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91.
Dermot Moran 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(3):317-358
Abstract Intentionality (‘directedness’, ‘aboutness’) is both a central topic in contemporary philosophy of mind, phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, and one of the themes with which both analytic and Continental philosophers have separately engaged starting from Brentano and Edmund Husserl’s ground-breaking Logical Investigations (1901) through Roderick M. Chisholm, Daniel C. Dennett’s The Intentional Stance, John Searle’s Intentionality, to the recent work of Tim Crane, Robert Brandom, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, among many others. In this paper, I shall review recent discussions of intentionality, including some recent explorations of the history of the concept (paying particular attention to Anselm), and suggest some ways the phenomenological approach of Husserl and Heidegger can still offer insights for contemporary philosophy of mind and consciousness. 相似文献
92.
Panos Theodorou 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2006,5(3-4):303-320
Progressively Husserl started referring to the whole sphere of the life of intentional acts in terms of praxis. Perception, imagination, judgement, scientific consciousness, etc., are all seen as practices. What is the meaning of this move? A seemingly self-evident possibility is that intentionality is praxial, because even perception is not completely free from empty intending moments that demand fulfilment; and all fulfilment is attained by means of bodily activities that enable our senses to acquire the relevant contents. I reject this approach as insufficient and misguided. I argue that perception and intentionality in general is praxial because consciousness, in all of its constituting syntheses, is or becomes organized as a practice-structure. Intentional consciousness organizes its contents according to rules so as to accomplish the evident or true givenness of its intended correlates. 相似文献
93.
Human subjects were exposed to contingencies which programmed aversive tones (100 db). Two types of contingencies were employed: self-confirming (i.e., self-fulfilling prophecies), in which the aversive tone was occasioned by the prediction it was about to occur; and self-disconfirming, in which the tone was probable when subjects predicted it would not occur. Experiments 1 and 2 used a modified classical conditioning paradigm, and demonstrated that a self-confirming contingency maintained reliable self-punitive responding, i.e., subjects consistently predicted and therefore obtained tones on every trial. Subjects in Experiment 3 were instructed to express predictions continuously throughout four sessions to ensure adequate sampling of the various predictions. Subjects exposed to a self-disconfirming contnngency reliably evidenced awareness of the contingency in effect (judged by answers on a postexperimental questionnaire), whereas subjects exposed to a self-confirming contingency failed to show effective avoidance behavior or contingency awareness. Experiment 4 investigated free-operant self-punitive behavior, utilizing a single prediction response button, which subjects depressed repeatedly. Subjects were exposed to either periodic or aperiodic punishment schedules over as many as four sessions. In general, more persistent self-punitive responding was found in the groups receiving periodic punishment. The results from the four experiments show that self-confirming contingencies can effectively prolong self-punitive responding in human subjects. The findings are consistent with a blocking interpretation of self-punitive behavior, which asserts that when an aversive event is already predicted by stimuli in the situation (including temporal cues), the association between a response and punishment is impaired, and self-punitive responding is likely to be maintained. An integration of human and animal self-punitive research is proposed. 相似文献
94.
A. David Smith 《Synthese》2008,160(3):313-333
It is argued that Husserl was an “externalist” in at least one sense. For it is argued that Husserl held that genuinely perceptual
experiences—that is to say, experiences that are of some real object in the world—differ intrinsically, essentially and as
a kind from any hallucinatory experiences. There is, therefore, no neutral “content” that such perceptual experiences share
with hallucinations, differing from them only over whether some additional non-psychological condition holds or not. In short,
it is argued that Husserl was a “disjunctivist”. In addition, it is argued that Husserl held that the individual object of
any experience, perceptual or hallucinatory, is essential to and partly constitutive of that experience. The argument focuses
on three aspects of Husserl’s thought: his account of intentional objects, his notion of horizon, and his account of reality. 相似文献
95.
96.
Wing-Chung Ho 《Human Studies》2008,31(3):323-342
This paper points to two little-discussed interrelated features—among sociologists—about the nature of the lifeworld (Lebenswelt): that the experience of transcendence is an essential component of human actions, and that lived experience (Erlebnis) is founded on the non-discursivity of the lifeworld, i.e., the pre-predicative background expectancies from which the discursive
arises. I examine the intellectual route of Alfred Schutz who developed his mundane lifeworld theory from appropriating Edmund
Husserl’s notions of appresentation and apperception. Harold Garfinkel later extended Schutz’s concept of lifeworld to the
empirical investigations of constitutive social orders. By way of conclusion, I warn against a strain of constructionism in
sociology, which tends to ignore the two said features of lived experience and inaccurately conceives social realities as
essentially the actor’s discursive accomplishments.
相似文献
Wing-Chung HoEmail: |
97.
Molly Brigid Flynn 《Husserl Studies》2009,25(1):57-79
Husserl’s philosophy of culture relies upon a person’s body being expressive of the person’s spirit, but Husserl’s analysis
of expression in Logical Investigations is inadequate to explain this bodily expressiveness. This paper explains how Husserl’s use of “expression” shifts from LI to Ideas II and argues that this shift is explained by Husserl’s increased understanding of the pervasiveness of sense in subjective
life and his increased appreciation for the unity of the person. I show how these two developments allow Husserl to better
describe the bodily expressiveness that is the source of culture. Husserl’s account of culture is thoroughly intentionalistic,
but it does not emphasize thought at the expense of embodiment. Culture originates not in an abstract subjectivity, but by
persons’ expressing themselves physically in the world. By seeing how Husserl develops his mature position on bodily expressiveness,
we can better appreciate the meaningfulness and the bodily concreteness of cultural objects.
相似文献
Molly Brigid FlynnEmail: |
98.
Gilbert T. Null 《Husserl Studies》2007,23(2):119-159
This is the second in a sequence of three essays which axiomatize and apply Edmund Husserl's dependence ontology of parts
and wholes as a non-Diodorean, non-Kantian temporal semantics for first-order predicate modal languages. The Ontology of Intentionality I introduced enough of Husserl's dependence-ontology of parts and wholes to formulate his account of order as effected by relating
moments of unity, and The Ontology of Intentionality II extends that axiomatic dependence-ontology far enough to enable its semantic application. Formalizing the compatibility [Vereinbarkeit] relation implicated in Husserl's notorious doctrine of impossible meanings, the essay introduces a compatibility restriction on relations to formulate Husserl's distinction between singular [einheitliche] and plural [mehrheitliche] objects, using plural relating moments to define first-order versions of Husserl's notions of relation complexes (i.e. Sachverhalte), abstracta of n-ary relation complexes, categorial relations, abstract eide as unifications of categorial relations, semantic domains as completions of abstract eide, and material regions as semantic domains which are compatibility upper bounds of categorial relations. These concepts will enable the formal dependence-ontological
noetic semantics for two-valued, first-order modal languages introduced in the sequel Two-Valued Logics of Intentionality, the third essay in the sequence. 相似文献
99.
Mathematizing phenomenology 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Jeffrey Yoshimi 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2007,6(3):271-291
Husserl is well known for his critique of the “mathematizing tendencies” of modern science, and is particularly emphatic that
mathematics and phenomenology are distinct and in some sense incompatible. But Husserl himself uses mathematical methods in
phenomenology. In the first half of the paper I give a detailed analysis of this tension, showing how those Husserlian doctrines
which seem to speak against application of mathematics to phenomenology do not in fact do so. In the second half of the paper
I focus on a particular example of Husserl’s “mathematized phenomenology”: his use of concepts from what is today called dynamical
systems theory.
相似文献
Jeffrey YoshimiEmail: |
100.