Contribution of upper trunk rotation to hand forward-backward movement and propulsion in front crawl strokes

The study aims to test three hypotheses: (a) the rotation of the upper trunk consists of roll, pitch and yaw of frequencies harmonic to the stroke frequency of the front crawl stroke, (b) the rotation of the upper trunk generates back-and-forth movements of the shoulders, which enhances the movements of the stroking arms, and (c) the angular velocities of roll, pitch and yaw are associated with hand propulsion (HP). Front crawl strokes performed by twenty male swimmers were measured with a motion capture system. The roll, pitch and yaw angles about the three orthogonal axes embedded in the upper trunk were determined as three sequential Cardan angles and their angular velocities were determined as the three respective components of the angular velocity. HP and the drag and lift components of HP (HP_D and HP_L) were estimated by the hand positions and the data from twelve pressure sensors attached on hands. The roll, pitch, and yaw angles were altered in frequencies harmonic to the stroke frequency during the front crawl stroke. Shoulders alternately moved back and forth due to the upper trunk rotation. In the pull phase the angular velocity of roll was correlated with HP_L (r = −0.62, p = 0.004). Based on the back-and-forth movements of the shoulders and roll motion relative to a hand movement, the arm-stroke technique of the front crawl swimming was discussed in terms of increasing the hand velocity and HP.     

Consciousness in a multilevel architecture: What causes the lateralization of effective connectivity under resting state?

Here we present our answers to a critical commentary by Elkhonon Goldberg on our recent publication (Velichkovsky et al., 2018). To avoid discussions about novelty effects in the human brain activity and memory processes, we narrowed down this response to a reanalysis of our data along the lines proposed in the commentary, namely to comparing the effective links between symmetrical brain structures during the first and the last parts of a prolonged resting-state fMRI experiment. We also tested for sex differences in our results and checked for a stability of top-down interactions during the course of experiment because learning is often expressed in the weakening of upper level control over low-level mechanisms. Our attempts to test the predictions based on the novelty hypothesis has led to mixed results suggesting that the discovered right-to-left dominance of causal connections at rest may have a deeper origin than supposed in the Goldberg’s commentary.     

Mimic automata: A novel formal model for mimic computing

In this paper, we aim to establish a mathematical model for mimic computing. To this end, we present a novel automaton called a mimic automaton. First, a one-dimensional cellular automaton is used for expressing some dynamic changes in the structure of a computing unit, a sequential automaton is employed to describe some state transitions, a hierarchical automaton is employed to express the different granularities of some computing units, and a probabilistic automaton is used to depict some random changes of a computing unit. Second, a mimic automaton is obtained by combining the various types of automata mentioned above in a certain logical relationship. Compared with the existing models of mimic computing, the new model portrays the operational semantics for a mimic computing system, and it can directly describe the behaviors of a system. Furthermore, the new model possesses a stronger generality.     

Old Foundations for the Logic of Agency and Action

The paper presents an infinite hierarchy of sound and complete axiomatic systems for Two-Dimensional Modal Tense Logic with Historical Necessity, Agents and Acts. A main novelty of these logics is their capacity to represent formally (i) basic action-sentences asserting that such and such an act is performed/omitted by an agent, as well as (ii) causative action-sentences asserting that by performing/omitting a certain act, an agent causes that such and such a state-of-affairs is realized (e.g. comes about/ceases/remains/remains absent). We illustrate how the formal machinery of our systems can be used to reconstruct a number of interesting ideas in the Logic of Agency and Action that have been proposed by authors like von Wright, von Kutschera, Belnap and Segerberg.     

Autism,early narcissistic injury and self‐organization: a role for the image of the mother’s eyes?

Holland elucidated the new paradigm of self-organization in complex adaptive systems. This paradigm holds for all living systems, including the personality. In conjunction with the theory of archetypes, self-organization suggests two radical hypotheses, one about early development, the other about the origins of autism. Autism is associated with several medical conditions, with genetic markers, and with infant visual deprivation. However none of these factors is either necessary or sufficient to cause autism. It is hypothesized that each of these factors increases the likelihood of a primary psychological deficit: failure to acquire, or retain, the image of the mother's eyes. This hypothesis was initially derived from analytic work with patients who have early narcissistic injury and with patients who have mild autistic traits. Both diagnoses may arise from the same initial disturbance: Symington argued that autism is an extreme form of infantile narcissism. Indirect evidence for the image-of-the-eyes hypotheses comes from the evolution of primates, from infant-mother observations, from observations of infant vision, and from experiments on vision in other vertebrates. Byrd recently confirmed that the incidence of autism is increasing dramatically. The image-of-the-eyes hypotheses suggest that this increase may be linked to increased use of non-maternal childcare for young infants.     

The dynamic framework of mind wandering revisited: How mindful meta-awareness affects mental states’ constraints

The dynamic framework of mind wandering (Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng, & Andrews-Hanna, 2016) is reviewed and modified through integrating the construct of mindful meta-awareness. The dynamic framework maintains that mind wandering belongs to a family of spontaneous thought phenomena. The key defining feature of mind wandering is ‘spontaneity’ which characterizes the dynamic nature of thoughts in the framework. The argument is made that incorporating the mindful meta-awareness construct modifies the dynamic framework as follows: (1) the framework’s criteria for mind wandering do not hold anymore as meta-awareness changes the relationship between thoughts and constraints, and (2) lucid dreaming can be categorized as unguided thought while at the same time being dependent on deliberate constraints. Finally, the application of this modified framework will be discussed in terms of the treatment of mental disorders related to spontaneous thought alterations, in particular depression and nightmares.     

The Undecidability of Propositional Adaptive Logic

We investigate and classify the notion of final derivability of two basic inconsistency-adaptive logics. Specifically, the maximal complexity of the set of final consequences of decidable sets of premises formulated in the language of propositional logic is described. Our results show that taking the consequences of a decidable propositional theory is a complicated operation. The set of final consequences according to either the Reliability Calculus or the Minimal Abnormality Calculus of a decidable propositional premise set is in general undecidable, and can be -complete. These classifications are exact. For first order theories even finite sets of premises can generate such consequence sets in either calculus.     

My beliefs about your beliefs: a case study in theory of mind and epistemic logic

We model three examples of beliefs that agents may have about other agents’ beliefs, and provide motivation for this conceptualization from the theory of mind literature. We assume a modal logical framework for modelling degrees of belief by partially ordered preference relations. In this setting, we describe that agents believe that other agents do not distinguish among their beliefs (‘no preferences’), that agents believe that the beliefs of other agents are in part as their own (‘my preferences’), and the special case that agents believe that the beliefs of other agents are exactly as their own (‘preference refinement’). This multi-agent belief interaction is frame characterizable. We provide examples for introspective agents. We investigate which of these forms of belief interaction are preserved under three common forms of belief revision.