The relationship between emotional clarity and suicidal ideation among trauma-exposed adolescents in inpatient psychiatric care: does distress tolerance matter?

ABSTRACT

The present investigation examined associations between low emotional clarity (the extent to which individuals are confused about the specific emotions they are experiencing) and suicidal ideation in a diverse sample of trauma-exposed inpatient adolescents, as well as the moderating role of distress tolerance (DT) in this association. Participants (N = 50; 52.0% female; M = 15.1 years, SD = .51; 44% White) completed measures of emotion dysregulation, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and suicidal ideation/attempts, as well as a behavioral measure of DT. Controlling for age, gender, presence of mood disorder, and past history of attempts, results revealed a significant interaction between DT and low emotional clarity in relation to suicidal ideation. Specifically, lower emotional clarity was related to suicidal ideation at higher, but not lower, levels of DT. Findings suggest that presence of suicidal ideation among traumatized youth with low emotion clarity is most likely when these emotional deficits are coupled with a high tolerance for cognitive/psychological distress. Given that the ability to withstand distress is arguably a key factor in transitioning individuals from ideation to lethal suicidal behavior, attention to the presence of this construct in the context of clinical practice may be warranted.     

The influence of cognitive and emotional suppression on overgeneral autobiographical memory retrieval

Over-general autobiographical memory (OAM) retrieval is characterized by retrieval of categoric autobiographical memories. According to the CarFAX model, this tendency may result from avoidance which functions to protect the person against recalling details of upsetting memories. This study tested whether avoidance strategies impact on the ability to retrieve specific autobiographical memories. Healthy participants (N = 51) watched a negative video clip and were instructed to either suppress any thought (thought suppression), suppress any feeling (emotional inhibition), or think and feel naturally (controls) in response to the video. Participants then completed the Autobiographical Memory Test. Participants engaging in either thought suppression or emotional inhibition retrieved fewer categoric autobiographical memories than controls. These findings challenge the affect regulation component of the CarFAX model insofar as they suggest that regulatory strategies that aim to reduce awareness of adverse emotional memories do not necessarily lead to increased recall of categoric autobiographical memories.     

The effect of stress on the suppression of erroneous competing responses

Abstract

Evidence exists that the intention to perform certain cognitive tasks activates, unintentionally, competing responses and computations that intrude on the performance of the intended tasks. For the intended task to be performed effectively, such intrusions must be controlled. Two experiments were carried out to test the hypothesis that stress heightens the difficulty of exercising effective control over erroneous competing responses, a possible explanation of decrements in the performance of cognitive tasks under stress. Participants performed four tasks, which contained features that could potentially prime or activate erroneous responses. The results demonstrated that the interference of these features with performance was more pronounced among stressed than among less-stressed participants. The need for a more comprehensive theory of the effects of stress on information processing is discussed.     

Active suppression of distractors that match the contents of visual working memory

The biased competition theory proposes that items matching the contents of visual working memory will automatically have an advantage in the competition for attention. However, evidence for an automatic effect has been mixed, perhaps because the memory-driven attentional bias can be overcome by top-down suppression. To test this hypothesis, the Pd component of the event-related potential waveform was used as a marker of attentional suppression. While observers maintained a colour in working memory, task-irrelevant probe arrays were presented that contained an item matching the colour being held in memory. We found that the memory-matching probe elicited a Pd component, indicating that it was being actively suppressed. This result suggests that sensory inputs matching the information being held in visual working memory are automatically detected and generate an “attend-to-me” signal, but this signal can be overridden by an active suppression mechanism to prevent the actual capture of attention.     

No templates for rejection: a failure to configure attention to ignore task-irrelevant features

ABSTRACT

Knowing the colour of an upcoming target allows one to bias attention towards objects of that colour. It is far less clear whether knowing the colour of an up-coming distractor can allow one to suppress attention to items of that colour. Arita, Carlisle, and Woodman (2012) suggest that people can create a template for rejection. However, the method used in Arita et al. may have allowed people to adopt a strategy of internally generating a positive cue for the target colour or target hemifield. Here we use a method very similar to theirs, but manipulate the display layouts and the number of un-cued colours in ways that should thwart such strategies. Across three experiments, we find a negative cuing benefit only in a very special circumstance that encourages a strategic shift to internally generating a positive cue (the same circumstance used by Arita et al.). We conclude that people are unable to use a negative feature-cue on a trial-by-trial basis to suppress attention to upcoming distractors, and attribute the finding in Arita et al. to a strategic shift rather than a template for rejection.     

Top-down control settings and the attentional blink: Evidence for nonspatial contingent capture

Previous studies have shown that spatial attention can be “captured” by irrelevant events, but only if the eliciting stimulus matches top-down attentional control settings. Here we explore whether similar principles hold for nonspatial attentional selection. Subjects searched for a coloured target letter embedded in an RSVP stream of letters inside a box centred on fixation. On critical trials, a distractor, consisting of a brief change in the colour of the box, occurred at various temporal lags prior to the target. In Experiment 1, the distractor produced a decrement in target detection, but only when it matched the target colour. Experiments 2 and 3 provide evidence that this effect does not reflect masking or the dispersion of spatial attention. The results establish that (1) nonspatial selection is subject to “capture”, (2) such capture is contingent on top-down attentional control settings, and (3) control settings for nonspatial capture can vary in specificity.     

A reversal of the search asymmetry favouring negative schematic faces

Quite a number of studies have tested whether the affective valence of stimuli can guide attention in visual search. Studies using schematic affective faces frequently found a relative search asymmetry (RSA), with more efficient search for a negative face in a friendly crowd than vice versa. Whether, however, this effect relates to differences in affect or to the confounded differences in perceptual features is unknown. The present study proposes and tests a similarity-based account for the RSA. Experiments 1a and 1b first replicate the typical RSA. Experiment 2 shows that the stimulus could be simplified to some degree without losing the RSA. Experiments 3 and 4, finally, demonstrate that the RSA could be reversed by a rather simple stimulus change, that leaves the facial expression intact. It is concluded that the strong dependence of the RSA on stimulus factors seriously questions the claim that emotional factors drive the RSA.     

How people think “if only …” about reasons for actions

When people think about how a situation might have turned out differently, they tend to imagine counterfactual alternatives to their actions. We report the results of three experiments which show that people imagine alternatives to actions differently when they know about a reason for the action. The first experiment (n = 36) compared reason – action sequences to cause – effect sequences. It showed that people do not imagine alternatives to reasons in the way they imagine alternatives to causes: they imagine an alternative to an action more than an effect, and to a cause more than a reason. The second experiment (n = 214) and the third experiment (n = 190) both show that different sorts of reasons have different sorts of effects on how people imagine alternatives to actions. People imagine an alternative to an action (the protagonist went to a ball) less often when they know the reason for the action was an obligation (he had to participate in fundraising) compared to when they know about a weaker reason (he wanted to meet a famous violinist) or no reason. The second experiment shows the effect for a social obligation and the third experiment replicates and extends it to a health obligation. We interpret the results in terms of the possibilities that people keep in mind about actions and their reasons.