Lateralisation of emotions: evidence from pupil size measurement

The way our brain processes emotional stimuli has been studied intensively. One of the main issues still under debate is the laterality of valence processing. Herein, we employed the fact that pupil size increases under conditions of higher mental effort and during emotional processing, in order to contrast three proposed hypotheses in the field. We used different manual response mapping for emotional stimuli: Participants responded with their right hand for positive and with their left hand for negative facial expressions, or vice versa. The hands position was either regular (Experiment 1) or crossed (Experiment 2) in order to rule out a “spatial-valence association” alternate explanation. A third experiment was conducted by employing a passive viewing procedure of peripheral emotional stimuli. In the first two experiments, pupil size was larger when participants responded to positive stimuli with their left hand and to negative with their right hand, compared with the opposite mapping. Results of Experiment 3 strengthen the findings of Experiments 1 and 2. These findings provide significant psychophysiological evidence for the valence hypothesis: Processing positive stimuli involves the left hemisphere, while processing negative stimuli involves the right hemisphere. These results are discussed in relation to contemporary theories of emotion processing.     

Profiles of emotion regulation: Understanding regulatory patterns and the implications for posttraumatic stress

Trauma survivors often experience posttraumatic stress (PTS) and report concurrent difficulties with emotion regulation (ER). Although individuals typically use multiple regulatory strategies to manage emotion, no studies yet examine the influence of a constellation of strategies on PTS in a community sample. We assessed six ER strategies and investigated whether specific profiles of ER (i.e. the typical pattern of regulation, determined by how often each strategy is used) were related to PTS. A hierarchical cluster analysis indicated that four distinct profiles were present: Adaptive Regulation, Active Regulation, Detached Regulation, and Maladaptive Regulation. Further analyses revealed that an individual's profile was not related to frequency of past trauma, but had the power to differentiate symptom severity for overall PTS and each symptom cluster of posttraumatic stress disorder. These findings highlight how profiles characterising multiple regulatory strategies offer a more complete understanding of the ways ER can account for PTS.     

Enhanced conflict-driven cognitive control by emotional arousal,not by valence

Emotion is widely agreed to have two dimensions, valence and arousal. Few studies have explored the effect of emotion on conflict adaptation by considering both of these, which could have dissociate influence. The present study aimed to fill the gap as to whether emotional valence and arousal would exert dissociable influence on conflict adaptation. In the experiments, we included positive, neutral, and negative conditions, with comparable arousal between positive and negative conditions. Both positive and negative conditions have higher arousal than neutral ones. In Experiment 1, by using a two-colour-word Flanker task, we found that conflict adaptation was enhanced in both positive and negative contexts compared to a neutral context. Furthermore, this effect still existed when controlling stimulus–response repetitions in Experiment 2, which used a four-colour-word Flanker task. The findings suggest emotional arousal enhances conflict adaptation, regardless of emotional valence. Thus, future studies should consider emotional arousal when studying the effect of emotion on conflict adaptation. Moreover, the unique role of the emotional context in conflict-driven cognitive control is emphasised.     

Emotional influences on perception and working memory

Although there has been steady progress elucidating the influence of emotion on cognition, it remains unclear precisely when and why emotion impairs or facilitates cognition. The present study investigated the mechanisms involved in the influence of emotion on perception and working memory (WM), using modified 0-back and 2-back tasks, respectively. First, results showed that attentional focus modulated the impact of emotion on perception. Specifically, emotion facilitated perceptual task performance when it was relevant to the task, but it impaired performance when it was irrelevant to the task. The differential behavioural effect of emotion on perception as a function of attentional focus diminished under high WM load. Second, attentional focus did not directly modulate the impact of emotion on WM, but rather its influence depended on the dynamic relationship between internal representations. Specifically, WM performance was worse when the material already being held online and the new input were of matching emotions (e.g. both were negative), compared to when they were not. We propose that the competition between “bottom-up” and “top-down” processing for limited cognitive resources explains the nature of the influence of emotion on both perception and WM.     

Why emotion recognition is not simulational

According to a dominant interpretation of the simulation hypothesis, in recognizing an emotion we use the same neural processes used in experiencing that emotion. This paper argues that the view is fundamentally misguided. I will examine the simulational arguments for the three basic emotions of fear, disgust, and anger and argue that the simulational account relies strongly on a narrow sense of emotion processing which hardly squares with evidence on how, in fact, emotion recognition is processed. I contend that the current body of empirical evidence suggests that emotion recognition is processed in an integrative system involving multiple cross-regional interactions in the brain, a view which squares with understanding emotion recognition as an information-rich, rather than simulational, process. In the final section, I discuss possible objections.     

