Practice makes perfect: Training the interpretation of emotional ambiguity

The interpretation of emotionally ambiguous words, sentences, or scenarios can be altered through training procedures that are collectively called cognitive bias modification for interpretation (CBM-I). In three experiments, we systematically manipulated the nature of the training in order to discriminate between emotional priming and ambiguity resolution accounts of training effects. In Experiment 1 participants completed word fragments that were consistently related to either a negative or benign interpretation of an ambiguous sentence. In a subsequent semantic priming task they demonstrated an interpretation bias, in that they were faster to identify relatedness of targets that were associated with the training-congruent meaning of an emotionally ambiguous homograph. We then manipulated the training sentences to show that interpretation bias was eliminated when participants simply completed valenced word fragments following unrelated sentences (Experiment 2), or completed fragments that were related to emotional but unambiguous sentences (Experiment 3). Only when participants were required to actively resolve emotionally ambiguous sentences during training did changes in interpretation emerge at test. Findings suggest that CBM-I achieves its effects by altering a production rule that aids the selection of meaning from emotionally ambiguous alternatives, in line with an ambiguity resolution account.     

Multifaceted emotion regulation,stress and affect in mothers of young children

We tested a novel multi-component emotion self-regulation construct that captured physiological (vagal tone), cognitive (reappraisal) and temperament (effortful control) aspects of emotion regulation (ER) as a moderator of the link between more stressors and greater negative/less positive affectivity (NA and PA). A socio-economically diverse sample of 151 women with young children completed questionnaires and a laboratory visit (including cognitive and parent–child interaction tasks and vagal tone measurement). Women with more stressors had more NA and less PA. Furthermore, for NA only, having more stressors was substantially associated with NA but only among women with the lowest ER. This pattern was evident for the composite as well as individual indicators of ER. Results were not attributable to individual differences in executive function. Findings are discussed in light of the diathesis-stress model of stress and coping.     

Individual differences in physiological flexibility predict spontaneous avoidance

People often regulate their emotions by resorting to avoidance, a putatively maladaptive strategy. Prior work suggests that increased psychopathology symptoms predict greater spontaneous utilisation of this strategy. Extending this work, we examined whether heightened resting cardiac vagal tone (which reflects a general ability to regulate emotions in line with contextual demands) predicts decreased spontaneous avoidance. In Study 1, greater resting vagal tone was associated with reduced spontaneous avoidance in response to disgust-eliciting pictures, beyond anxiety and depression symptoms and emotional reactivity. In Study 2, resting vagal tone interacted with anxiety and depression symptoms to predict spontaneous avoidance in response to disgust-eliciting film clips. The positive association between symptoms and spontaneous avoidance was more pronounced among participants with reduced resting vagal tone. Thus, increased resting vagal tone might protect against the use of avoidance. Our findings highlight the importance of assessing both subjective and biological processes when studying individual differences in emotion regulation.     

Contributions of facial expressions and body language to the rapid perception of dynamic emotions

Correctly perceiving emotions in others is a crucial part of social interactions. We constructed a set of dynamic stimuli to determine the relative contributions of the face and body to the accurate perception of basic emotions. We also manipulated the length of these dynamic stimuli in order to explore how much information is needed to identify emotions. The findings suggest that even a short exposure time of 250 milliseconds provided enough information to correctly identify an emotion above the chance level. Furthermore, we found that recognition patterns from the face alone and the body alone differed as a function of emotion. These findings highlight the role of the body in emotion perception and suggest an advantage for angry bodies, which, in contrast to all other emotions, were comparable to the recognition rates from the face and may be advantageous for perceiving imminent threat from a distance.     

Explicit vs. implicit emotional processing: The interaction between processing type and executive control

The current study examined whether the interaction between emotion and executive control (EC) is modulated by the processing type of the emotional information. Namely, whether the emotional information is explicitly processed, implicitly processed or passively viewed. In each trial, a negative or neutral picture preceded an arrow-flanker stimulus that was congruent or incongruent. Incongruent stimuli are known to recruit EC. Explicit processing of the pictures (Experiment 1a), which required responding to their emotional content, resulted in emotional interference for congruent but not for incongruent stimuli. Similar effects were shown for the passive viewing condition (Experiment 2). In contrast, implicit processing (Experiment 1b), which required responding to non-emotional content, resulted in emotional interference for both congruent and incongruent stimuli. Thus, our findings indicate that implicit emotional processing affects performance independently of EC recruitment. In contrast, explicit emotional processing and passive viewing of emotional pictures lead to reduced emotional interference when EC is recruited.     

