Personality,reciprocity, and strength of conflict resolution strategy

The present field study investigates how an individual’s interpersonal conflict resolution behavior is affected by the individual’s personality (assessed by the Big 5) and a situational factor (the other party’s conflict behavior), as well as how the two factors interact. A hierarchical regression analysis based on 256 student–roommate/friend dyads shows that both factors are important. Extraversion and Agreeableness were significantly related to most conflict strategies used by students. The results show that interactions between the parties in conflict situations are strongly governed by the norm of reciprocity. Finally, we found some empirical support for the interaction effect between personality and situation, suggesting that an individual’s conflict behavior is more complex than what the dispositional or the situational view may suggest.     

An experimental test of a game‐theoretical model of reciprocity

In this contribution the norm of reciprocity is defined as a basic internal motivation. Using formal tools of game theory, a model of social utility function is presented. The reciprocity model predicts that social actors should reciprocate costs and benefits they receive, even when there are costs in conforming to the norm. Hypotheses about actors' behavior, expectations and evaluations are derived from the model. The hypotheses were tested in an experimental situation, the reciprocity game, consisting of a prisoner's dilemma game (PD) followed by a dictator game (DG). The sample was composed of 74 Italian undergraduate students. In line with the model's predictions, the experimental results showed that participants reciprocate the behavior of the opponent in the PD. In the DG, if the opponent cooperated, participants gave back an almost equal share, whereas if the opponent defected, participants gave a minimal amount. These reciprocity effects are modulated by individual differences in the concern for reciprocity. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Behavioral Logic of Collective Action: Partisans Cooperate and Punish More Than Nonpartisans

Laboratory experiments indicate that many people willingly contribute to public goods and punish free riders at a personal cost. We hypothesize that these individuals, called strong reciprocators, allow political parties to overcome collective action problems, thereby allowing those organizations to compete for scarce resources and to produce public goods for like‐minded individuals. Using a series of laboratory games, we examine whether partisans contribute to public goods and punish free riders at a greater rate than nonpartisans. The results show that partisans are more likely than nonpartisans to contribute to public goods and to engage in costly punishment. Given the broad theoretical literature on altruistic punishment and group selection as well as our own formal evolutionary model, we hypothesize that it is being a partisan that makes an individual more likely to be a strong reciprocator and not vice versa.     

The effects of a teaching-modeling intervention on early mother-infant reciprocity

This study investigated the effects of a teaching and modeling intervention on the development of early reciprocity and maternal self-confidence between black low-income primiparous mothers and their newborn infants. The sample included 20 mothers who had an uneventful pregnancy, labor, delivery, and postpartum course. Infants were healthy, full-term, singleton, and bottle-fed. Mothers in the experimental group received a teaching session in which the investigator discussed and modeled caregiver behaviors which elicit interactive behaviors and skills of the infant. State control, response to stress, motoric processes, and interaction processes were discussed. On pretest, no significant differences were found between the control and experimental groups on any variable. At posttest, statistically significant differences were found between the two groups on assessment of the mother-infant sensitivity scale. No significant differences were found between the treatment and the control groups on the Mother's Assessment of the Behavior of her Infant (MABI) or the Self-Confidence scores.     

The influence of locative expressions on context-dependency of endpoint control in aiming

It has been claimed that increased reliance on context, or allocentric information, develops when aiming movements are more consciously monitored and/or controlled. Since verbalizing target features requires strong conscious monitoring, we expected an increased reliance on allocentric information when verbalizing a target label (i.e. target number) during movement execution. We examined swiping actions towards a global array of targets embedded in different local array configurations on a tablet under no-verbalization and verbalization conditions. The global and local array configurations allowed separation of contextual-effects from any possible numerical magnitude biases triggered from calling out specific target numbers. The patterns of constant errors in the target direction were used to assess differences between conditions. Variation in the target context configuration systematically biased movement endpoints in both the no-verbalization and verbalization conditions. Ultimately, our results do not support the assertion that calling out target numbers during movement execution increases the context-dependency of targeted actions.     

