Within-day time-varying associations between motivation and movement-related behaviors in older adults

ObjectivesEmerging evidence suggests both motivation and movement-related behaviors vary within and across days. Yet common data analytic approaches assume static or consistent relationships between motivation and behavior across time. Just as motivation and behavior change across time, so too might associations between motivation and behavior. This study will apply time-varying effect modeling to Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) data to examine time of day differences in how motivational constructs predict older adults’ subsequent movement-related behavior over the next 2 h.DesignOlder adults (n = 104) completed a 10-day EMA protocol.MethodParticipants answered up to 6 EMA prompts/day to assess momentary intentions and self-efficacy to stand or move as well as intentions and self-efficacy to limit sedentary time over the next 2 h. Participants wore an activPAL accelerometer continuously to measure time spent being upright (i.e., standing or moving) and time spent sitting.ResultsOn weekdays, intentions and self-efficacy were generally predictive of subsequent behavior in the expected direction over the majority of the day whereas these constructs predicted subsequent behavior in the expected directions over a smaller range of times on weekend days.ConclusionsThis study adds to emerging evidence that associations between motivational constructs and subsequent behavior change over the course of the day, but these time-varying associations may be different depending on the day of week. This work has implications for intervention design and the timing of intervention content delivery in approaches like just-in-time adaptive interventions.     

Power and Action in Critical Theory Across Disciplines: Implications for Critical Community Psychology

Although critical scholarship and community psychology share similar aspirations, the links between them remain unexplored and under-theorized. In this article we explore the implications of critical scholarship in various specialties for the field of community psychology. To understand the contributions of critical scholarship to a theory of power and action for social change, we conducted a systematic analysis of a ten-year period of publications in seven journals associated with the critical scholarship tradition. We created precise criteria for the concepts of power and action and applied them to the publications. Results indicate an interesting paradox at play. Whereas community psychology is more action oriented than critical scholarship, its actions fall short of challenging institutionalized power structures and the status quo; and whereas critical scholarship is more challenging of the status quo than community psychology in theory, it has failed to produce viable actions that challenge the status quo. We discuss the implications of this state of affairs for the development of a more critical community psychology.     

The Situational Context <Emphasis Type="Italic">on the Nature of Political Philosophy</Emphasis>

Rationalism in political philosophy is the view that politics should be governed by moral principles and that those principles can and should be justified independently of the situations and circumstances that make up political reality. This traditional view of political philosophy implies that the meaning of right political action is determined by moral principles the rational authority of which derives from abstract philosophical reasoning, not from the situations and circumstances that are the substance of political reality. In this essay I argue that rationalist moralities must presuppose the understanding of particular situations and circumstances for their meaningful and correct interpretation. This means, I argue, that the rightness of political judgement and action is immanent in particular situations, not in abstract moralities. And this, I argue, suggests a shift from the traditional view of political society as the embodiment of abstract principles, towards a view of political society as the embodiment of the activity of situational judgement. A society worth hoping for, then, is one in which we can live in the light of our understanding of the situations and circumstances that are the substance of everyday life, rather than in the shadow of abstract moralities. Such a society would be sensitive to the particularities and complexities of political reality, but at the same time it does not succumb to moral relativism and skepticism.     

Can competitive paradigms increase the validity of experiments on primate social cognition?

Experiments vary in their ability to distinguish between competing hypotheses. In tests on primate cognition the majority of this variation is due to an experimenter's ability to test primates in valid settings while providing the adequate amount of experimental control. While experimenters studying primate cognition can use methods of control perfected in captivity, it is still very unclear how to design and then objectively evaluate the external validity of new experimental paradigms. I recommend that more effort be allocated to specify how to create relevant test settings for primates. Primate social life is highly competitive. This means that all aspects of primates themselves, including their cognitive abilities, have likely been shaped by the need to out-compete conspecifics. Based on this hypothesis, sophisticated cognitive abilities of primates might best be demonstrated in competitive contexts. Thus, it is suggested that one possible measure of validity is whether investigators integrate a competitive component into their experimental designs. To evaluate this methodological prediction I review the literature on chimpanzee perspective-taking as a case study including several recent studies that include a competitive component in their experimental designs. Accepted after revision: 8 April 2001 Electronic Publication     

Child’s Play: Anatomically Correct Dolls and Embodiment

Anatomically detailed dolls have been used to elicit testimony from children in sex abuse cases. However, studies have shown they often provide false accounts in young, preschool-age children. Typically this problem is seen as a cognitive one: with age, children can correctly map their bodies onto a doll due to greater intellectual ability to represent themselves. I argue, along with the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, that although cognitive developments aid in the ability to represent one’s own body, a discussion of embodiment is required in order to understand the use and abuse of anatomical dolls in forensic interviews. This paper examines these issues and maintains that a better understanding of embodied perception in both adults and children helps show how phenomenology can provide a more nuanced understanding to a troubling ethical and legal problem.

