In which direction to move? Facilitative and interference effects of gestures on problem solver's thinking

Recent research shows that co-speech gestures can influence gesturers’ thought. This line of research suggests that the influence of gestures is so strong, that it can wash out and reverse an effect of learning. We argue that these findings need a more robust and ecologically valid test, which we provide in this article. Our results support the claim that gestures not only reflect information in our mental representations, but can also influence gesturer's thought by adding action information to one's mental representation during problem solving (Tower of Hanoi). We show, however, that the effect of gestures on subsequent performance is not as strong as previously suggested. As opposed to what previous research indicates, gestures' facilitative effect through learning was not nullified by the potentially interfering effect on subsequent problem-solving performance of incompatible gestures. To conclude, using gestures during problem solving seems to provide more benefits than costs for task performance.     

Evaluating performance over time: Is improving better than being consistently good?

In many decision contexts, people evaluate others based on intertemporal performance records and commonly face a choice between two distinct profiles: performance that is consistently high versus performance that improves over time to that high level. We proposed that these two profiles could be appealing for different reasons, and thus evaluators’ preferences will differ across decision contexts. In three studies, participants were presented with candidates (e.g., students, employees) displaying the two profiles, and evaluated each candidate in terms of performance, future expectations, and deservingness. The consistent candidate was rated higher on performance, but lower on future expectations, than the improved candidate. Consequently, in achievement-based decisions (e.g., selecting a student for a scholarship), the consistent candidate was viewed as most deserving, whereas in potential-based decisions (e.g., selecting an employee for promotion), the improved candidate was preferred. These effects were mediated by the relative weight that evaluators placed on performance and future expectations.     

Testing complex animal cognition: Concept learning,proactive interference,and list memory

This article describes an approach for assessing and comparing complex cognition in rhesus monkeys and pigeons by training them in a sequence of synergistic tasks, each yielding a whole function for enhanced comparisons. These species were trained in similar same/different tasks with expanding training sets (8, 16, 32, 64, 128 … 1024 pictures) followed by novel‐stimulus transfer eventually resulting in full abstract‐concept learning. Concept‐learning functions revealed better rhesus transfer throughout and full concept learning at the 128 set, versus pigeons at the 256 set. They were then tested in delayed same/different tasks for proactive interference by inserting occasional tests within trial‐unique sessions where the test stimulus matched a previous sample stimulus (1, 2, 4, 8, 16 trials prior). Proactive‐interference functions revealed time‐based interference for pigeons (1, 10 s delays), but event‐based interference for rhesus (no effect of 1, 10, 20 s delays). They were then tested in list‐memory tasks by expanding the sample to four samples in trial‐unique sessions (minimizing proactive interference). The four‐item, list‐memory functions revealed strong recency memory at short delays, gradually changing to strong primacy memory at long delays over 30 s for rhesus, and 10 s for pigeons. Other species comparisons and future directions are discussed.     

Associative false consumer memory: effects of need for cognition and encoding task

Two experiments investigated the effects of product–attribute associations on false consumer memory. In both experiments, subjects were presented with sets of related product attributes under incidental encoding conditions. Later, recognition memory was tested with studied attributes, non-studied but associated attributes (critical lures) and non-studied unrelated attributes. In Experiment 1, the effect of Need for Cognition (NFC) was assessed. It was found that individuals high in NFC recognised more presented attributes and falsely recognised more associative critical lures. The increase in both true and associative false memory was accompanied by a greater number of responses that index the retrieval of detailed episodic-like information. Experiment 2, replicated the main findings through an experimental manipulation of the encoding task that required subjects to consider purchase likelihood. Explanations for these findings are considered from the perspective of activation processes and knowledge structures in the form of gist-based representations.     

Shifts of spatial attention cued by irrelevant numbers: Electrophysiological evidence from a target discrimination task

Fischer et al. demonstrated that a centrally presented number can shift attention to the left/right when its magnitude is small/large. Two electrophysiological studies described these attentional effects as event-related potentials (ERPs) at centro-parietal sites. Since both studies used target detection tasks, it remains currently unknown whether similar results would be obtained with a discrimination task. We used ERPs to test whether digit cues also induce attention shifts when participants perform a feature-discrimination task on targets. ERPs were recorded whereas subjects discriminated the colour of lateral targets that were preceded by a central non-predictive digit. Analysis of cue-locked controlateral vs. ipsilateral ERP activity showed the emergence of early preparatory attention-directing components in parietal and frontal regions. Moreover, target-locked P1 components at occipito-parietal sites were significantly modulated by digit magnitude-target side congruency. These results demonstrate that irrelevant digit cues also bias sensory processing when embedded in a feature-discrimination task.     

