合作动机与信任:基于不确定性简化机制的研究

信任是对他人合作行为的预期。Luhmann认为信任是简化不确定性的重要机制。合作动机高的个体有着更高的简化不确定性的需求,从而可能产生更高的信任水平。文章研究了不同合作动机下不确定性对信任的不同影响。实验在社会两难范式下采用不确定性(高、低)和合作动机(高、低)为自变量、信任为因变量的混合设计。结果显示:1.合作动机高的个体更倾向于信任对方;2.合作动机较高时,不确定性增高时个体对他人的信任也增高;合作动机较低时,不确定性增高时个体对他人的信任降低。对此的解释是:不确定性的增高造成个体简化不确定性的需求增高;合作动机高的个体会用信任来简化不确定性,而合作动机低的个体会用不信任来简化不确定性;因此在不确定性增高的情况下,前者对他人的信任程度增强,后者对他人的不信任程度增强。     

从归因视角探讨公共物品两难中惩罚系统对合作的影响

社会两难中惩罚系统对合作的影响是当前的一个研究热点。前人研究发现惩罚系统可以促进合作,但也有学者提出惩罚系统对合作动机具有破坏作用,存在不一致结论。且这些研究大多只关注金钱惩罚而忽略了社会惩罚。本文采用2(惩罚类型:金钱,社会)×2(惩罚频率:高,低)×2(阶段:有惩罚,无惩罚)混合设计,利用"惩罚撤除"实验范式,比较了社会高低频惩罚和金钱高低频惩罚对合作、归因以及预期的影响。并探讨了合作、归因、预期之间的相互关系,结果发现:(1)金钱和社会惩罚均可提高被试合作水平;(2)金钱高频惩罚减少了对合作行为的内归因,惩罚撤除后合作行为下降,而低频惩罚没有出现下降效应;(3)社会惩罚增加了对合作的内归因,高低频惩罚在移除之后均保持较高水平,且之前的惩罚频率越高,保持效果越好;(4)合作、预期与内归因正相关,外归因负相关,同时合作与预期正相关。     

Logical dynamics of some speech acts that affect obligations and preferences

In this paper, illocutionary acts of commanding will be differentiated from perlocutionary acts that affect preferences of addressees in a new dynamic logic which combines the preference upgrade introduced in DEUL (dynamic epistemic upgrade logic) by van Benthem and Liu with the deontic update introduced in ECL II (eliminative command logic II) by Yamada. The resulting logic will incorporate J. L. Austin’s distinction between illocutionary acts as acts having mere conventional effects and perlocutionary acts as acts having real effects upon attitudes and actions of agents, and help us understand why saying so can make it so in explicit performative utterances. We will also discuss how acts of commanding give rise to so-called “deontic dilemmas” and how we can accommodate most deontic dilemmas without triggering so-called “deontic explosion”.     

To be or not to be trusted: The influence of media richness on defection and deception

When business transactions take place between strangers, individuals rely on the cues during communication to determine whether they can trust others’ intentions. How that process occurs in the context of computer-mediated, video-mediated, and face-to-face interactions is still somewhat unknown. We examine how media richness influences both affective-based and cognitive-based trust in the context of two studies with two different social dilemma scenarios. Further, we explore how these two types of trust influence not only non-cooperative behavior (defection) but also lying (deception). Results from the first study suggest cognitive-based trust mediates the relationship between media richness and defection, while results from both studies suggest that affective-based trust mediates the relationship between media richness and deception. Video-mediated communication solves some, but not all, of the problems inherent when interacting via communication technology.     

罚款对城市居民个人用水行为的影响

以城市居民用水两难情景为实验任务,探讨了处罚（罚款）对城市居民个人用水行为的影响。结果表明：相对只是对违规的个体进行处罚的方式,个体一群体其他成员处罚的方式更能约束人们的不良行为发生相对于现行水价标准,5．4元的超水高额处罚标准很可能是人们的一个心理接受节点,高于该金额的水费处罚标准人们可能将难以接受。     

囚徒选择和中国人的义

通过对囚徒困境博弈的囚徒策略选择发现,中国被试的囚徒策略选择受到中国传统文化中的义的影响：在一次囚徒博弈中,并不像传统博弈论预测的那样被试选择坦白为最优策略,而是有一半多的被试选择了不坦白策略;在进行囚徒选择时大多数被试都意识到了囚徒之间的熟悉关系。囚徒关系被激活后,选择不坦白策略的被试与选择坦白策略的被试之间有显著差异,但性别差异不显著。结果表明,中国传统文化中的“义”以及相应的人际信任是导致被试选择不坦白策略的主要原因。     

When and how communicated guilt affects contributions in public good dilemmas

Two laboratory studies investigated how groups may deal with the strong emotions that social dilemmas often elicit. A first study showed that a new group member evaluated guilt communicated by a fellow group member as more instrumental than neutral emotion feedback when the amount of required resources to obtain the public good (i.e., provision point) was perceived as difficult to obtain. A second study revealed that participants use communicated guilt to draw inferences about both past and future contributions from all fellow group members. Participants also contributed more themselves and adhered to equality more often when guilt versus no emotion was communicated, but only when the provision point was high. Expected contributions from fellow group members mediated this effect.     

Which type of leader do I support in step‐level public good dilemmas? The roles of level of threshold and trust

The present research examined the moderating effect of the level of threshold on people's preferences for different leader types in step-level public good dilemmas. It was assumed that the primary focus of people in step-level public good dilemmas is to make sure that the group surpasses the threshold. Consequently, when the level of threshold is difficult to reach people are expected to provide more support for and cooperate with a leader that monitors and controls the contributions made toward the public good. However, if the threshold is easy to surpass people will focus more on whether the obtained public good or bonus will be distributed according to agreements, suggesting that people will provide more support to and cooperate with a leader that monitors and controls the distribution of the bonus. These predictions were confirmed across two experiments using a step-level public good paradigm with a dichotomous (Study 1) and a continuous (Study 2) contribution choice. Moreover, the results also revealed that perceptions of trust accounted, in part, for the effect of level of threshold on people's leadership preferences.