Soames on Russell’s logic: a reply

In “What is History For?,” Scott Soames responds to criticisms of his treatment of Russell’s logic in volume 1 of his Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century. This note rebuts two of Soames’s replies, showing that a first-order presentation of Russell’s logic does not fit the argument of the Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, and that Soames’s contextual definition of classes does not match Russell’s contextual definition of classes. In consequence, Soames’s presentation of Russell’s logic misrepresents what Russell took to be its technical achievement and its philosophical significance.     

Endless forms most beautiful 1

Beautiful form rather than efficient cause is the crucial category for understanding living processes, especially evolution. Drawing on the fields of non-equilibrium thermodynamics and citing Darwin's own observations, the author proposes a new understanding of form that corresponds to the dynamism present in living forms and overcomes the limitations of other metaphysical notions of form. Form as beautiful “dynamic form” promises an enriched empiricism, which not only can speak “correctly” about nature but also “well” of nature. In other words, an enriched empiricism of beautiful dynamic forms allows for a fruitful dialogue between science and theology. It avoids theological explanations that call for special divine intervention in the world of Nature which threaten the dignity and self-integrity of Creation. It opens up a view, however, of a divine “milieu,” a divine “Openness,” that providentially calls for beautiful dynamic forms to emerge and entangle through the evolutionary process of nature.     

Dynamic Bayesian Network Modeling of Game-Based Diagnostic Assessments

Abstract

Digital games offer an appealing environment for assessing student proficiencies, including skills and misconceptions in a diagnostic setting. This paper proposes a dynamic Bayesian network modeling approach for observations of student performance from an educational video game. Drawing from and advancing methods in dynamic Bayesian networks, cognitive diagnostic modeling, and analysis of process data, a Bayesian approach to model construction, calibration, and use in facilitating inferences about students on the fly is described, and implemented in the context of an educational video game.     

Infant Movement Motivation Questionnaire: Development of a measure evaluating infant characteristics relating to motor development in the first year of life

This paper highlights the development and testing of the Infant Movement Motivation Questionnaire (IMMQ), an instrument designed to evaluate qualities of infant characteristics that relate specifically to early motor development. The measurement development process included three phases: item generation, pilot testing and evaluation of acceptability and feasibility for parents and exploratory factor analysis. The resultant 27-item questionnaire is designed for completion by parents and contains four factors including Activity, Exploration, Motivation and Adaptability. Overall, the internal consistency of the IMMQ is 0.89 (Cronbach's alpha), with test–retest reliability measured at 0.92 (ICC, with 95% CI 0.83–0.96). Further work could be done to strengthen the individual factors; however it is adequate for use in its full form. The IMMQ can be used for clinical or research purposes, as well as an educational tool for parents.     

Category theory,logic and formal linguistics: Some connections,old and new

We seize the opportunity of the publication of selected papers from the Logic, categories, semantics workshop to survey some current trends in logic, namely intuitionistic and linear type theories, that interweave categorical, geometrical and computational considerations. We thereafter present how these rich logical frameworks can model the way language conveys meaning.     

Progress with Science and Religion Issues: Critical Questions and Suggestions

Progress with the marriage of science and religion is slowed by “sterile” controversies. Ways toward overcoming them are suggested here. These concern the metaphysical foundations of science and religion (science and spirituality, science and theology) with a specific emphasis on epistemology, ontology, anthropology, aims, methodological procedures, limitations of binary logic, and the use of other types of logic (in particular relational and contextual reasoning). Dialogues between science and religion can have positive practical societal relevance, and therefore need to progress faster. An enlargement of humanity's mental horizons and development—especially of epistemic cognition—seems to be called for in order to secure the future of a global intellectual culture. Suggestions for achieving this are included.     

