Consciousness in a multilevel architecture: What causes the lateralization of effective connectivity under resting state?

Here we present our answers to a critical commentary by Elkhonon Goldberg on our recent publication (Velichkovsky et al., 2018). To avoid discussions about novelty effects in the human brain activity and memory processes, we narrowed down this response to a reanalysis of our data along the lines proposed in the commentary, namely to comparing the effective links between symmetrical brain structures during the first and the last parts of a prolonged resting-state fMRI experiment. We also tested for sex differences in our results and checked for a stability of top-down interactions during the course of experiment because learning is often expressed in the weakening of upper level control over low-level mechanisms. Our attempts to test the predictions based on the novelty hypothesis has led to mixed results suggesting that the discovered right-to-left dominance of causal connections at rest may have a deeper origin than supposed in the Goldberg’s commentary.     

Mimic automata: A novel formal model for mimic computing

In this paper, we aim to establish a mathematical model for mimic computing. To this end, we present a novel automaton called a mimic automaton. First, a one-dimensional cellular automaton is used for expressing some dynamic changes in the structure of a computing unit, a sequential automaton is employed to describe some state transitions, a hierarchical automaton is employed to express the different granularities of some computing units, and a probabilistic automaton is used to depict some random changes of a computing unit. Second, a mimic automaton is obtained by combining the various types of automata mentioned above in a certain logical relationship. Compared with the existing models of mimic computing, the new model portrays the operational semantics for a mimic computing system, and it can directly describe the behaviors of a system. Furthermore, the new model possesses a stronger generality.     

Old Foundations for the Logic of Agency and Action

The paper presents an infinite hierarchy of sound and complete axiomatic systems for Two-Dimensional Modal Tense Logic with Historical Necessity, Agents and Acts. A main novelty of these logics is their capacity to represent formally (i) basic action-sentences asserting that such and such an act is performed/omitted by an agent, as well as (ii) causative action-sentences asserting that by performing/omitting a certain act, an agent causes that such and such a state-of-affairs is realized (e.g. comes about/ceases/remains/remains absent). We illustrate how the formal machinery of our systems can be used to reconstruct a number of interesting ideas in the Logic of Agency and Action that have been proposed by authors like von Wright, von Kutschera, Belnap and Segerberg.     

The dynamic framework of mind wandering revisited: How mindful meta-awareness affects mental states’ constraints

The dynamic framework of mind wandering (Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng, & Andrews-Hanna, 2016) is reviewed and modified through integrating the construct of mindful meta-awareness. The dynamic framework maintains that mind wandering belongs to a family of spontaneous thought phenomena. The key defining feature of mind wandering is ‘spontaneity’ which characterizes the dynamic nature of thoughts in the framework. The argument is made that incorporating the mindful meta-awareness construct modifies the dynamic framework as follows: (1) the framework’s criteria for mind wandering do not hold anymore as meta-awareness changes the relationship between thoughts and constraints, and (2) lucid dreaming can be categorized as unguided thought while at the same time being dependent on deliberate constraints. Finally, the application of this modified framework will be discussed in terms of the treatment of mental disorders related to spontaneous thought alterations, in particular depression and nightmares.     

Dynamic traffic management on a familiar road: Failing to detect changes in variable speed limits

Variable speed limits (VSL) are used more commonly around the globe lately. Although on a macroscopic level positive effects of VSLs have been reported, the caveat is that the impact of VSLs is very sensitive to the level of driver compliance. Thus far it is unknown whether all individual drivers are actually able to notice when a speed limit changes into another speed limit; a prerequisite for purposeful speed limit compliance in the first place. To simulate regular driving conditions, twenty-four participants were familiarised with a particular route by driving the same route in a driving simulator nineteen times on five separate days. Part of the route consisted of a motorway where VSL signs were regularly displayed above every driving lane. At drive nineteen, speed limits changed from 80 km/h to 100 km/h on four out of eight consecutive signs. After passing all signs, one expects 6.25% of the participants still to be unaware that the speed limit had increased (based on chance), while the results showed most participants had failed to notice the speed limit change (58.3%). Instead, they saw what they expected to see: a speed limit of 80 km/h. If the speed change had been vice versa, in other words from 100 km/h to 80 km/h, this would immediately result in speed offences, though not deliberately at all.     

The Undecidability of Propositional Adaptive Logic

We investigate and classify the notion of final derivability of two basic inconsistency-adaptive logics. Specifically, the maximal complexity of the set of final consequences of decidable sets of premises formulated in the language of propositional logic is described. Our results show that taking the consequences of a decidable propositional theory is a complicated operation. The set of final consequences according to either the Reliability Calculus or the Minimal Abnormality Calculus of a decidable propositional premise set is in general undecidable, and can be -complete. These classifications are exact. For first order theories even finite sets of premises can generate such consequence sets in either calculus.     

My beliefs about your beliefs: a case study in theory of mind and epistemic logic

We model three examples of beliefs that agents may have about other agents’ beliefs, and provide motivation for this conceptualization from the theory of mind literature. We assume a modal logical framework for modelling degrees of belief by partially ordered preference relations. In this setting, we describe that agents believe that other agents do not distinguish among their beliefs (‘no preferences’), that agents believe that the beliefs of other agents are in part as their own (‘my preferences’), and the special case that agents believe that the beliefs of other agents are exactly as their own (‘preference refinement’). This multi-agent belief interaction is frame characterizable. We provide examples for introspective agents. We investigate which of these forms of belief interaction are preserved under three common forms of belief revision.     

Dynamic Topological Completeness for

Dynamic topological logic (DTL) combines topological and temporalmodalities to express asymptotic properties of dynamic systemson topological spaces. A dynamic topological model is a tripleX ,f , V , where X is a topological space, f : X X a continuousfunction and V a truth valuation assigning subsets of X to propositionalvariables. Valid formulas are those that are true in every model,independently of X or f. A natural problem that arises is toidentify the logics obtained on familiar spaces, such as . It [9] it was shown that any satisfiable formulacould be satisfied in some for n large enough, but the question of how the logic varieswith n remained open. In this paper we prove that any fragment of DTL that is completefor locally finite Kripke frames is complete for . This includes DTL; it also includes some largerfragments, such as DTL₁, where "henceforth" may not appear inthe scope of a topological operator. We show that satisfiabilityof any formula of our language in a locally finite Kripke frameimplies satisfiability in by constructing continuous, open maps from the plane intoarbitrary locally finite Kripke frames, which give us a typeof bisimulation. We also show that the results cannot be extendedto arbitrary formulas of DTL by exhibiting a formula which isvalid in but not in arbitrarytopological spaces.     

Erikson’s Case of the Theological Student

This article focuses on Erik H. Erikson’s case of a theological student on the borderline of psychosis. The case, presented in a lecture published in Insight and Responsibility (1964, pp. 47–80), was important to Erikson for two important reasons: It enabled him to gain confidence in his capacity to help young adults and convinced him that he was not being disloyal to Freud by focusing on patients’ religious experiences. His presentation of the case focuses on an enigmatic dream image that caused the patient to believe that he was losing his mind but that, when interpreted, led to a breakthrough in his therapy and eventual recovery of his mental health. The springboard for his study of Martin Luther, this case illustrates the three primary religious images that Erikson identifies in Young Man Luther (1958): the maternal matrix, the paternal voice, and the pure self. It also illustrates how the timely appearance of a new person in one’s life may have enormous therapeutic value.