Exploring the hardship of ease: Subjective and objective effort in the ease-of-processing paradigm

Numerous studies examined the role of processing effort in judgments using the “ease-of-processing” paradigm in which participants generate or retrieve few or many issue-relevant thoughts. Because earlier studies only assessed the subjective effort, it is unclear if this paradigm also mobilizes objective effort, and how such effort relates to subjective effort. These questions were addressed in two experiments modeled on standard tasks from the processing effort literature: “ease of argument generation” (Study 1) and “ease of retrieval” (Study 2). In both experiments we simultaneously measured subjective effort (via self-report) and objective effort (via cardiovascular reactivity). The results showed that processing ease manipulations (generation or retrieval of few vs. many exemplars) influence not only subjective effort, but also objective effort, as reflected especially by increases of systolic blood pressure in the many exemplars condition. However, only subjective effort was related to judgment. In the discussion, we consider the role of various forms of effort and other relevant variables in “processing ease” effects.     

The effort heuristic

The research presented here suggests that effort is used as a heuristic for quality. Participants rating a poem (Experiment 1), a painting (Experiment 2), or a suit of armor (Experiment 3) provided higher ratings of quality, value, and liking for the work the more time and effort they thought it took to produce. Experiment 3 showed that the use of the effort heuristic, as with all heuristics, is moderated by ambiguity: Participants were more influenced by effort when the quality of the object being evaluated was difficult to ascertain. Discussion centers on the implications of the effort heuristic for everyday judgment and decision-making.     

Rating of perceived effort but relative to what? A comparison between imposed and self-selected anchors

PurposeCollecting reliable and valid rating of perceived effort (RPE) data requires properly anchoring the scales’ upper limits (i.e., the meaning of 10 on a 0–10 scale). Yet, despite their importance, anchoring procedures remain understudied and theoretically underdeveloped. Here we propose a new task-based anchoring procedure that distinguishes between imposed and self-selected anchors. In the former, researchers impose on participants a specific task as the anchor; in the latter, participants choose the most effortful task experienced or imaginable as the anchor. We compared the impact of these conceptually different anchoring procedures on RPE.MethodsTwenty-five resistance-trained participants (13 females) attended a familiarization and two randomized experimental sessions. In both experimental sessions, participants performed non-fatiguing and fatiguing isometric maximal voluntary contraction (MVC) protocols with the squat followed by the gripper or vice versa. After each MVC, participants reported their RPE on a 0–10 scale relative to an imposed anchor of the performed task (e.g., gripper MVCs anchored to a gripper MVC) or to a self-selected anchor.ResultsIn the non-fatiguing condition, imposed anchors yielded greater RPEs than self-selected anchors for both the squat [on average, 9.4 vs. 5.5; Δ(CI_95%) = 3.9 (3.2, 4.5)] and gripper [9.4 vs. 3.9; Δ = 5.5 (4.7, 6.3)]. Similar results were observed in the fatiguing condition for both the squat [9.7 vs. 6.9; Δ = 2.8 (2.1, 3.5)] and gripper [9.7 vs. 4.5; Δ = 5.2 (4.3, 5.9)].ConclusionsWe found large differences in RPE between the two anchors, independent of exercises and fatigue state. These findings provide a basis for further development and refinement of anchoring procedures and highlight the importance of selecting, justifying, and consistently applying the chosen anchors.     

The interactive effects of conscientiousness, work effort, and psychological climate on job performance

Historically, conscientiousness-performance relationships have been modest, suggesting the need to examine theoretically-relevant moderating variables. Based on theory and empirical research suggesting that performance variance is maximally predicted in the presence of person and situation variables, we examined the moderating potential of work effort and psychological climate on the conscientiousness-performance relationship. Data gathered from 139 predominately part-time restaurant employees revealed that conscientiousness predicted performance in the simultaneous presence of high levels of work effort and positive psychological climate. Conversely, conscientiousness had no empirical association with performance when coupled with other combinations (e.g., high-negative; low-positive; low-negative) of work effort and psychological climate. Implications for research, strengths, limitations, and directions for future research are discussed.     

Effort denial in self-deception

We propose a mixed belief model of self-deception. According to the theory, people distribute belief over two possible causal paths to an action, one where the action is freely chosen and one where it is due to factors outside of conscious control. Self-deceivers take advantage of uncertainty about the influence of each path on their behavior, and shift weight between them in a self-serving way. This allows them to change their behavior to provide positive evidence and deny doing so, enabling diagnostic inference to a desired trait. In Experiment 1, women changed their pain tolerance to provide positive evidence about the future quality of their skin, but judgments of effort claimed the opposite. This “effort denial” suggests that participants’ mental representation of their behavior was dissociated from their actual behavior, facilitating self-deception. Experiment 2 replicated the pattern in a hidden picture task where search performance was purportedly linked to self-control.     

Children and the Test of Memory Malingering: Is one trial enough?

There is a growing body of research suggesting that the first trial of the TOMM may provide an accurate screener of effort in children. During neuropsychological assessments, some circumstances result in only one completed trial of the TOMM. Research on adults reflects that passing scores on Trial 1 (based on Trial 2 cutoff) are highly predictive of passing scores on Trial 2 and the TOMM overall. Pediatric research found that 100% of children and adolescents who passed Trial 1 of the TOMM also passed Trial 2. Our research hypothesis is that children who pass Trial 1 will also pass Trial 2. Data from 75 clinically diagnosed children (ages 6–18 years) found that 64% performed above the published adult TOMM cutoff on Trial 1. All children who passed Trial 1 also passed Trial 2 suggesting support for the research hypothesis. Sensitivity was 1.0, specificity was 0.72, positive predictive value was .33, and negative predictive value was 1.0. These findings suggest that in this sample, the children who performed above the Trial 2 cutoff on Trial 1 also all passed Trial 2 (so there were no false negatives, thus a perfect sensitivity and negative predictive value). Of the 36% of children who did not pass the Trial 1 cutoff, 67% passed on Trial 2. Data clearly support that children passing Trial 1 have a high likelihood of passing Trial 2, thus drawing conclusions about performance validity after passing Trial 1. Conclusions after failing Trial 1 require further investigation.