Freud

The author explores the evidence-base and selection criteria for a short-term supportive dynamic approach for patients whose psychological mindedness and quality of object relationships is low. Illustrating this approach with a case example he outlines the central features of Supportive Dynamic Therapy. He describes a psychodynamic conceptual and developmental framework that can be used to guide the therapist's interventions and responses, and modulate the patient's anxiety. A dynamic focus presented in the form of a central issue is shown to have a significant function both in containing the patient's anxiety, and in giving shape to the therapist's efforts to support the patient's ego-strengths and adaptive abilities. The therapeutic work can be seen to result in an alteration in the trajectory or reiterating pattern of the patient's life.     

Knowledge and man

Collective Intelligence (CI) can be formalized as a specific1 computational process through the use of a molecular model of computations and mathematical logic, in terms of interacting information_molecules, which are chaotically or quasi-chaotically displacing and running natural-based inference processes in their own environment. The formal definition of Collective Intelligence as a property of a social structure of beings of any nature is surprisingly short and abstract (which is astonishing) from definitions of Life. The formal definition of Collective Intelligence proposed by the author in the last few years seems to be valid for the whole spectrum of beings, in human social structures to ants in colonies, and even for bacterial colonies. It has recently been found that the CI definition also has an engineering value. The theory of CI can also be used to better understand Evolution because it allows us to locate and relate Life and Intelligence in Evolution. Moreover, this approach presents Evolution as something more complex than can be concluded from Darwinism. Probably the most surprising fact is that a simple extrapolation of the definition of Collective Intelligence brings us to the conclusion that most probably the first elementary Collective Intelligence emerged on Earth in the "chemical soup of primeval molecules," much before Life emerged. Collective Intelligence can be defined with fewer and weaker conditions than Life requires. Perhaps the emergence of that early elementary Collective Intelligence provided the basic momentum to build Life as we now know it. Thus Evolution caused Intelligence to create Life. Our hypothesis is consistent with biochemistry theories that "primeval biochemical molecules" started to interact, "firing" the Collective Intelligence of their "elementary chemical social structure" for survival. This successful action boosted further growth of complexity in that "elementary social structure," which finally resulted in the emergence of "well-defined Life." Furthermore, it provided a self-propagating cycle of growth of individual and collective Intelligence and individual and collective Life. The Collective Intelligence of ants, wolves, humans, and so forth today is only a higher level of Collective Intelligence development. Thus the present Evolution is a computational process of unidentified complexity where Life, Intelligence, and perhaps other as yet undiscovered components play temporary roles. In this paper we provide formalization and a proposed partial proof for this hypothesis.     

Using Dynamic Field Theory to extend the embodiment stance toward higher cognition

The embodiment stance emphasizes that cognitive processes unfold continuously in time, are constantly linked to the sensory and motor surfaces, and adapt through learning and development. Dynamic Field Theory (DFT) is a neurally based set of concepts that has turned out to be useful for understanding how cognition emerges in an embodied and situated system. We explore how the embodiment stance may be extended beyond those forms of cognition that are closest to sensorimotor processes. The core elements of DFT are dynamic neural fields (DNFs), patterns of activation defined over different kinds of spaces. These may include retinal space and visual feature spaces, spaces spanned by movement parameters such as movement direction and amplitude, or abstract spaces like the ordinal axis along which sequences unfold. Instances of representation that stand for perceptual objects, motor plans, or action intentions are peaks of activation in the DNFs. We show how such peaks may arise from input and are stabilized by intra-field interaction. Given a neural mechanism for instantiation, the neuronal couplings between DNFs implement cognitive operations. We illustrate how these mechanisms can be used to enable architectures of dynamic neural fields to perform cognitive functions such as acquiring and updating scene representations, using grounded spatial language, and generating sequences of actions. Implementing these DFT models in autonomous robots demonstrates how these cognitive functions can be enacted in embodied, situated systems.     

Logical Knowledge

It seems obvious that our beliefs are logically imperfect in two ways: they are neither deductively closed nor logically consistent. But this common-sense truism has been judged erroneous by some philosophers in the light of various arguments. In defence of common sense I consider and rebut interpretative arguments for logical perfection and show that the assumption espoused by common sense is theoretically superior, and capable - unlike its rival - of accounting for the informativeness of mathematics. Finally, I suggest that common sense opens the way to genuine disputes about the correct logic.