism in epistemology are either false or uninteresting. The paper
divides into two sections. First, I explain precisely what internalists and externalists in epistemology disagree over. This
puts us in a position to assess whether Greco’s argument succeeds. Second, I present Greco’s argument and offer two objections. 相似文献
110.
The aim of this paper is to review research on epistemic emotions in learning. The emphasis is not only on the cognitive states that give rise to epistemic emotions but also on the dynamics of epistemic emotions in complex learning situations. The interrelations between epistemic emotions and their interactions with affective states and metacognitive experiences are also explored. The position put forth is that epistemic emotions are triggered by cognitive states involving discrepancy, or conflict, between active schemas and incoming information, or gap in one's knowledge. However, each of the epistemic emotions has its specific triggering conditions that differentiate it from the others. Changing conditions during a cognitive endeavor impact the intensity as well as the interrelations between epistemic emotions. Also, there are relations between epistemic emotions and metacognitive experiences such as feeling of difficulty or confidence, albeit not so strong. The implications for future research are discussed. 相似文献