A semantics-based approach to the "no negative evidence" problem

Previous studies have shown that children retreat from argument-structure overgeneralization errors (e.g., * Don't giggle me ) by inferring that frequently encountered verbs are unlikely to be grammatical in unattested constructions, and by making use of syntax-semantics correspondences (e.g., verbs denoting internally caused actions such as giggling cannot normally be used causatively). The present study tested a new account based on a unitary learning mechanism that combines both of these processes. Seventy-two participants (ages 5–6, 9–10, and adults) rated overgeneralization errors with higher (* The funny man's joke giggled Bart ) and lower (* The funny man giggled Bart ) degrees of direct external causation. The errors with more-direct causation were rated as less unacceptable than those with less-direct causation. This finding is consistent with the new account, under which children acquire—in an incremental and probabilistic fashion—the meaning of particular constructions (e.g., transitive causative = direct external causation) and particular verbs, rejecting generalizations where the incompatibility between the two is too great.     

Correct Responses and the Priority of the Normative

The ‘Wrong Kind of Reason’ problem for buck-passing theories (theories which hold that the normative is explanatorily or conceptually prior to the evaluative) is to explain why the existence of pragmatic or strategic reasons for some response to an object does not suffice to ground evaluative claims about that object. The only workable reply seems to be to deny that there are reasons of the ‘wrong kind’ for responses, and to argue that these are really reasons for wanting, trying, or intending to have that response. In support of this, it is pointed out that awareness of pragmatic or strategic considerations, unlike awareness of reasons of the ‘right kind’, are never sufficient by themselves to produce the responses for which they are reasons. I argue that this phenomenon cannot be used as a criterion for distinguishing reasons-for-a-response from reasons-for-wanting-to-have-a-response. I subsequently investigate the possibility of basing this distinction on a claim that the responses in question (e.g. admiration or desire) are themselves inherently normative; I conclude that this approach is also unsuccessful. Hence, the ‘direct response’ phenomenon cannot be used to rule out the possibility of pragmatic or strategic reasons for responses; and the rejection of such reasons therefore cannot be used to circumvent the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem.

What Does the Frame Problem Tell us About Moral Normativity?

Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program. This foundational approach has encountered a long-standing, persistently recalcitrant, problem often called the frame problem; it is sometimes called the relevance problem. In this paper we describe the frame problem and certain of its apparent morals concerning human cognition, and we argue that these morals have significant import regarding both the nature of moral normativity and the human capacity for mastering moral normativity. The morals of the frame problem bode well, we argue, for the claim that moral normativity is not fully systematizable by exceptionless general principles, and for the correlative claim that such systematizability is not required in order for humans to master moral normativity.

The Psychology of Dilemmas and the Philosophy of Morality

We review several instances where cognitive research has identified distinct psychological mechanisms for moral judgment that yield conflicting answers to moral dilemmas. In each of these cases, the conflict between psychological mechanisms is paralleled by prominent philosophical debates between different moral theories. A parsimonious account of this data is that key claims supporting different moral theories ultimately derive from the psychological mechanisms that give rise to moral judgments. If this view is correct, it has some important implications for the practice of philosophy. We suggest several ways that moral philosophy and practical reasoning can proceed in the face of discordant theories grounded in diverse psychological mechanisms.

影响9点问题解决的关键行为

在已有研究的基础上,作者提出划出第三条线是解决9点问题关键行为的假设,并设计了三个实验来验证假设.结果表明:任意两条线的提示训练使9点问题的解决率接近或达到100%,因而,提示两条线不能被看成是解决9点问题的关键行为;而提示划出第三条线的训练使9点问题的解决率明显高于提示其它任何一条线训练的效果,可以被认为是解决9点问题的关键行为;能够引导被试划出第三条线的训练使9点问题的解决率明显提高.     

Execution architectures for program algebra

We investigate the notion of an execution architecture in the setting of the program algebra PGA, and distinguish two sorts of these: analytic architectures, designed for the purpose of explanation and provided with a process-algebraic, compositional semantics, and synthetic architectures, focusing on how a program may be a physical part of an execution architecture. Then we discuss in detail the Turing machine, a well-known example of an analytic architecture. The logical core of the halting problem—the inability to forecast termination behavior of programs—leads us to a few approaches and examples on related issues: forecasters and rational agents. In particular, we consider architectures suitable to run a Newcomb Paradox system and the Prisoner's Dilemma.     

中等生与学困生解决故事问题的认知差异

通过对40名小学生解决故事问题的过程分析,研究表明:(1)中等生与学困生在解题结果和解题过程2个方面都存在显著差异;(2)中等生和学困生的认知差异体现在,前者的特点主要是"比较"、"编码"和"目标定向",而后者的特点是"联结"和"比较"。     

聋生和听力正常学生解决加减文字题的眼动比较研究

采用EyetinkⅡ眼动记录仪,探讨了聋生与解题正确率高的听力正常学生表征和解决加减文字题的差异。被试为小学3年级学生．聋生12名．听力正常学生8名。研究结果表明：（1）在解决加减文字题时,聋生与解题正确率高的听力正常学生在阅读方式、关注关键信息上有显著差异,很多聋生阅读没规律．漏看文字题的关键信息;（2）聋生解决加减文字题的困难与其不能正确表征文字题的文本有关。     

THOG问题促进效应研究

通过选取经典的THOG问题作为实验材料,探讨了大学生解决具体以及抽象选言推理问题的认知机制,结果发现:(1)具体内容的选言推理问题对抽象内容的选言推理问题有明显的促进效应,表现为先解决逃犯问题后解决THOG问题组的正确率显著高于先解决THOG问题后解决逃犯问题组;(2)提供笼统的解题策略对大学生解决THOG问题几乎没有促进作用。     

Worries about Pritchard’s safety

I take issue with two claims that Duncan Pritchard makes in his recent book, Epistemic Luck. The first concerns his safety-based response to the lottery problem; the second his account of the relationship between safety and intellectual virtue.