Beyond IQ: A latent state-trait analysis of general intelligence, dynamic decision making, and implicit learning

The present study investigated cognitive performance measures beyond IQ. In particular, we investigated the psychometric properties of dynamic decision making variables and implicit learning variables and their relation with general intelligence and professional success. N = 173 employees from different companies and occupational groups completed two standard intelligence tests, two dynamic decision making tasks, and two implicit learning tasks at two measurement occasions each. We used structural equation models to test latent state-trait measurement models and the relation between constructs. The results suggest that dynamic decision making and implicit learning are substantially related with general intelligence. Furthermore, general intelligence is the best predictor for income, social status, and educational attainment. Dynamic decision making can predict supervisor ratings even beyond general intelligence.     

Capturing Context-Related Change in Emotional Dynamics via Fixed Moderated Time Series Analysis

Much of recent affect research relies on intensive longitudinal studies to assess daily emotional experiences. The resulting data are analyzed with dynamic models to capture regulatory processes involved in emotional functioning. Daily contexts, however, are commonly ignored. This may not only result in biased parameter estimates and wrong conclusions, but also ignores the opportunity to investigate contextual effects on emotional dynamics. With fixed moderated time series analysis, we present an approach that resolves this problem by estimating context-dependent change in dynamic parameters in single-subject time series models. The approach examines parameter changes of known shape and thus addresses the problem of observed intra-individual heterogeneity (e.g., changes in emotional dynamics due to observed changes in daily stress). In comparison to existing approaches to unobserved heterogeneity, model estimation is facilitated and different forms of change can readily be accommodated. We demonstrate the approach's viability given relatively short time series by means of a simulation study. In addition, we present an empirical application, targeting the joint dynamics of affect and stress and how these co-vary with daily events. We discuss potentials and limitations of the approach and close with an outlook on the broader implications for understanding emotional adaption and development.     

Rhythmic ostensive gestures: How adults facilitate infants’ entrance into early triadic interactions

For decades, the literature on the emergence of triadic interactions considers the end of the first year of life as the time when children become able to communicate with others intentionally about a referent. Prior to that, children only relate in dyads, either with someone else or with an object. However, several researchers claim that referents are not naturally given in human communication and that they need to be established in interaction with others.In this study, we focus on earlier triadic interactions initiated by adults, when young babies still require an adult to bring the material world within their reach. In these early triadic interactions, ostensive gestures (with the object in the hand) are one of the first means of enabling the establishment of shared reference. Such gestures are easier to understand since sign (gesture) and referent (object) coincide. We conducted a longitudinal study with 6 babies filmed at 2, 3 and 4 months old in interaction with their mothers and a sounding object (a maraca). We analyzed different communicative initiatives by the adult and the child’s responses.The results show that children come to understand the adult’s communicative intention gradually through interaction. Adults include children in organized communicative “niches” based on ostensive actions, both through ostensive gestures and demonstrations of the use of the object. Consequently, the first shared understandings between adult and child take place around the object and its uses. Rhythm is a powerful tool used to structure the interaction. Eventually, adults provide space to children to actively interact with the sounding object themselves. These results highlight the importance of considering ostensive actions as a communicative tool that favors joint attention and action. They also bring some light to the interdependence between a child who actively perceives and acts, and the structured situation that the adult organizes for them.     

A CHALLENGE TO INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE FROM MORAL VIRTUE: THE CASE OF UNIVERSAL LOVE

Abstract: On the Aristotelian picture of virtue, moral virtue has at its core intellectual virtue. An interesting challenge for this orthodoxy is provided by the case of universal love and its associated virtues, such as the dispositions to exhibit grace, or to forgive, where appropriate. It is difficult to find a property in the object of such love, in virtue of which grace, for example, ought to be bestowed. Perhaps, then, love in general, including universal love, is not necessarily exhibited for reasons . This is the view that, with the help of Heidegger's notion of a fundamental emotional attunement ( Grundstimmung ), I defend. The problem is to show how universal love, and its manifestation in the virtues of universal love, can then be seen as rational. Showing this is the task of the essay.     

When affordances climb into your mind: Advantages of motor simulation in a memory task performed by novice and expert rock climbers

Does the sight of multiple climbing holds laid along a path activate a motor simulation of climbing that path? One way of testing whether multiple affordances and their displacement influence the formation of a motor simulation is to study acquired motor skills. We used a behavioral task in which expert and novice rock climbers were shown three routes: an easy route, a route impossible to climb but perceptually salient, and a difficult route. After a distraction task, they were then given a recall test in which they had to write down the sequence of holds composing each route. We found no difference between experts and novices on the easy and impossible routes, whereas on the difficult route, the performance of experts was better than that of novices. This suggests that seeing a climbing wall activates a motor, embodied simulation, which relies not on perceptual salience, but on motor competence. More importantly, our results show that the capability to form this simulation is modulated by individuals’ motor repertoire and expertise, and that this strongly impacts recall.     

Infant's perception of goal-directed actions performed by a mechanical device

The present work investigated whether by the end of the first year, infants interpret actions performed by a mechanical device as goal-directed and why they would do so. Using a modified version of the Woodward (1998) habituation paradigm, 9- and 12-month-old infants were tested in a condition in which they saw a mechanical claw performing an action (Study 1). When infants viewed the claw grasping and transporting objects to the back of a stage, 12-month-old but not 9-month-old infants interpreted the action as goal-directed. In Study 2, 9-month-olds received prior to habituation an information phase showing infants how a human held and operated the claw. This enrichment of infants’ knowledge enabled 9-month-old infants to interpret the action display as goal-directed. The role of the developing means-end understanding and tool-use for infants’ interpretation of actions performed by a mechanical device is discussed.     

Decision support for real-time, dynamic decision-making tasks

By definition, dynamic decision making dictates that multiple and interrelated decisions be made in a continuously changing environment. Such decision making is difficult and often taxes individuals’ cognitive resources. Here I investigated ways in which to support decision making in these environments. I evaluated three forms of decision support: outcome feedback, cognitive feedback, and feedforward that incorporated (to varying degrees) common features of learning theories associated with dynamic tasks. Participants in a laboratory experiment performed a real-time, dynamic decision-making task while receiving one of the different types of decision support. During the first 2 days, individuals received one type of decision support, but on the third day they performed the task without this support. Participants who received feedforward improved their performance considerably and continued to exhibit improved performance even after discontinuation of the decision support on the third day. Neither outcome feedback nor cognitive feedback resulted in improved performance. More research is necessary to conclusively identify the best forms of dynamic decision-making support and their durability when transferred to new tasks.     

Understanding dynamic and static displays: using images to reason dynamically

We examined expert meteorologists as they created a weather forecast while working in a naturalistic environment. We examined the type of external representation they chose to examine (a static image, a sequence of static images, or a dynamic display) and the kind of information they extracted from those representations (static or dynamic). We found that even though weather is an extremely dynamic domain, expert meteorologists examined very few animations, examining primarily static images. However, meteorologists did extract large amounts of dynamic information from these static images, suggesting that they reasoned about the weather by mentally animating the static images rather than letting the software do it for them.     

Cut Elimination for S4C: A Case Study

S4C is a logic of continuous transformations of a topological space. Cut elimination for it requires new kind of rules and new kinds of reductions     

Doing cognitive neuroscience: a third way

The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aiming to characterize in its own terms the states and processes responsible for brain-based cognition. We sketch the basic motivation for the approach, describe a particular version of the approach, so-called ‘Dynamic Causal Modeling’ (DCM), and consider a concrete example of DCM. This third way, we argue, has the potential to avoid the problems that afflict the other two approaches.