Integration of Two Skeptical Emotion Theories: Dimensional Appraisal Theory and Russell's Psychological Construction Theory

This inquiry attempts to integrate two skeptical emotion theories: dimensional appraisal theory and Russell's (2003) psychological construction theory. To bring out the skeptical elements of these theories, I compare them first with two classic theories: affect program theory and discrete appraisal theory. The skeptical theories are similar to each other in that they replace the concept of emotion with the concept of emotional episode, and that they organize the variety within the set of emotional episodes according to dimensions instead of vernacular emotion subsets. Their differences concern the strength of the relations among the components in emotional episodes and the scientific status of the set of emotional episodes. To make an informed decision about the elements to keep and to revise from both theories, I engage in a separate analysis of the behavior-related components and the experience component, guided by insights from general behavior theories and general theories of consciousness. The analysis of the behavior-related components suggests the relatively uncharted idea that the so-called emotional aspect of behavior can be caused by a goal-directed mechanism. The analysis of the experience component reveals that different theories have emphasized different aspects of experience and hence different paths toward experience. The inquiry ends with an integrated theory that rejects the scientific status of emotions or emotional episodes, but accepts the scientific status of the components and sees strong causal relations among them.     

Masked emotional priming: A double dissociation between direct and indirect effects reveals non-conscious processing of emotional information beyond valence

We demonstrate non-conscious processing beyond valence by employing the masked emotional priming paradigm (Rohr, Degner, & Wentura, 2012) with a stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) variation. Emotional faces were briefly presented and directly masked, followed by the target face, using a SOA of either 43 ms or 143 ms. Targets were categorized as happy, angry, fearful, or sad. With short SOA, we replicated the differentiated priming effect within the negative domain (i.e., angry differentiate from fearful/sad). A direct test of prime awareness indicated that primes could not be discriminated consciously in this condition. With long SOA, however, we did not observe the priming effect whereas the direct test indicated some degree of conscious processing. Thus, indirect effects dissociated from direct effects in our study, an indication for non-conscious processing. Thereby, the present study provides evidence for non-conscious processing of emotional information beyond a simple positive-negative differentiation.     

Incidental emotions have a greater impact on the logicality of less proficient reasoners

Previous research shows differences in reasoning about emotional and neutral stimuli. A common explanation hypothesised for this effect is that emotion incurs an additional cognitive load. If this is the case, incidental emotion should have a greater impact on the reasoning of less proficient reasoners, and when items are more difficult, because a greater proportion of available cognitive resources must be allocated to the task. We manipulated the emotional value of reasoning stimuli using conditioning and with the simultaneous presentation of images. The deleterious effect of emotion on logicality was greater for less proficient reasoners. There was also some indication that the effect of emotion may be more pronounced for more difficult items. Physiological responses and affective evaluations of the stimuli were similar across groups, irrespective of reasoning proficiency. Results provide some support for the hypothesis that the impact of emotion occurs through increased cognitive load.     

Émotions et stratégies d’adaptation de prestataires de soins suite à des décès maternels dans le Nord-Kivu

This qualitative study describes the emotional structure and coping strategies associated with maternal death in North Kivu. Based on a heuristic approach, the methodology is based on an iterative process of explicating the experience of maternal death as experienced by the care teams. In conjunction with the transactional model of Lazarus and Folkman, the results focus on four themes: openness to spiritual values, telescoping age identification, use of hygiene strategies and rationalization. The study suggests the establishment of psychological support mechanisms for providers after a maternal death.     

Measuring cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression in children: A parent-rating version of the emotion regulation questionnaire

The frequency of using cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression strategies to regulate emotions has been associated with social-emotional adjustment. The aim of the present study was to evaluate the Parent-Rating Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (P-ERQ), a parent-rating version of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) in children aged five to six years. Children from Germany (N = 112) and the U.S. (N = 59) participated. Confirmatory factor analyses of P-ERQ data from Germany indicated a two-factor structure that closely reflected the factor structure of the adult ERQ with adequate scale reliabilities. Correlations with a measure of coping strategies supported the convergent validity of the P-ERQ. Cross-country measurement invariance analyses between samples from Germany and the U.S. suggested partial scalar invariance for the cognitive reappraisal subscale and metric invariance for the expressive suppression subscale. Findings provide preliminary evidence that the P-ERQ can be recommended for use in developmental research.