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11.
Epraim Shmueli 《Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology》2013,44(2):139-152
In his book, Hermeneutics and Reflection (2013), Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann outlines what he sees as the fundamental differences between Edmund Husserl’s “theoretical” phenomenology and Martin Heidegger’s “a-theoretical” phenomenology, which he frames in terms of the distinction between “reflective observation” and “hermeneutic understanding”. In this paper, I will clarify the sense of these terms in order to elucidate some of the crucial similarities and differences between Husserl and Heidegger. Against von Herrmann’s characterization of the Husserlian project, I argue that we should not consider these differences in terms of “reflection”, since this runs the risk of misconstruing Husserlian phenomenology with the philosophical tradition he was striving against. Taken together, by way of a close reading of von Herrmann, the following discussion will serve as a brief sketch of the early Heidegger’s turn away from Husserlian phenomenology and toward his own hermeneutic phenomenology. 相似文献
12.
Anthony F. Beavers 《Metaphilosophy》2002,33(1&2):70-82
13.
We present a schizophrenia patient who reports “seeing rain” with attendant somatosensory features which separate him from his surroundings. Because visual/multimodal hallucinations are understudied in schizophrenia, we examine a case history to determine the role of these hallucinations in self-disturbances (Ichstörungen). Developed by the early Heidelberg School, self-disturbances comprise two components: 1. The self experiences its own automatic processing as alien to self in a split-off, “doubled-I.” 2. In “I-paralysis,” the disruption to automatic processing is now outside the self in omnipotent agents. Self-disturbances (as indicated by visual/multimodal hallucinations) involve impairment in the ability to predict moment-to-moment experiences in the ongoing perception-action cycle. The phenomenological approach to subjective experience of self-disturbances complements efforts to model psychosis using the computational framework of hierarchical predictive coding. We conclude that self-disturbances play an adaptive, compensatory role following the uncoupling of perception and action, and possibly, other low-level perceptual anomalies. 相似文献
14.
Time-consciousness has long been a focus of research in phenomenology and phenomenological psychology. We advance and extend this tradition of research by focusing on the character of temporal experience under conditions of mania. Symptom scales and diagnostic criteria for mania are peppered with temporally inflected language: increased rate of speech, racing thoughts, flight-of-ideas, hyperactivity. But what is the underlying structure of temporal experience in manic episodes? We tackle this question using a strategically hybrid approach. We recover and reconstruct three hypotheses regarding manic temporality that were advanced and modeled by two pioneers of clinical phenomenology: Eugène Minkowski (1885–1972) and Ludwig Binswanger (1881–1966). We then test, critique, and refine these hypotheses using heterophenomenological methods in an interview-based study of persons with a history of bipolar and a current diagnosis of acute mania. Our conclusions support a central hypothesis due to Minkowski and Binswanger, namely, that disturbance in the formal structure of temporal experience is a core feature of mania. We argue that a suitably refined variant of Binswanger’s model of disturbance in manic protention helps to explain a striking pattern of impaired insight and impaired reasoning in manic episodes. 相似文献
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16.
WANG Tangjia 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2014,9(2):254-267
In our times, philosophy has been suffering from a spiritual crisis that takes the forms of the crisis of culture, the crisis of meaning, and the crisis of way of life. As the soul of culture, philosophy should contribute valuable responses to the problems of our times. Thus understood, this paper intends to analyze the concept of crisis in a phenomenological approach. The concept of crisis is concerned with the philosophical themes of time and death, and the crises of our times are primarily the crises of life-meaning and the life-world. Drawing sources from Husserl and other phenomenologists, as well as experiences from Chinese culture, I argue that a philosophy of crisis should find its point of departure from the crisis of philosophy. 相似文献
17.
NI Liangkang 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2014,9(2):241-253
Husserl the philosopher personally experienced World War I breaking out 100 years ago. Like most German and Austrian commoners, at the initial stage of the war, Husserl was extremely passionate for it. After undergoing the cruelty of war and losing many relatives and friends, he was once enmeshed in extreme confusion and disappointment, albeit he still made every effort to offer spiritual and ethical support to the soldiers at the front. Along with the proceeding of the war, he soon changed his views with respect to this war and confessed that more and deeper reflections were needed to address issues about problems of nationality, super-national ethics and about problems of wars relevant to them. He made philosophical theoretical reflections with regard to this war after it ended, and presented, eventually, requirements for himself: to be satisfied with taking the possibility of the practical activities of philosophy as the topic of philosophical theoretical study and to give up, in drastic fashion, the intention in such philosophical practices as providing political proposals and exerting political influences, "living purely as a scientific philosopher." 相似文献
18.
Christian Etzrodt 《Human Studies》2008,31(2):157-177
George H. Mead and Alfred Schutz proposed foundations for an interpretative sociology from opposite standpoints. Mead accepted
the objective meaning structure a priori. His problem became therefore the explanation of the individuality and creativity
of human actors in his social behavioristic approach. In contrast, Schutz started from the subjective consciousness of an
isolated actor as a result of a phenomenological reduction. He was concerned with the problem of explaining the possibility
of this isolated actor’s perceiving other actors in their existence, their concreteness, and the motives for their behavior.
I treat these two approaches and their associated problems as equally relevant. My evaluation is based on their success in
solving their specific problems. The aim is to decide which of the two approaches provides the more adequate foundation for
an interpretative sociology.
相似文献
Christian EtzrodtEmail: |
19.
Rick Grush 《Synthese》2006,153(3):417-450
A number of recent attempts to bridge Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness and contemporary tools and results from cognitive science or computational neuroscience are described and critiqued. An alternate proposal is outlined that lacks the weaknesses of existing accounts. 相似文献
20.
Marcus Brainard 《Husserl Studies》2007,23(1):17-31
The thesis of this article is that in Husserlian phenomenology there is no opposition between theory and praxis. On the contrary,
he understands the former to serve the latter, so as to usher in a new world. The means for doing is the phenomenological
reduction or epoché. It gives the phenomenologist access to the starting point, the “first things,” and orients his/her striving
towards reason and the renewal of humanity. Careful attention to the significance of the epoché also sheds light on Husserl’s
understanding of the relationship of phenomenology not only to philosophy but also to the other sciences. Though an exposition
of the “phenomenology of the philosophical vocation” which Husserl sketched in the 1920s, e.g., in his Kaizo articles and lectures on first philosophy, the author seeks to shore up his thesis.
For Walter Biemel 相似文献