Blueprint for a dynamic deontic logic

Extending the idiom of dynamic logic we outline a deontic logic in which deontic operators operate on terms rather than on formulæ. In a second step we distinguish between what we call real and deontic actions.     

A cortical framework for invariant object categorization and recognition

In this paper we present a new model for invariant object categorization and recognition. It is based on explicit multi-scale features: lines, edges and keypoints are extracted from responses of simple, complex and end-stopped cells in cortical area V1, and keypoints are used to construct saliency maps for Focus-of-Attention. The model is a functional but dichotomous one, because keypoints are employed to model the “where” data stream, with dynamic routing of features from V1 to higher areas to obtain translation, rotation and size invariance, whereas lines and edges are employed in the “what” stream for object categorization and recognition. Furthermore, both the “where” and “what” pathways are dynamic in that information at coarse scales is employed first, after which information at progressively finer scales is added in order to refine the processes, i.e., both the dynamic feature routing and the categorization level. The construction of group and object templates, which are thought to be available in the prefrontal cortex with “what” and “where” components in PF46d and PF46v, is also illustrated. The model was tested in the framework of an integrated and biologically plausible architecture.

Learning, risk attitude and hot stoves in restless bandit problems

This research examines decisions from experience in restless bandit problems. Two experiments revealed four main effects. (1) Risk neutrality: the typical participant did not learn to become risk averse, a contradiction of the hot stove effect. (2) Sensitivity to the transition probabilities that govern the Markov process. (3) Positive recency: the probability of a risky choice being repeated was higher after a win than after a loss. (4) Inertia: the probability of a risky choice being repeated following a loss was higher than the probability of a risky choice after a safe choice. These results can be described with a simple contingent sampler model, which assumes that choices are made based on small samples of experiences contingent on the current state.     

Early life origins of psychological development and mental health

According to the Developmental Origins of Health and Disease (DOHaD)‐hypothesis, conditions early in life may have life‐long consequences. In a series of epidemiological birth cohort and clinical studies and natural experiments, we have had the chance to test the extent to which this hypothesis is useful in understanding individual differences in psychological development and mental health. Our findings have provided evidence that individual differences in cognitive, social and emotional development and in mental health may lie in early life circumstances, and add significantly to the literature by pointing out which periods of early growth are the most critical. These findings are also important in translating pre‐clinical evidence to humans. What remains less clear, however, is what the mechanisms of programming are. Thus, further research is needed to elucidate these mechanisms before information on the early life origins of health and disease can be used in designing prevention and intervention programs.     

Inference and update

We look at two fundamental logical processes, often intertwined in planning and problem solving: inference and update. Inference is an internal process with which we uncover what is implicit in the information we already have. Update, on the other hand, is produced by external communication, usually in the form of announcements and in general in the form of observations, giving us information that might not have been available (even implicitly) before. Both processes have received attention from the logic community, usually separately. In this work, we develop a logical language that allows us to describe them together. We present syntax, semantics and a complete axiom system; we discuss similarities and differences with other approaches and mention how the work can be extended.     

Determining the environment: a modal logic for closed interaction

The aim of the work is to provide a language to reason about Closed Interactions, i.e. all those situations in which the outcomes of an interaction can be determined by the agents themselves and in which the environment cannot interfere with they are able to determine. We will see that two different interpretations can be given of this restriction, both stemming from Pauly Representation Theorem. We will identify such restrictions and axiomatize their logic. We will apply the formal tools to reason about games and their regulation.     

Extending probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic

This paper aims to extend in two directions the probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic provided in Kooi’s paper (J Logic Lang Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003) and to relate these extensions to ones made in van Benthem et al. (Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool, 2006). Kooi’s probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic adds to probabilistic epistemic logic sentences that express consequences of public announcements. The paper (van Benthem et al., Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool, 2006) extends (Kooi, J Logic Lang Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003) to using action models, but in both papers, the probabilities are discrete, and are defined on trivial σ-algebras over finite sample spaces. The first extension offered in this paper is to add a previous-time operator to a probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic similar to Kooi’s in (J Logic Lang Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003). The other is to involve non-trivial σ-algebras and continuous probabilities in probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic.     

The Port-Royal Logic's Theory of Argument

This is a critical examination of Antoine Arnauld's Logic or the Art of Thinking (1662), commonly known as the Port-Royal Logic. Rather than reading this work from the viewpoint of post-Fregean formal logic or the viewpoint of seventeenth-century intellectual history, I approach it with the aim of exploring its relationship to that contemporary field which may be labeled informal logic and/or argumentation theory. It turns out that the Port-Royal Logic is a precursor of this current field, or conversely, that this field may be said to be in the same tradition.     

Basic Logic,K4, and Persistence

We characterize the first-order formulas with one free variable that are preserved under bisimulation and persistence or strong persistence over the class of Kripke models with transitive frames and unary persistent predicates. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Judgment in a dynamic task: Microburst forecasting

The major goals of this research are to (a) study professionals engaging in dynamic, representative task conditions, (b) apply lens model theory to these conditions, (c) learn how judgments are changed in response to changing conditions, and (d) utilize a hierarchical judgment model to investigate the judgment process from perception of data to final judgment. The results indicate that (a) agreement regarding inferred cue values is modest, not because of differences in perception of proximal, directly observed cue values but because of differences in inferences drawn from them, (b) agreement in probability judgments is higher when inferred cue values are specified, (c) little change in judgments occurred over time, and (d) confidence increased over time. The results regarding agreement and accuracy over time were ambiguous.