排序方式: 共有125条查询结果,搜索用时 31 毫秒
11.
Bart de Langhe Stijn M.J. van Osselaer Berend Wierenga 《Organizational behavior and human decision processes》2011
This article challenges the view that it is always better to hold decision makers accountable for their decision process rather than their decision outcomes. In three multiple-cue judgment studies, the authors show that process accountability, relative to outcome accountability, consistently improves judgment quality in relatively simple elemental tasks. However, this performance advantage of process accountability does not generalize to more complex configural tasks. This is because process accountability improves an analytical process based on cue abstraction, while it does not change a holistic process based on exemplar memory. Cue abstraction is only effective in elemental tasks (in which outcomes are a linear additive combination of cues) but not in configural tasks (in which outcomes depend on interactions between the cues). In addition, Studies 2 and 3 show that the extent to which process and outcome accountability affect judgment quality depends on individual differences in analytical intelligence and rational thinking style. 相似文献
12.
Pierre Le Morvan 《Synthese》2008,162(2):251-264
How is epistemic justification related to knowledge? Is it, as widely thought, constitutive of knowledge? Is it merely a means to knowledge, or merely a means to something else, such as truth? In a recent article in this journal, Hofmann (2005, Synthese, 146(3), 357–369) addresses these questions in attempting to defend an important argument articulated by Sartwell (1992, The Journal of Philosophy, 89(4), 167–180) and reconstructed and criticized by Le Morvan (2002, Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 56(2), 151–168). This Sartwellian argument purported to show that, since epistemic justification is of merely instrumental value, it is not constitutive of knowledge. In this paper, I argue that Hofmann’s defense of Sartwell fails, but that its failure brings to light some important lessons concerning the nature of justification and its relationship to truth and knowledge. 相似文献
13.
Kevin McCain 《Synthese》2008,164(2):185-200
Although several important methodologies implicitly assume the truth of epistemic conservatism, the view that holding a belief
confers some measure of justification on the belief, recent criticisms have led some to conclude that epistemic conservatism
is an implausible view. That conclusion is mistaken. In this article, I propose a new formulation of epistemic conservatism
that is not susceptible to the criticisms leveled at earlier formulations of epistemic conservatism. In addition to withstanding
these criticisms, this formulation of epistemic conservatism has several benefits. First, this formulation has the benefits
of earlier formulations of epistemic conservatism, that is to say it makes sense of our intuitions about justification in
regard to both memory beliefs and beliefs for which we have forgotten our evidence. Second, it provides a good way of responding
to the skeptic’s challenge concerning the possibility of possessing knowledge of the external world posed by the Alternative
Hypotheses argument. Third, it provides responses to both forms of a new skeptical problem plaguing basic knowledge structure
theories, the Problem of Easy Knowledge formulated by Stewart Cohen. I argue that given the many benefits of this formulation
of epistemic conservatism and the fact that it is not vulnerable to the criticisms that undermine earlier formulations of
epistemic conservatism, this formulation of epistemic conservatism is a plausible view to maintain. 相似文献
14.
Michael Blome-Tillmann 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(1):29-53
Epistemic contextualism—the view that the content of the predicate ‘know’ can change with the context of utterance—has fallen
into considerable disrepute recently. Many theorists have raised doubts as to whether ‘know’ is context-sensitive, typically
basing their arguments on data suggesting that ‘know’ behaves semantically and syntactically in a way quite different from
recognised indexicals such as ‘I’ and ‘here’ or ‘flat’ and ‘empty’. This paper takes a closer look at three pertinent objections
of this kind, viz. at what I call the Error-Theory Objection, the Gradability Objection and the Clarification-Technique Objection.
The paper concludes that none of these objections can provide decisive evidence against contextualism. 相似文献
15.
