Averting the Tragedy of the Commons: Using Social Psychological Science to Protect the Environment

ABSTRACT— Many local and global environmental challenges are tragedies-of-the-commons dilemmas in which private and collective interests are frequently at odds. Recent developments in social psychological theory and research suggest that in such commons dilemmas people are not just motivated by narrow (economic) self-interest but that they also consider the broader implications of their decisions for others and for the natural environment. Based on a core-motives analysis, I identify four necessary components for designing interventions to protect the environment: (a) information, (b) identity, (c) institutions, and (d) incentives, and discuss their utility and the feasibility of incorporating them.     

Can Rawls’ Constructivism Avoid the Euthyphro Dilemma? In Reply to Shafer-Landau

In this essay, I consider two challenges implicit in Russ Shafer-Landau’s criticism of constructivists: the realism challenge and the relativism challenge, respectively. I do not try to offer a decisive set of objections to the challenges; instead I argue that some objective versions of constructivism, especially Rawls’s constructivism, are not susceptible to the criticisms.     

社会距离与合作指数对不同年龄青少年合作行为影响的差异

本研究采用重复囚徒困境实验范式,考察了社会距离和合作指数对不同年龄青少年（初中生、高中生和大学生,且每个年龄段的被试数为40名）在博弈决策中的合作行为的影响。结果发现：（1）随着年龄的增加,青少年合作行为的总体趋势表现为下降;（2）社会距离对大学生的合作行为的正向作用显著,而中学生的合作行为却不受其影响;（3）个体合作率会受到合作指数的促进作用,但这种促进作用在大学生中表现的更为显著。即随年龄增长,个体会更少的采取合作行为,并且个体是否采取合作在更大程度上基于当前博弈中的收支情况和与博弈对象之间的社会距离。     

Are Thoughtful People More Utilitarian? CRT as a Unique Predictor of Moral Minimalism in the Dilemmatic Context

Recent theorizing about the cognitive underpinnings of dilemmatic moral judgment has equated slow, deliberative thinking with the utilitarian disposition and fast, automatic thinking with the deontological disposition. However, evidence for the reflective utilitarian hypothesis—the hypothesized link between utilitarian judgment and individual differences in the capacity for rational reflection (gauged here by the Cognitive Reflection Test [CRT; Frederick, 2005]) has been inconsistent and difficult to interpret in light of several design flaws. In two studies aimed at addressing some of the flaws, we found robust evidence for a reflective minimalist hypothesis—high CRT performers’ tendency to regard utility‐optimizing acts as largely a matter of personal prerogative, permissible both to perform and to leave undone. This relationship between CRT and the “minimalist” orientation remained intact after controlling for age, sex, trait affect, social desirability, and educational attainment. No significant association was found between CRT and the strict utilitarian response pattern or CRT and the strict deontological response pattern, nor did we find any significant association between CRT and willingness to act in the utility‐optimizing manner. However, we found an inverse association between empathic concern and a willingness to act in the utility‐optimizing manner, but there was no comparable association between empathic concern and the deontological judgment pattern. Theoretical, methodological, and normative implications of the findings are discussed.     

Eye Movements in Strategic Choice

In risky and other multiattribute choices, the process of choosing is well described by random walk or drift diffusion models in which evidence is accumulated over time to threshold. In strategic choices, level‐k and cognitive hierarchy models have been offered as accounts of the choice process, in which people simulate the choice processes of their opponents or partners. We recorded the eye movements in 2 × 2 symmetric games including dominance‐solvable games like prisoner's dilemma and asymmetric coordination games like stag hunt and hawk–dove. The evidence was most consistent with the accumulation of payoff differences over time: we found longer duration choices with more fixations when payoffs differences were more finely balanced, an emerging bias to gaze more at the payoffs for the action ultimately chosen, and that a simple count of transitions between payoffs—whether or not the comparison is strategically informative—was strongly associated with the final choice. The accumulator models do account for these strategic choice process measures, but the level‐k and cognitive hierarchy models do not. © 2015 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

财富越多，责任越大：资金数量和来源对公共物品困境中第三方惩罚的影响

本研究探讨了公共物品困境中,初始资金的数量和来源如何影响第三方对成员贡献值的评价及惩罚。行为结果发现了“贵族责任效应”,即在同等贡献值条件下,相比于获得较少初始资金的成员,第三方会更重地惩罚获得较多初始资金的成员。当初始资金是随机分配而非通过个人努力获得时,该效应更强。在神经层面上,发现初始资金的数量和来源调节了第三方评估贡献值时所诱发的FRN和P3成分。其中FRN波幅与惩罚力度显著相关。本研究揭示了初始资金数量和来源如何调节第三方对成员贡献的评估及相关惩罚决策。     

When clients want to pay more for psychotherapy: ethical issues and implications

One ethical issue that commonly comes up in clinical practice is the negotiation of fees with clients. Although the APA Ethics Code provides standards regarding clients who are unable to or do not pay (Standard 6.04), little guidance is given pertaining to fee limits for clients who want to pay more. This issue is explored using a real case example, including the relevant ethical codes to be considered. The necessary “gray” areas of ethical decision-making are demonstrated through my own decision process. Implications for future scenarios are discussed.     

Knowledge Justice: An Opportunity for Counter-expertise in Security vs. Science Debates

ABSTRACT

Knowledge justice provides a conceptual framework to apply principles of social justice in environments of competing interests regarding science. Both knowledge and its making can be seen as a good to be distributed, including all voices for whom the science will matter. In this framework, knowledge production is shared among a broader constituency of knowers representing both local and cosmopolitan voices. The problem of knowledge injustice can be seen in the U.S. government’s recent attempt to secure scientific knowledge about H5N1 or avian bird flu virus. The censorship produced a global debate between scientists and policy-makers over how to balance the nation-state’s desire for security with the life science’s tradition of open and shared research. This conundrum, known as the dual-use dilemma, obscures larger questions that lie outside of expert-centered domains—namely the concerns of many communities in the Global South struggling with the impact of the virus in their daily lives. An example of such counter-expertise is that of the backyard poultry farmer whose ways of knowing are foreign to science and policy experts who frame the ways in which knowledge about H5N1 should be developed, controlled, and used. While the H5N1 debate illuminated competing positions regarding knowledge production between powerful elites, it ignored the social justice inequities produced by the dual-use dilemma. The concept of knowledge justice provides a way of thinking about science that can include locally situated counter-expertise, disrupting the dual-use dilemma produced by competing dominant priorities of security and public health.