Modeling the Ecological Validity of Neurocognitive Assessment in Adults with Acquired Brain Injury

Neuropsychologists are increasingly asked to make judgments regarding treatment options and rehabilitation strategies in addition to evaluating the degree and scope of neuropsychological impairment following acquired brain injuries. The capacity to make informed clinical decisions relies upon research investigating the relationships between neuropsychological and psychosocial status (i.e., ecological validity). Unfortunately, much of this research employs exploratory analyses, an approach that can lead to theoretical ambiguity and ad-hoc interpretations. The current availability and accessibility of analytical tools, like structural equation modeling (SEM), however, permits the testing of specific hypotheses regarding ecological validity and promotes a-priori theory development. In the current study, a theory-driven model of the ecological validity of a neurocognitive assessment was tested against data obtained from individuals with acquired brain injury using SEM. The results provide confirmatory evidence for the ecological validity of neurocognitive constructs and empirical support for a theory-driven analytical approach to ecological validity research.     

Principles for The Law of Peoples

In The Law of Peoples John Rawls gives a list of eight principles for the law of peoples. I argue that the force of the principles depends in large part upon their being lexically ordered, and I attempt such an ordering. However, the lexically ordered list makes it clear that the duty of non-intervention obtains only after the duty to honor human rights is satisfied. Also, I point to certain “practical” difficulties with intervention on behalf of human rights. Rawls writes that additional principles are needed, and I make two suggestions. I conclude that the problems arising from intervention and the need for additional principles show that the “second Original Position” is like the first Original Position: both involve, Rawls notwithstanding, the selection and ordering of principles of justice.     

Intuition and The Junctures of Judgment in Decision Procedures for Clinical Ethics

Moral decision procedures such as principlism or casuistry require intuition at certain junctures, as when a principle seems indeterminate, or principles conflict, or we wonder which paradigm case is most relevantly similar to the instant case. However, intuitions are widely thought to lack epistemic justification, and many ethicists urge that such decision procedures dispense with intuition in favor of forms of reasoning that provide discursive justification. I argue that discursive justification does not eliminate or minimize the need for intuition, or constrain our intuitions. However, this is not a problem, for intuitions can be justified in easy or obvious cases, and decision procedures should be understood as heuristic devices for reaching judgments about harder cases that approximate the justified intuitions we would have about cases under ideal conditions, where hard cases become easy. Similarly, the forms of reasoning which provide discursive justification help decision procedures perform this heuristic function not by avoiding intuition, but by making such heuristics more accurate. Nonetheless, it is possible to demand too much justification; many clinical ethicists lack the time and philosophical training to reach the more elaborate levels of discursive justification. We should keep moral decision procedures simple and user-friendly so that they will provide what justification can be achieved under clinical conditions, rather than trying to maximize our epistemic justification out of an overstated concern about intuition.     

History of Methodology in Psychology: Starting Point,Not the Goal

Current mainstream psychology is characterized by mismatch between questions asked and methods used to answer the questions. There are several important and theoretically justified methodological principles that can be found in pre-WWII (mostly continental Europe) psychology, but disappeared from current mainstream psychology. Future psychology can be built with understanding that not everything that is new is better than the old and not everything that disappeared in the history of psychology disappeared for rational reasons. Methodological thinking of several pre-WWII psychologists may have been far ahead of current mainstream psychology.

Influence of dysphoria on positive and negative cognitive reactivity to daily mood fluctuations

We used an experience sampling design to investigate the influence of dysphoria on positive and negative cognitive reactivity. Participants recorded their thoughts and mood four times per day on PDA devices for one week. We hypothesized that those higher in dysphoria would demonstrate a greater increase in negative thinking in response to negative mood, and a weaker increase in positive cognitions in response to positive mood. These hypotheses were largely supported. For those participants who reported higher initial dysphoria, there was a stronger association between negative mood and thinking and a weaker link between positive mood and thinking. Regression analyses indicated that positive and negative cognitive reactivity were independently related to dysphoria, suggesting that they represent distinct processes. Our results highlight the importance of understanding levels of both negative and positive cognitive reactivity and underscore the benefits of assessing mood and cognition with repeated measurements in "real-time," in order to better understand the antecedent effects of mood on thinking.