Jeffrey C. King 《Philosophical Studies》2007,133(3):443-453
Robert Stalnaker is an actualist who holds that merely possible worlds are uninstantiated properties that might have been
instantiated. Stalnaker also holds that there are no metaphysically impossible worlds: uninstantiated properties that couldn't
have been instantiated. These views motivate Stalnaker's "two dimensional" account of the necessary a posteriori on which
there is no single proposition that is both necessary and a posteriori. For a (metaphysically) necessary proposition is true
in all (metaphysically) possible worlds. If there were necessary a posteriori propositions, that would mean that there were
propositions true in all possible worlds but which could only be known to be true by acquiring empirical evidence. Consider
such a purported proposition P. The role of empirical evidence for establishing P's truth would have to be to rule out worlds
in which P is false. If there were no such worlds to be ruled out, we would not require evidence for P. But by hypothesis,
P is necessary and so true in all metaphysically possible worlds. And on Stalnaker's view, the metaphysically possible worlds
are all the worlds there are. So there can be no proposition that is true in all possible worlds, but that we require evidence
to know. In this way, the motivation for Stalnaker's two dimensional account of the necessary a posteriori rests on his denying
that there are metaphysically impossible Worlds. I argue that given his view of what possible worlds are, Stalnaker has no
principled reason for denying that there are metaphysically impossible worlds. If I am right, this undercuts Stalnaker's motivation
for his two dimensional account of the necessary a posteriori.
相似文献
Jeffrey C. KingEmail: |
16.
Standard Kripke models are inadequate to model situations of inexact knowledge with introspection, since positive and negative
introspection force the relation of epistemic indiscernibility to be transitive and euclidean. Correlatively, Williamson’s
margin for error semantics for inexact knowledge invalidates axioms 4 and 5. We present a new semantics for modal logic which
is shown to be complete for K45, without constraining the accessibility relation to be transitive or euclidean. The semantics corresponds to a system of
modular knowledge, in which iterated modalities and simple modalities are not on a par. We show how the semantics helps to
solve Williamson’s luminosity paradox, and argue that it corresponds to an integrated model of perceptual and introspective
knowledge that is psychologically more plausible than the one defended by Williamson. We formulate a generalized version of
the semantics, called token semantics, in which modalities are iteration-sensitive up to degree n and insensitive beyond n. The multi-agent version of the semantics yields a resource-sensitive logic with implications for the representation of common
knowledge in situations of bounded rationality. 相似文献
17.
Guy Axtell 《Synthese》2007,158(3):363-383
This essay extends my side of a discussion begun earlier with Duncan Pritchard, the recent author of Epistemic Luck.Pritchard’s work contributes significantly to improving the “diagnostic appeal” of a neo-Moorean philosophical response to
radical scepticism. While agreeing with Pritchard in many respects, the paper questions the need for his concession to the
sceptic that the neo-Moorean is capable at best of recovering “‘brute’ externalist knowledge”. The paper discusses and directly
responds to a dilemma that Pritchard poses for virtue epistemologies (VE). It also takes issue with Pritchard’s “merely safety-based”
alternative. Ultimately, however, the criticisms made here of Pritchard’s dilemma and its underlying contrast of “anti-luck”
and “virtue” epistemologies are intended to help realize his own aspirations for a better diagnosis of radical scepticism
to inform a still better neo-Moorean response. 相似文献
18.
This paper is an attempt to put forward a new kind of partial model for representing belief states. I first introduce some philosophical motivations for working with partial models. Then, I present the standard (total) model proposed by Hintikka, and the partial models studied by Humberstone and Holliday. I then show how to reduce Hintikka’s semantics in order to obtain a partial model which, however, differs from Humberstone’s and Holliday’s. The nature of such differences is assessed, and I provide motivations for using the newly proposed semantics rather than the existing ones. Finally, I review some promising philosophical applications of the ideas developed throughout the discussion. 相似文献
19.
In this paper we investigate first order common knowledge logics; i.e., modal epistemic logics based on first order logic with common knowledge operators. It is shown that even rather weak fragments of first order common knowledge logics are not recursively axiomatizable. This applies, for example, to fragments which allow to reason about names only; that is to say, fragments the first order part of which is based on constant symbols and the equality symbol only. Then formal properties of "quantifying into" epistemic contexts are investigated. The results are illustrated by means of epistemic representations of Nash Equilibria for finite games with mixed strategies. 相似文献
20.