From geometry to phenomenology

Richard Tieszen [Tieszen, R. (2005). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXX(1), 153–173.] has argued that the group-theoretical approach to modern geometry can be seen as a realization of Edmund Husserl’s view of eidetic intuition. In support of Tieszen’s claim, the present article discusses Husserl’s approach to geometry in 1886–1902. Husserl’s first detailed discussion of the concept of group and invariants under transformations takes place in his notes on Hilbert’s Memoir Ueber die Grundlagen der Geometrie that Hilbert wrote during the winter 1901–1902. Husserl’s interest in the Memoir is a continuation of his long-standing concern about analytic geometry and in particular Riemann and Helmholtz’s approach to geometry. Husserl favored a non-metrical approach to geometry; thus the topological nature of Hilbert’s Memoir must have been intriguing to him. The task of phenomenology is to describe the givenness of this logos, hence Husserl needed to develop the notion of eidetic intuition. The author wishes to thank Academy of Finland for financial assistance that enabled her to work on this article.     

Das große Spiel der Epoché. Die transzendentalphänomenologische Einstellung zwischen natürlichem Weltverhalten und theoretischer Wissenschaft

Zusammenfassung  Husserls Ansatz der Transzendentalph?nomenologie wird gemeinhin als Versuch einer rationalen Letztbegründung von Erkenntnis überhaupt gedeutet. Sein Verst?ndnis der konstitutiven Rolle des reinen Bewu?tseins gegenüber dem Weltph?nomen als solchem sowie seine Betonung des teleologischen Aspektes der transzendentalen Vernunft scheint sein Denken von vornherein in radikalen Gegensatz zu all jenen ph?nomenologischen Entwürfen zu bringen, die – wie etwa Heidegger oder Fink – die Beziehung von Subjekt und Welt sowie die Philosophie als ganze wesentlich vom Spiel her zu verstehen suchen. Andererseits hat die ph?nomenologische Epoché durch die in ihr liegende Neutralisierung der Existenzsetzung von transzendenter Wirklichkeit bisweilen in dem Ruf gestanden, sich in die freischwebende Sph?re der „reinen Denkbarkeiten” und Fiktionen zurückziehen zu wollen. Ausgehend von gewissen kritischen Bemerkungen Husserls zu den Analysen der praktischen Verwendungs- und Verstehenszusammenh?nge in Sein und Zeit soll in diesem Artikel gezeigt werden, da? der Spielbegriff bei Husserl so vielschichtig ist wie die intentionale Struktur des Bewu?tseins selbst. Zwischen der existenzneutralen Betrachtung „freischwebender” eidetischer Strukturen einerseits und der Betonung des absoluten teleologischen Zwecksinnes der transzendentalen Bewu?tseinsaktivit?t andererseits versucht Husserl, die Motivation des Durchbruchs der rein theoretischen Haltung als solcher vor dem Hintergrund spielerischer Freiheit und Spontaneit?t zu verstehen. Im Gegensatz zu Heidegger wird die „spielerische Neugierde” der theoretischen Haltung, die auch der Epoché zugrunde liegt, als ein positives Grundph?nomen verstanden, das auf die Freiheit des transzendentalen Subjekts von dinglichen Zweckzusammenh?ngen und damit auf seine überweltliche Würde als transzendentale Person verweist.

Husserl on Intentionality as an Essential Property of Consciousness

In the phenomenological tradition intentionality is considered to be an essential property of consciousness. Philosophers from this tradition （Brentano, Husserl, Sartre, etc.） generally share the following two commitments： （i） intentionality is an essential property of consciousness; and （ii） all intentional states are directed at, and are intentionally related to, objects. This view of consciousness has two pressing problems. Firstly, philosophers such as John Searle and David Rosenthal have suggested raw feelings and some forms of seemingly undirected and thus non-intentional feelings as counterexamples to the essential intentionality of conscious states. Secondly, some analytical philosophers and Husserlian scholars inspired by Frege, such as Smith and Follesdal, deny that every intentional state is related to a correlative object. This paper presents a Husserlian view concerning the essential intentionality of consciousness. It will be shown that both problems can be successfully dealt with from an essentially Husserlian and phenomenological perspective.     

Husserl,Protention, and the Phenomenology of the Unexpected

Although there has been a great deal said about Husserl’s account of time-consciousness, little attention has been specifically paid to future-consciousness. This article gives an Husserlian account of future-consciousness. It begins by arguing that protention should be understood as a future-directed version of retention and so that future-consciousness should be understood as perception. This account is developed in two ways: (1) the future need not be determinately given in protention and so future-consciousness can be vague; (2) cases when the future turns out to be other than we perceived it to be (cases when the unexpected happens) can be understood as temporal illusions. This account of future-consciousness both illuminates some of Husserl’s more obscure remarks on time-consciousness and (more importantly) provides a means of understanding an often neglected phenomenon of independent philosophical interest: our awareness of the future.     

