Collaborative Research, Knowledge and Emergence

We use the notion of emergence to consider the sorts of knowledge that can be produced in a collaborative research project. The notion invites us to see collaborative work as a developmental dynamic system in which various changes constantly occur. Among these we examine two sorts of knowledge that can be produced: scientific knowledge, and collaborative knowledge. We argue that collaborative knowledge can enable researchers to reflectively monitor their collaborative project, so as to encourage its most productive changes. On the basis of examples taken from this special issue, we highlight four modes of producing collaborative knowledge and discuss the possible uses of such knowledge.

Human stigmergy: Theoretical developments and new applications

This paper contextualizes and introduces this special issue.     

Reduction: the Cheshire cat problem and a return to roots

In this paper, I propose two theses, and then examine what the consequences of those theses are for discussions of reduction and emergence. The first thesis is that what have traditionally been seen as robust, reductions of one theory or one branch of science by another more fundamental one are a largely a myth. Although there are such reductions in the physical sciences, they are quite rare, and depend on special requirements. In the biological sciences, these prima facie sweeping reductions fade away, like the body of the famous Cheshire cat, leaving only a smile. ... The second thesis is that the “smiles” are fragmentary patchy explanations, and though patchy and fragmentary, they are very important, potentially Nobel-prize winning advances. To get the best grasp of these “smiles,” I want to argue that, we need to return to the roots of discussions and analyses of scientific explanation more generally, and not focus mainly on reduction models, though three conditions based on earlier reduction models are retained in the present analysis. I briefly review the scientific explanation literature as it relates to reduction, and then offer my account of explanation. The account of scientific explanation I present is one I have discussed before, but in this paper I try to simplify it, and characterize it as involving field elements (FE) and a preferred causal model system (PCMS) abbreviated as FE and PCMS. In an important sense, this FE and PCMS analysis locates an “explanation” in a typical scientific research article. This FE and PCMS account is illustrated using a recent set of neurogenetic papers on two kinds of worm foraging behaviors: solitary and social feeding. One of the preferred model systems from a 2002 Nature article in this set is used to exemplify the FE and PCMS analysis, which is shown to have both reductive and nonreductive aspects. The paper closes with a brief discussion of how this FE and PCMS approach differs from and is congruent with Bickle’s “ruthless reductionism” and the recently revived mechanistic philosophy of science of Machamer, Darden, and Craver.     

Emergence and reduction: Reply to Kim

In this paper I examine Jaegwon Kim’s view that emergent properties are irreducible to the base properties on which they supervene. Kim’s view assumes a model of ‘functional reduction’ which he claims to be substantially different from the traditional Nagelian model. I dispute this claim and argue that the two models are only superficially different, and that on either model, properly understood, it is possible to draw a distinction between a property’s being reductively identifiable with its base property and a property’s being reductively explainable in terms of it. I propose that we should take as the distinguishing feature of emergent properties that they be truly novel properties, i.e., ontologically distinct from the ‘base’ properties which they supervene on. This only requires that emergent properties cannot be reductively identified with their base properties, not that they cannot be reductively explained in terms of them. On this conception the set of emergent properties may well include mental properties as conceived by nonreductive physicalists.     

Resolving the emergence-reduction debate

The debate between emergentists and reductionists rests on the observation that in many situations, in which it seems desirable to work with a coherent and unified discourse, key predicates fall into different groups, such that pairs of members one taken from each group, cannot be co-predicated of some common subject. Must we settle for ‘island’ discourses in science and human affairs or is some route to a unified discourse still open? To make progress towards resolving the issue the conditions under which such segregations of predicates seem inexorable must be brought out. The distinction between determinable and determinate properties throws light on some aspects of this problem. Bohr’s concept of complementarity, when combined with Gibson’s idea of an affordances as a special class of dispositional properties is helpful. Several seeming problems melt away, for example, how it is possible for a group of notes to become hearable as a melody. The mind-body problem and the viability of the project of reducing biology to chemistry and physics are two issues that are more difficult to deal with. Are mental phenomena, such as feelings and memories emergent from material systems or are they actually material properties themselves? Are the attributes of living beings emergent from certain accidental but long running collocations of chemical reactions, or are they nothing but chemical phenomena? If emergent, in what way are they distinctive from that from which they emerge?     

Evolution and Process Thought

Five topics arising from evolutionary biology open new possibilities for fruitful dialogue between scientists and proponents of the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. These topics (with the main authors whose views are discussed) are: (1) Contingency and Teleology, Stephen Jay Gould, Simon Conway Morris; (2) The Baldwin Effect and Interiority, Bruce Weber and David DePew, Daniel Dennett, Terrence Deacon, Susan Oyama; (3) Complexity and Design, Michael Behe, David Griffin; (4) Hierarchical Levels and Downward Causation, Theo Meyering, Charles Hartshorne; and (5) Self-organization and Emergence, Terrence Deacon, Philip Clayton. In the final section, I look at the relation of science and metaphysics and ask whether the subjectivity postulated by process philosophy is accessible to scientific investigation.     

Forms of emergent interaction in General Process Theory

General Process Theory (GPT) is a new (non-Whiteheadian) process ontology. According to GPT the domains of scientific inquiry and everyday practice consist of configurations of ‘goings-on’ or ‘dynamics’ that can be technically defined as concrete, dynamic, non-particular individuals called general processes. The paper offers a brief introduction to GPT in order to provide ontological foundations for research programs such as interactivism that centrally rely on the notions of ‘process,’ ‘interaction,’ and ‘emergence.’ I begin with an analysis of our common sense concept of activities, which plays a crucial heuristic role in the development of the notion of a general process. General processes are not individuated in terms of their location but in terms of ‘what they do,’ i.e., in terms of their dynamic relationships in the basic sense of one process being part of another. The formal framework of GPT is thus an extensional mereology, albeit a non-classical theory with a non-transitive part-relation. After a brief sketch of basic notions and strategies of the GPT-framework I show how the latter may be applied to distinguish between causal, mechanistic, functional, self-maintaining, and recursively self-maintaining interactions, all of which involve ‘emergent phenomena’ in various senses of the term.     

Hylomorphism and Human Wholeness: Perspectives on the Mind-Brain Problem

The relation between mind and matter has always been a conundrum in Western philosophy. Now framed as the mind-brain problem, it is often addressed through reductionism or dualism. As empirical science has become more aware of instances of emergence and top-down causality, however, it has developed a new appreciation of the wholeness of individuals or systems. By retrieving some aspects of Aristotle's philosophy of hylomorphism, we may better understand the metaphysical grounding of human wholeness and so develop an integrated account of the human person, including mind and brain.     

Testing relations between group cohesion and satisfaction in project teams: A cross-level and cross-lagged approach

Based on a two-dimensional perspective of group cohesion, this study examines the emergence of task cohesion and interpersonal cohesion in project teams and their roles in changes in members’ individual satisfaction with the team. Specifically, we tested a direct-effect and mediation model of the cross-level relationship between team task and interpersonal cohesion and individual satisfaction with the team over time. With a sample of 74 newly created project teams, the hypotheses were tested using a two-wave panel design. Results indicate that task cohesion emerges more strongly than interpersonal cohesion during the first stages of work in project teams. Moreover, the cross-lagged relationship between team interpersonal cohesion and individual satisfaction with the team was mediated by team task cohesion.