Attention network test: Assessment of cognitive function in chronic fatigue syndrome

Information processing difficulties are common in patients with chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS). It has been shown that the time it takes to process a complex cognitive task, rather than error rate, may be the critical variable underlying CFS patients' cognitive complaints. The Attention Network Task (ANT) developed by Fan and colleagues may be of clinical utility to assess cognitive function in CFS, because it allows for simultaneous assessment of mental response speed, also called information processing speed, and error rate under three conditions challenging the attention system. Comparison of data from two groups of CFS patients (those with and without comorbid major depressive disorder; n = 19 and 22, respectively) to controls (n = 29) consistently showed that error rates did not differ among groups across conditions, but speed of information processing did. Processing time was prolonged in both CFS groups and most significantly affected in response to the most complex task conditions. For simpler tasks, processing time was only prolonged in CFS participants with depression. The data suggest that the ANT may be a task that could be used clinically to assess information processing deficits in individuals with CFS.     

Are Automatic Conceptual Cores the Gold Standard of Semantic Processing? The Context‐Dependence of Spatial Meaning in Grounded Congruency Effects

According to grounded cognition, words whose semantics contain sensory‐motor features activate sensory‐motor simulations, which, in turn, interact with spatial responses to produce grounded congruency effects (e.g., processing the spatial feature of up for sky should be faster for up vs. down responses). Growing evidence shows these congruency effects do not always occur, suggesting instead that the grounded features in a word's meaning do not become active automatically across contexts. Researchers sometimes use this as evidence that concepts are not grounded, further concluding that grounded information is peripheral to the amodal cores of concepts. We first review broad evidence that words do not have conceptual cores, and that even the most salient features in a word's meaning are not activated automatically. Then, in three experiments, we provide further evidence that grounded congruency effects rely dynamically on context, with the central grounded features in a concept becoming active only when the current context makes them salient. Even when grounded features are central to a word's meaning, their activation depends on task conditions.     

Beliefs About the True Self Explain Asymmetries Based on Moral Judgment

Past research has identified a number of asymmetries based on moral judgments. Beliefs about (a) what a person values, (b) whether a person is happy, (c) whether a person has shown weakness of will, and (d) whether a person deserves praise or blame seem to depend critically on whether participants themselves find the agent's behavior to be morally good or bad. To date, however, the origins of these asymmetries remain unknown. The present studies examine whether beliefs about an agent's “true self” explain these observed asymmetries based on moral judgment. Using the identical materials from previous studies in this area, a series of five experiments indicate that people show a general tendency to conclude that deep inside every individual there is a “true self” calling him or her to behave in ways that are morally virtuous. In turn, this belief causes people to hold different intuitions about what the agent values, whether the agent is happy, whether he or she has shown weakness of will, and whether he or she deserves praise or blame. These results not only help to answer important questions about how people attribute various mental states to others; they also contribute to important theoretical debates regarding how moral values may shape our beliefs about phenomena that, on the surface, appear to be decidedly non‐moral in nature.     

The Impact of Analogies on Creative Concept Generation: Lessons From an In Vivo Study in Engineering Design

Research on innovation often highlights analogies from sources outside the current problem domain as a major source of novel concepts; however, the mechanisms underlying this relationship are not well understood. We analyzed the temporal interplay between far analogy use and creative concept generation in a professional design team's brainstorming conversations, investigating the hypothesis that far analogies lead directly to very novel concepts via large steps in conceptual spaces (jumps). Surprisingly, we found that concepts were more similar to their preceding concepts after far analogy use compared to baseline situations (i.e., without far analogy use). Yet far analogies increased the team's concept generation rate compared to baseline conditions. Overall, these results challenge the view that far analogies primarily lead to novel concepts via jumps in conceptual spaces and suggest alternative pathways from far analogies to novel concepts (e.g., iterative, deep exploration within a functional space).