论阿多诺视域中的一段现象学公案

同一段现象学描述,在胡塞尔那里意味着同一性和直接性,而阿多诺却从中发现了非同一性、中介性、缺席性、他者性和剩余性这些与后现代思想相关的特质。但是,互文性的分析表明,这些特质的首倡者恰恰不是阿多诺而是胡塞尔。阿多诺的分析与批驳,胡塞尔的凸现与“辩护”,恰恰透露了辩证法与现象学的不同旨趣。     

Transcendental Phenomenology and the Way to Happiness: Husserl’s Reply to Csikszentmihalyi

It is an unprecedented task to interpret Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology as a fundamental philosophy of happiness. Although happiness has been discussed in many psychologies, Csikszentmihalyi’s positive psychology defines happiness as “flow”, a psychic state of ongoing immersion guided by intrinsic motivations and rewards. In this paper, I interpret our transcendental consciousness as a radical “flow” maker and claim that in our transcendental life, happiness is what we ourselves are. Then, I propose this not only as an appeal to a change of attitude (i.e. reduction) for happiness, but also as a deep hermeneutics of the mental skills and activity designs suggested by positive psychology. In this way, worldly happiness dictums can be profoundly re-examined. Understood as such, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology leaves us the task of how to make a concrete form of qualitative or hermeneutical research on happiness out of it.     

Towards completeness: Husserl on theories of manifolds 1890–1901

Husserl’s notion of definiteness, i.e., completeness is crucial to understanding Husserl’s view of logic, and consequently several related philosophical views, such as his argument against psychologism, his notion of ideality, and his view of formal ontology. Initially Husserl developed the notion of definiteness to clarify Hermann Hankel’s ‘principle of permanence’. One of the first attempts at formulating definiteness can be found in the Philosophy of Arithmetic, where definiteness serves the purpose of the modern notion of ‘soundness’ and leads Husserl to a ‘computational’ view of logic. Inspired by Gauss and Grassmann Husserl then undertakes a further investigation of theories of manifolds. When Husserl subsequently renounces psychologism and changes his view of logic, his idea of definiteness also develops. The notion of definiteness is discussed most extensively in the pair of lectures Husserl gave in front of the mathematical society in Göttingen (1901). A detailed analysis of the lectures, together with an elaboration of Husserl’s lectures on logic beginning in 1895, shows that Husserl meant by definiteness what is today called ‘categoricity’. In so doing Husserl was not doing anything particularly original; since Dedekind’s ‘Was sind und sollen die Zahlen’ (1888) the notion was ‘in the air’. It also characterizes Hilbert’s (1900) notion of completeness. In the end, Husserl’s view of definiteness is discussed in light of Gödel’s (1931) incompleteness results.     

Between conflict and reconciliation: the hard truth

In the context of the fairly recent Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC), I examine phenomenologically the nature of truth as the essential condition for overcoming social and political conflicts, and as an instrument for enforcing so-called “transitional justice” periods and promoting reconciliation. I also briefly approach the limits of this truth’s possibility of being recognized, if its evaluative and practical dimensions and its appeal to an “intelligence of emotions” do not prevail over its merely theoretical claims. Though not expounding Schutz’s and Husserl’s contributions, and meditating on phenomena they did not deal with, I carry out this reflection inspired by their work and methodological approach. The case study used as an intuitive illustration is the recent Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Husserlian Phenomenology and Derridean Deconstruction: Their Fundamental Methodological Commitments

This paper reinterprets the relation between Derridian deconstruction and Husserlian phenomenology on the basis of their respective methodological commitments. According to the proposed view, epoché, reduction, and eidetic variation are the fundamental methodological principles of Husserlian phenomenology. This paper interprets Derrida’s reading of Husserl as presenting a type of semiological reductionism, which is marked by the absorption of the fundamental phenomenological principles within a semiological framework. Conceiving of meaning as a sign that refers to other signs, Derrida contends that neither epoché, nor reduction, nor eidetic variation can be carried through successfully; their validity is thereby indefinitely deferred. This paper also addresses the relationship between indication and expression, the Principle of all Principles, the living present, and their alleged deconstruction in Derrida’s writings. I conclude with some suggestions concerning how, apart from deconstructing phenomenology, one could also phenomenologize deconstruction. According to my suggestion, this would require problematizing evidence that underlies the central claims and commitments of deconstruction.     

Husserl’s Intercultural Implication of Ethical Renewal and Theoretical Rationality: A Reappraisal from an East Asian Perspective

In the Kaizo articles, written between 1922 and 1924, Husserl touched on the intercultural relationship between “the European” and “the non-European.” Husserl addressed Japan as he dealt with ethical and cultural renewal in his Kaizo articles. Husserl wished to spread the European spiritual gestalt, which he comprehended as a universal theoretical rationality to remote cultures. At that time, Husserl imagined China as unfamiliar and remote. He even used China as a typical example of alienworld when he dealt with the problem of cultural difference. This paper reappraises Husserl’s thesis by exploring Eurocentrism as a factor that might impede the willingness for non-Western or non-European cultures to accept the idea of European spiritual gestalt. This paper suggests that the non-Western or non-European cultures should take delight in learning from Europe and carry out what Husserl had in mind about the meaning of “renewal.”