La révision du texte : une activité de contrôle et de réflexion

Recent proposals in the field of text revision reveal significant changes in perspective concerning cognitive processes involved in writing. Whereas revision has been considered for a long time as being aimed at enhancing writing, this activity is now seen as a control of the different writing processes. Thus, planning is now added to this control process. Our review shows how results of novel studies strengthen this conception and in which way further researches should be pursued. In particular, we focus on three issues: training of control performed by expert writers, the cognitive cost of the required cognitive treatments and the conditions which permit to increase this control among writers during learning.     

Study effort versus distinctiveness in the recollection of veridical and illusory memories

In past research, stimulus distinctiveness and study effort have been claimed to promote the development of distinctive memories, which in turn have been considered critical for enhancing veridical recollection and reducing illusory memory experiences. In the present investigation, stimulus distinctiveness, obtained by displaying text-redundant pictorial information at study, was pitted against study effort to determine whether either factor would be more beneficial to veridical recall and more detrimental to illusory recall than the other. Subjects first completed word fragments with or without the aid of an image of each word’s referent and then performed a recall test. It was found that when images were useful to the encoding task (fragment completion), their presence at study enhanced veridical recall and reduced illusory memories more than any additional encoding effort.     

Perceived control,nature of risk information and risk taking. An experimental test of a simple taxonomy of uncertainty

Uncertainty may be categorized along two dimensions: (1) the nature of probabilistic information (i.e. frequency information, about the outcomes of similar situations in the past, versus process information, about the way(s) in which a future loss might occur), and (2) the degree of personal control (i.e. the extent to which an activity's outcomes depend on internal factors (e.g. knowledge, skills) versus external (e.g. chance) factors). The effects of variations in both dimensions on people's risk-taking tendency were experimentally studied. In a computerized task, subjects had to stop a fast-moving symbol before it passed a target line. Success yielded a financial gain, failure led them into a ‘penalty task’ with the possibility of a considerable loss. On each trial subjects chose among 10 risk levels (varying symbol speeds): low levels resulted in small but almost sure gains, high levels yielded larger but less probable gains. Across subgroups of subjects, three penalty task characteristics were varied: (1) the actual loss probability, (2) the external versus internal determination of outcomes, and (3) the available risk information. Major findings were: (a) subjects did not set a lower risk level, but they did appear to be more attentive (i.e. they failed fewer trials) when the actual loss probability was lower; (b) internal outcome determination resulted in more failed trials (lesser caution); (c) subjects ignored frequency information, but were sensitive to process information. Results are discussed in terms of effort allocation for controlling risk during task performance.     

Rating of perceived effort but relative to what? A comparison between imposed and self-selected anchors

PurposeCollecting reliable and valid rating of perceived effort (RPE) data requires properly anchoring the scales’ upper limits (i.e., the meaning of 10 on a 0–10 scale). Yet, despite their importance, anchoring procedures remain understudied and theoretically underdeveloped. Here we propose a new task-based anchoring procedure that distinguishes between imposed and self-selected anchors. In the former, researchers impose on participants a specific task as the anchor; in the latter, participants choose the most effortful task experienced or imaginable as the anchor. We compared the impact of these conceptually different anchoring procedures on RPE.MethodsTwenty-five resistance-trained participants (13 females) attended a familiarization and two randomized experimental sessions. In both experimental sessions, participants performed non-fatiguing and fatiguing isometric maximal voluntary contraction (MVC) protocols with the squat followed by the gripper or vice versa. After each MVC, participants reported their RPE on a 0–10 scale relative to an imposed anchor of the performed task (e.g., gripper MVCs anchored to a gripper MVC) or to a self-selected anchor.ResultsIn the non-fatiguing condition, imposed anchors yielded greater RPEs than self-selected anchors for both the squat [on average, 9.4 vs. 5.5; Δ(CI_95%) = 3.9 (3.2, 4.5)] and gripper [9.4 vs. 3.9; Δ = 5.5 (4.7, 6.3)]. Similar results were observed in the fatiguing condition for both the squat [9.7 vs. 6.9; Δ = 2.8 (2.1, 3.5)] and gripper [9.7 vs. 4.5; Δ = 5.2 (4.3, 5.9)].ConclusionsWe found large differences in RPE between the two anchors, independent of exercises and fatigue state. These findings provide a basis for further development and refinement of anchoring procedures and highlight the importance of selecting, justifying, and consistently applying the chosen anchors.     