Neutral details associated with emotional events are encoded: evidence from a cued recall paradigm

Enhanced emotional memory often comes at the cost of memory for surrounding background information. Narrowed-encoding theories suggest that this is due to narrowed attention for emotional information at encoding, leading to impaired encoding of background information. Recent work has suggested that an encoding-based theory may be insufficient. Here, we examined whether cued recall—instead of previously used recognition memory tasks—would reveal evidence that non-emotional information associated with emotional information was effectively encoded. Participants encoded positive, negative, or neutral objects on neutral backgrounds. At retrieval, they were given either the item or the background as a memory cue and were asked to recall the associated scene element. Counter to narrowed-encoding theories, emotional items were more likely than neutral items to trigger recall of the associated background. This finding suggests that there is a memory trace of this contextual information and that emotional cues may facilitate retrieval of this information.     

Affective expressions in groups and inferences about members' relational well-being: The effects of socially engaging and disengaging emotions

Our findings draw attention to the interpersonal communication function of a relatively unexplored dimension of emotions—the level of social engagement versus disengagement. In four experiments, regardless of valence and target group gender, observers infer greater relational well-being (more cohesiveness and less conflict) between group members from socially engaging (sadness and appreciation) versus disengaging (anger and pride) emotion expressions. Supporting our argument that social (dis)engagement is a critical dimension communicated by these emotions, we demonstrate (1) that inferences about group members' self-interest mediate the effect of socially engaging emotions on cohesiveness and (2) that the influence of socially disengaging emotion expressions on inferences of conflict is attenuated when groups have collectivistic norms (i.e., members value a high level of social engagement). Furthermore, we show an important downstream consequence of these inferences of relational well-being: Groups that seem less cohesive because of their members' proud (versus appreciative) expressions are also expected to have worse task performance.     

Sarcasm and emoticons: Comprehension and emotional impact

Most theorists agree that sarcasm serves some communicative function that would not be achieved by speaking directly, such as eliciting a particular emotional response in the recipient. One debate concerns whether this kind of language serves to enhance or mute the positive or negative nature of a message. The role of textual devices commonly used to accompany written sarcastic remarks is also unclear. The current research uses a rating task to investigate the influence of textual devices (emoticons and punctuation marks) on the comprehension of, and emotional responses to, sarcastic versus literal criticism and praise, for both unambiguous (Experiment 1) and ambiguous (Experiment 2) materials. Results showed that sarcastic criticism was rated as less negative than literal criticism, and sarcastic praise was rated as less positive than literal praise, suggesting that sarcasm serves to mute the positive or negative nature of the message. In terms of textual devices, results showed that emoticons had a larger influence on both comprehension and emotional impact than punctuation marks.     

A small-world network model of facial emotion recognition

Various models have been proposed to increase understanding of the cognitive basis of facial emotions. Despite those efforts, interactions between facial emotions have received minimal attention. If collective behaviours relating to each facial emotion in the comprehensive cognitive system could be assumed, specific facial emotion relationship patterns might emerge. In this study, we demonstrate that the frameworks of complex networks can effectively capture those patterns. We generate 81 facial emotion images (6 prototypes and 75 morphs) and then ask participants to rate degrees of similarity in 3240 facial emotion pairs in a paired comparison task. A facial emotion network constructed on the basis of similarity clearly forms a small-world network, which features an extremely short average network distance and close connectivity. Further, even if two facial emotions have opposing valences, they are connected within only two steps. In addition, we show that intermediary morphs are crucial for maintaining full network integration, whereas prototypes are not at all important. These results suggest the existence of collective behaviours in the cognitive systems of facial emotions and also describe why people can efficiently recognize facial emotions in terms of information transmission and propagation. For comparison, we construct three simulated networks—one based on the categorical model, one based on the dimensional model, and one random network. The results reveal that small-world connectivity in facial emotion networks is apparently different from those networks, suggesting that a small-world network is the most suitable model for capturing the cognitive basis of facial emotions.     

Reframing emotion in education through lenses of <Emphasis Type="Italic">parrhesia</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">care of the self</Emphasis>

In this article, we critique two theoretical positions that analyze the place of emotions in education: the psychological strand and the cultural feminist strand. First of all, it is shown how a social control of emotions in education is reflected in the combination of psychological and cultural feminist discourses that function to govern one’s self effectively and efficiently. These discourses perpetuate an assumed divide between the rational and the emotional, and reinforce the existing power hierarchies and the status quo of stereotypes about the role of emotion in education. Then we use the Foucauldian notions of parrhesia and care of the self to suggest alternative ways of thinking about emotions in education. Instead of campaigning for one side or the other of the rational/emotional divide, we suggest that it may be more interesting and fruitful to examine the particular ways discourses of emotion in education construct their own brand of parrhesia.