领导-成员交换与情绪枯竭:互惠信念和权力距离导向的作用

结合社会交换理论和角色理论,领导-成员交换关系中下属的回报不仅受到互惠规范的约束,还受到上下级关系权力不对称的影响。因此,将探索互惠信念和权力距离导向单独及交互项对领导-成员交换与情绪枯竭关系的调节作用。采用两个时间点172名员工的匹配数据,运用层级回归对假设进行了检验。结果表明,领导-成员交换(T1)与情绪枯竭(T2)总体上呈显著负向关系。互惠信念(T1)和权力距离导向(T1)单独对领导-成员交换与情绪枯竭关系的调节作用并不显著,但是二者的交互项的调节作用显著。即,领导-成员交换、互惠信念和权力距离导向对情绪枯竭有显著三维交互作用。具体的,高互惠信念和低权力距离导向的员工,领导-成员交换与情绪枯竭呈显著正向关系;高互惠信念和高权力距离导向的员工,领导-成员交换与情绪枯竭呈显著负向关系。研究验证了领导-成员交换过程中互惠规范的作用,表明互惠规范的适用性受到上下级关系特征的影响。     

Cooperation in repeated interactions: A systematic review of Centipede game experiments, 1992–2016

Cooperation is a fundamental form of social interaction, and turn-taking reciprocity one of its most familiar manifestations. The Centipede game provides a formal model of such alternating reciprocal cooperation, but a backward induction (BI) argument appears to prove logically that instrumentally rational players would never cooperate in this way. A systematic review of experimental research reveals that human decision makers cooperate frequently in this game, except under certain extreme conditions. Several game, situational, and individual difference variables have been investigated for their influence on cooperation. The most influential are aspects of the payoff function (especially the social gain from cooperation and the risk associated with a cooperative move), the number of players, repetitions of the game, group vs. individual decisions, and players’ social value orientations (SVOs). Our review of experimental evidence suggests that other-regarding preferences, including prosocial behavioural dispositions and collective rationality, provide the most powerful explanation for cooperation.     

Third-party punishment: altruistic and anti-social behaviours in in-group and out-group settings

This study aims at exploring the decision-making process involved in third-party punishment (TPP) within an economic frame, using the TPP game. We investigated altruistic punishment, that is, the behaviour of spending one's own money, with no personal gain, to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation. We analysed this behaviour, in an in-group and out-group game setting, to compare how individuals behave with members of their own group (in-group) and with members of another group (out-group). In particular, groups were defined on a real nationality basis (Chinese or Italian). Our results showed altruistic punishment behaviour in both experimental groups and this tendency emerged as more prominent when faced with unfair play towards a member of one's own group. Furthermore, both groups exhibited a propensity for anti-social punishment behaviour: many participants spent small amounts of money to punish fair behaviour, regardless of national group membership.     

直觉和深思下积极互惠行为的信任水平差异：基于收益框架视角

采用2（加工方式：直觉加工vs.深思加工）×3（信任水平：低vs.中vs.高）被试内设计,探讨双响应范式中直觉加工和深思加工下积极互惠行为存在差异的原因。结果发现,（1）在直觉加工中,处于低、中信任时被试更为利己,高信任时更为利他;深思加工中,信任水平越高利他行为越明显。（2）在低信任时,被试深思后呈现利己行为;中信任、高信任时,深思后呈现利他行为。这表明是信任水平的差异决定了被试在直觉和深思阶段的利己或利他倾向。     

Psychological Realism, Morality, and Chimpanzees

The parsimonious consideration of research into food sharing among chimpanzees suggests that the type of social regulation found among our closest genetic relatives can best be understood as a form of morality. Morality is here defined from a naturalistic perspective as a system in which self-aware individuals interact through socially prescribed, psychologically realistic rules of conduct which provide these individuals with an awareness of how one ought to behave. The empirical markers of morality within chimpanzee communities and the traditional moral traits to which they correspond are (1) self-awareness/agency; (2) calculated reciprocity/obligation; (3) moralistic aggression/blame; and (4) consolation/empathy.