Effect of effort and deadlines on consumer product returns

While extant research has examined return policies as a combination of time and effort, we investigate both the independent and interactive impacts of time and effort on consumer decisions to return or retain products. We find that decreasing return deadlines can have the counterintuitive effect of increasing return rates under some conditions. Using construal level theory, we propose that perceived effort (both physical and cognitive) mediates the effect of return policy on return rates leading to suppressed returns. Further, when deadlines are framed as durations between store visits, overall product returns are exacerbated except when perceived effort is high.     

How fast can you (possibly) do it,or how long will it (certainly) take? Communicating uncertain estimates of performance time

Recent research on verbal probability statements has revealed that some expressions (e.g., possible) are especially appropriate for describing outcomes in the high end of a distribution, whereas other expressions (e.g., certain) are more appropriate for describing low-end values. However, some dimensions appear to be reversible, with higher achievements sometimes associated with high and sometimes with low values, depending on frame. We report three experiments where this “reframing effect” is studied in communications of estimated performance time, both from a speaker's and from a listener's perspective. We hypothesize that statements describing tasks as “taking time” suggest a duration frame, and find accordingly that statements about how many hours that possibly will be spent on a task, or the time a task possibly takes, lead to high time estimates. Statements focusing on the actor's role suggest, in contrast, a speed frame, thus statements about what the actor can possibly do lead to low time estimates. Estimates of the time a task certainly takes or when it is certainly done follow the opposite pattern. The results are in line with approaches that see production and comprehension of language as a dynamical and context-driven process.     

Rats place greater value on rewards produced by high effort: An animal analogue of the “effort justification” effect

The effort justification phenomenon, in which greater value is given to rewards that require more effort to obtain, is frequently explained in terms of cognitive dissonance (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). Here, we employed a novel combination of operant and lick analysis techniques to show that rats place more value on a sucrose reward when it follows high effort than when the same reward follows low effort. This is the first demonstration of a direct analogue of the effort justification phenomenon in nonhuman animals. As the behavior of rats is normally considered in terms of relatively simple mechanisms, the current results question the need for complex cognitive accounts for the effort justification phenomenon (in rats or humans). As an alternative, we examine the possibility that high effort produces an aversive state that enhances reward value by a process of contrast.     

Exploring the hardship of ease: Subjective and objective effort in the ease-of-processing paradigm

Numerous studies examined the role of processing effort in judgments using the “ease-of-processing” paradigm in which participants generate or retrieve few or many issue-relevant thoughts. Because earlier studies only assessed the subjective effort, it is unclear if this paradigm also mobilizes objective effort, and how such effort relates to subjective effort. These questions were addressed in two experiments modeled on standard tasks from the processing effort literature: “ease of argument generation” (Study 1) and “ease of retrieval” (Study 2). In both experiments we simultaneously measured subjective effort (via self-report) and objective effort (via cardiovascular reactivity). The results showed that processing ease manipulations (generation or retrieval of few vs. many exemplars) influence not only subjective effort, but also objective effort, as reflected especially by increases of systolic blood pressure in the many exemplars condition. However, only subjective effort was related to judgment. In the discussion, we consider the role of various forms of effort and other relevant variables in “processing ease” effects.     

The effort heuristic

The research presented here suggests that effort is used as a heuristic for quality. Participants rating a poem (Experiment 1), a painting (Experiment 2), or a suit of armor (Experiment 3) provided higher ratings of quality, value, and liking for the work the more time and effort they thought it took to produce. Experiment 3 showed that the use of the effort heuristic, as with all heuristics, is moderated by ambiguity: Participants were more influenced by effort when the quality of the object being evaluated was difficult to ascertain. Discussion centers on the implications of the effort heuristic for everyday judgment and decision-making.     

Relations between self-efficacy beliefs,self-presentation motives,personal task goals,and performance on endurance-based physical activity tasks

We conducted two studies with the aim of examining the relations between self-presentation motives and physical activity task performance. In study 1, prior to performing an endurance-based physical activity task, 133 undergraduate participants (M_age = 20.89, SD = 5.21) reported acquisitive-agentic and protective-agentic self-presentation motives alongside task self-efficacy, self-presentational efficacy, and their personal task goals. Using a different endurance-based physical activity task in study 2, we also assessed undergraduate participants' (n = 150; M_age = 20.23, SD = 3.34) dispositional exercise-related self-presentation motivation alongside the variables measured in study 1. Bayesian path analyses revealed indirect relations between agentic self-presentation motives and task performance via participants' personal task goals. Findings also indicated that agentic self-presentation motives may act as intermediaries in indirect pathways linking efficacy beliefs and dispositional exercise-related self-presentation motivation to goal processes and task performance. The results contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between self-presentation motivation and task performance.