A mechanism of implicit lexicalized phonological recoding used concurrently with underdeveloped explicit letter-sound skills in both precocious and normal reading development

These are findings of theoretical interest from: (i) follow-up of a case study of a precocious reader; and (ii) normally developing readers who served as comparison groups. The precocious reader was first reported when 2–3 years of age (Cognition 74 (2000) 177). From 3 to 7 years of age her precocious reading development continued, her word reading accuracy increasing from the 8- to the 16-year-level, although her phonemic awareness skills remained underdeveloped relative to word reading. Nonword reading continued to develop rapidly. Her word reading, however, was more than phonological recoding. At 5 years of age, in comparison with reading-level matched normal 11-year-olds she exhibited strong effects of semantic characteristics of words and evidence of well-specified lexical orthographic representations. In common with normal comparison 11-year-olds, who had not received instruction in explicit phonics, her explicit letter-sound skills were underdeveloped but she possessed high speed and accuracy in nonword reading, a result most theories of the acquisition of reading fail to explain. Her responses to irregularly spelt nonwords indicated higher proficiency than the 11-year-olds in acquiring lexical orthographic representations not predictable from prior phonological recoding knowledge. It is considered that this proficiency contributes to an explanation of her precocious reading development. A mechanism of implicit lexicalized phonological recoding is involved which explains the dissociation of skills in both the precocious reader and normally developing readers.     

Illusion of sense of self-agency: discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory consequences of actions modulates the sense of self-agency, but not the sense of self-ownership

It is proposed that knowledge of motor commands is used to distinguish self-generated sensation from externally generated sensation. In this paper, we show that the sense of self-agency, that is the sense that I am the one who is generating an action, largely depends on the degree of discrepancy resulting from comparison between the predicted and actual sensory feedback. In Experiment 1, the sense of self-agency was reduced when the presentation of the tone was unpredictable in terms of timing and its frequency, although in fact the tone was self-produced. In Experiment 2, the opposite case was found to occur. That is, participants experienced illusionary sense of self-agency when the externally generated sensations happened to match the prediction made by forward model. In Experiment 3, the sense of self-agency was reduced when there was a discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory consequences, regardless of presence or absence of a discrepancy between the intended and actual consequences of actions. In all the experiments, a discrepancy between the predicted and actual feedback had no effects on sense of self-ownership, that is the sense that I am the one who is undergoing an experience. These results may suggest that both senses of self are mutually independent.     

The effect of emotional context on cognitive inhibition and attentional processing in dissociative identity disorder

In light of previous research, the current study tested the hypothesis that dissociative identity disorder (DID) would be characterised by effective cognitive inhibitory functioning when tested in a neutral context, but weakened inhibition when tested in an emotionally negative context. Using a negative priming task (i.e. the flanker task) to assess inhibitory ability 11 DID, 11 depressed, and 11 general population participants were tested in the two differing experimental contexts. The contexts were manipulated by instructions and word stimuli, and following the completion of this task participants completed the Dissociative Experiences Scale and the Schizotypal Personality Scale. DID participants displayed a greater degree of self-reported anxiety in the negative context and as expected displayed a reduction in inhibition in this context but not in the neutral context. The degree of negative priming for the depressed and general population samples remained stable across contexts as did their anxiety levels. The DID sample displayed slower response times to negative compared to neutral words but this attentional bias was not evident for the two comparison groups. The relationship between increased arousal, inhibitory functioning, dissociation and information processing in DID is discussed.     

Self-consciousness, self-agency, and schizophrenia

Empirical approaches on topics such as consciousness, self-awareness, or introspective perspective, need a conceptual framework so that the emerging, still unconnected findings can be integrated and put into perspective. We introduce a model of self-consciousness derived from phenomenology, philosophy, the cognitive, and neurosciences. We will then give an overview of research data on one particular aspect of our model, self-agency, trying to link findings from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Finally, we will expand on pathological aspects of self-agency, and in particular on psychosis in schizophrenia. We show, that a deficient self-monitoring system underlies, in part, hallucinations and formal thought (language) disorder in schizophrenia. We argue, that self-consciousness is a valid construct and can be studied with the instruments of cognitive and neuroscience.